


# Marine Corps Gazette



OCTOBER 1960  
FIFTY CENTS

# PARRIS ISLAND

## Marine Corps Recruit Depot

*Marines first started serving on Parris Island in 1891, a 13-man guard detachment. Recruits began training here in 1911, 350 years after Huguenot Jean Ribault sailed into the harbor he named Port Royal. Some familiar scenes:*



**MajGen T. G. Ennis**  
CG




**"Iron Mike" honors WWI dead**



*Usually a recruit's first view of Parris Island is the main gate*

Cover painting by  
GySgt R. F. Fleischauer




**Modern golf course club house includes snack bar**



**Depot headquarters is the control center of PI**



**Horse Island picnic area—Spanish moss and oak**



**Marines attend services in this modern chapel**



# Marine Corps 1960

The Marine Corps Association Newsletter

An unofficial digest  
of news of interest  
to our members

## IG Report: a New Index to Combat Readiness

IG Division plans to expand readiness inspections, carry them through-out air-ground FMF units, if funds are available. Two have been held (3dMarDiv, 1stMarBrig) and evaluated. It's what CMC wants. "... a better way to have an index of the readiness of our Fleet Marine Force units."

Boiled down, CMC wants the IG to tell him if FMF units have the Marines, gear, knowhow to do their job. To find out, a third phase has been added to previous IG inspections: Readiness to deploy.

Some sample Readiness tests:

- Mount out by air of a BLT
- Battalion defense of a given area
- Mount out by surface craft of an RLT
- Setting up a 60-bed hospital

How about clothing and equipment? IG readiness inspectors won't look at uniforms except to note if the Marine is wearing one. That he's got a pack on his back, a weapon in his hand. And can move out.

Units not chosen for readiness-type inspection could plan on IG looking sharp at clothing and equipment, physical fitness, administrative matters. Outfits wouldn't know which type of inspection is theirs—readiness or military—until IG arrives.

In its prototype readiness inspection an IG team stepped off a plane on Okinawa at 0545, handed the OD a sealed envelope, sat back and observed how long it took the outfit to get Marines and gear to the airstrip.

IG inspection schedule calls for a visit to Camp Lejeune in November. Inspections of Force Troops, Atlantic, 1stMarDiv, Force Troops, Pacific follow. Next fiscal year: AirFMF units.

### Lighten the Load

Inspecting officers will be checking belt length as well as shine on the buckle. MCO 6100.3B, just out, sounds a warning to start watching calories, get in shape.

"An unfit and obese officer or enlisted Marine reflects adversely on the Marine Corps as a whole, and upon himself, and upon his unit in particular," the order states. The remedy? Diet and exercise. "The habits of self-discipline required for application of the remedy are inherent in the Marine Corps way of life and should be part of the character of every Marine."

The order leaves physical fitness and weight control programs up to commanding officers, but gives them some strong guidance. Overweight Marines who don't shape up after "a reasonable period" of diet and exercise may have physical profile reevaluated, be transferred to a Naval Hospital for treatment and disposition, or be evaluated by a medical board.

As previously reported here, physical conditioning programs will continue to be based on TM 21-200. The physical readiness test is simple and relates to "common tasks performed by Marines in combat." It will be used by the IG; COs will test all Marines under 40 at least once a year. Here's the way it works:

- Uniform: Utilities, boots, helmet, LMP, weapon & belt.
- Event 1: Climbing uphill—take 60 up-and-down steps to and from an 18-inch high platform in three minutes.
- Event 2: Rope Climb—Climb a knotted, 20-foot rope and descend

(See Lighten the Load, next page)

### Forces Afloat

More attack power added to Forces-in-Readiness afloat: VMA-224 (CO: Maj D. L. Fenton) has deployed to Med aboard *USS Independence* for a six-month tour.

Two attack squadrons, VMAs 121 (CO: Maj W. L. Traynor) and 332, have boarded 7th Fleet's *USS Ticonderoga*. It will be a short sea-going tour for LtCol John Maas' 332, slated to be relieved this month via normal squadron rotation by LtCol Donald Gehri's VMA-324. VMA-332 joins 2dMAW at Cherry Point, N. C.

More changes this month:

Two new attack squadrons, one per coast. Forming about 1Oct60 at 2dMAW: VMA-242; at 3dMAW, El Toro: VMA 343. Squadron commanders had not been announced at press time. VMA-343 will fly the new A4D2N, an improved Douglas attack bomber with built-in terrain clearance radar for all-weather, night capability.

Squadron rotations slated for November:

VMF(AW)-314 to Atsugi, Japan, relieving VMF(AW)-542, returning to El Toro.

Cadre relief of VMCT-1 at Iwakuni, Japan by Marines of El Toro's VMCT-3. Squadron designations do not change.

### More Amphibious Lift

In spite of Navy personnel shortages, three APA scheduled for mothballs this fiscal year will be kept in service. They'll help back up the increased combat strength of the FMF.

One more APA is also saved from mothballs, but this is no gain. It takes the place of the *USS Lake Champlain*, which HQMC wanted as an LPH. She won't be converted this fiscal year, might be around December 1961. If this happens, the carrier would join *Iwo Jima* (LPH-2) and *Raleigh* (LPD-1), both due for completion about the same date. LPD-2, also building, is to be along six to eight months later.

### More With Less

CNO has directed fleet commanders to schedule cold weather amphibious exercises in alternate years, not every year. This may mean more training. Reason: Past exercises have been BLT-strength. Provided shipping and troops are available, CNO now authorizes RLT-scale training every two years.

## Lighten the Load, Contd

without sliding or dropping in 30 seconds.

- Event 3: Evacuate casualty—With equipment advance 50 yards under "fire" and carry out a Marine of your own weight in 42 seconds.
- Event 4: Advance by Fire and Maneuver—Creep or crawl 25 yards, run zig-zag 100 yards, hit deck and fire three times, clear an 8-foot trench and dash 25 yards—all in 31½ minutes.

The GAZETTE recommends to any Marines worried by this order that they turn at once to page 17 for some practical tips on getting in shape quickly. Also recommended, the one-hand pushaway (executed from a sitting position at the dinner table.)

**In a nutshell:** "It is essential to the combat readiness of the Marine Corps that every Marine, regardless of duty assignment, be physically fit."—MCO 6100.3B.

## Solid Comfort

BuWeps has approved mock-up design of Chance-Vought's integrated flight capsule cockpit that's geared to ease the strain of May Day situations.

In an emergency the F8U pilot separates the detachable "nose cone" from the rest of the plane, wafts gently to earth via parachute attached to the capsule. On ground, snow or water he's got it made. Inside are survival



rations, tools, medical supplies, clothing for the kind of climate he's in. He stays inside the capsule, sends rescue messages. It floats.

A belt of shaped charges severs cockpit section from fuselage. In one test a blast successfully cut loose the capsule from an F8U submerged under 10 feet of water.

Actually, the flight capsule concept means pilots can fly in their shirt-sleeves, unencumbered by G-suits, hard hats, and oxygen masks. It provides safe means of emergency exit at supersonic speeds. Pilot rides in nearly horizontal position, which increases his resistance to gravity without a G-suit.

Follow up phases on the project call for mounting test capsule on rocket sleds, making separations at both high and low speeds. Tests are designed to see if such a system can work at takeoff speeds as well as supersonic flight.

## More Fight, Less TAD

You won't be going to TAD this year unless there's a real need. School quotas will be smaller. Here's the story:

Already austere, Marine Corps travel funds have been slashed twice. First chop was by Congress; the second, the deliberate decision to spend a good share in upping the FMF manning level.

First casualty was the Squad Competition-in-Arms. It's to be held by regions only. The Technique of Instruction Competition may get the same treatment. Word was passed at the SNCO Symposium that funds for that meeting may be lacking next year.

Varying cuts have been made to preserve essential programs, while saving 15%. HQMC training has taken a larger-than-average slash (22%). This money mainly provides TAD funds for schools. G-3 is taking a hard look at school quotas, will cut with the aim of insuring training to the most critical MOS fields.

The squeeze will hurt, but it could be worse. At one stage in the budget battle planners feared loss of travel funds would prevent reactivating BLTs. That danger's over, but the cost will be a belt-tightening all around.

## SNCO Symposium

Fifth Annual SNCO Symposium, may be the last because of tight TAD money, may also prove to be the one longest remembered by the most Marines.

Included among 41 recommendations now being studied by appropriate staff sections at HQMC: Deep six eight-man squad drill; "that LPM be the only reference for Marine Corps drill."

Generally, recommendations covered 19 categories. Some affect all the services, would need action by Congress to come about.

A few major recommendations:

- Place ribbons and bars in supply system.
- Give certificates of appreciation to Marines transferring FMCR.
- Discontinue local interview boards for Marines eligible for promotion to 1stSgt/MSgt.
- More bachelor SNCO quarters.
- Abolish wearing of collar ornaments on shirts.

Thirty-three SNCOs and their wives attended the conference, held this year at CampPen. Apparently the ladies' influence was felt, too. Another recommendation: Authorize Bermuda shorts, not brief ones, for WMs engaged in recreation.

## Nutshell News

The Quantico *Sentry* won the 1960 (8th) Annual Marine Corps Journalism award.

BGen Walter A. Churchill, USMCR, of Toledo, O., is the new National Commandant, Marine Corps League.

Marine Corps strength rose 2,200 during July, DOD reports. It was 170,621 30 June; climbed to 172,821.

For quotas in the Sixth Annual Technique of Instruction Competition, see MC Bul 3590.

Ground Reserve officers have until 10 Jan 1961 to apply for regular commissions. Eligible: Cpts of 1955, Lts of 1958 & 1959. A new program will be announced in January for naval aviator lieutenants of 1958 & 1959 and ground or NA Cpts of 1956. Inactive duty reservists are eligible. See MCO 1120.14.

The Army will procure and manage automotive supplies for all services. A Military Automotive Supply Agency has been set up in Detroit.

First shipment of Mechanical Mules to 3dMarDiv is underway; 198 are promised by Christmas. 1stMarBrig gets 99.





**1stMarDiv Marines assaulting CampPen's White Beach**

## Marines at Work

The Navy bore a hand in September to help Marines get that "more and better intelligence" which is the frequent post-exercise cry. PacFlt turned over *USS Redfish* (SS-395) and *USS Cook* (APD-130) for a whole month (29 Aug-25 Sep) as 1st Force Recon Co roamed the Pacific Coast from Washington to California. Although generally aiming to avoid detection, the company was scheduled to make one public appearance, and official visit to Coos Bay, Ore. Code name: Wagon Train.

*USS Princeton* and HMR-361 joined forces with 1stMarDiv Marines for three weeks. Taking part in two consecutive Helilexes were BLTs 3 (3) /5 and 1 (1) /7.

VMF-122, home-based at MCAS, Beaufort, S. C., is exercising its ordnance, including Sidewinder, in air gunnery, missile practice at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. Exercise is slated to end 1Nov60. Squadron pilots made the trip in F8Us, adding a few hours to their already hefty flight log. VMF-122 was the first Marine fighter squadron to log 10,000 hours in the Crusader. Ground crews and gear went via R4Q.

Six hundred US civic and business leaders watched 3/5, supporting units from 1stMarDiv, 3dMAW, flex their muscles 27 September on CampPen's White Beach. Division and wing Marines made their usual amphibious assault landing via LVT and helicopter. The visitors, guests of CMC for this 31st Joint Civilian Orientation Conference, later watched a FIREX, plus a tank/infantry attack, close-air supported, on Combat Town.

## A Short, Short Report

In recent issues the GAZETTE has featured several Special Reports. Some have been submitted by readers, others dug out in reply to individual questions which seemed of broad interest.

Here's the question-of-the-month: How and why did I get my date of rank? (By a 2dLt.)

The answer's in PersDep Study 2-54, revised in 1959. It's a good half inch thick, lists 33 categories of officers (15 regular, 18 Reserve). It's based primarily on specific laws. Obviously, a complete explanation is impossible. Here's a very fast look at the overall picture:

- Regular officers who are "June graduates" (mid-May to mid-July) also get the Naval Academy date of rank.
- Reserve officers who aren't June graduates get their date of rank from the day their Basic School class convenes. Currently, this is later than the Academy graduates.
- MarCads' date of rank is the date they complete basic training.
- WO's date of appointment is the day SecNav signs their warrant. Currently, he signs on the day of graduation from WO screening course.
- Regulars appointed from PLC program, reserve status, or enlisted ranks generally come under the same law and get date of rank assigned as with reserves.

## Shooting Fronts

Two Marine shooters went a'hunting at 17th Olympic Games in Rome. Their bag: two medals.

• Capt W. W. McMillan earned US its 33rd Gold Medal by knocking off Russian and Finnish competition in rapid fire pistol competition. He did it the hard way—a shootoff—missed the target only three times for a 147/150 score. His perfect score 50/50 in the second round was the decisive factor. The special shootoff came after a three-place tie, 587/600, in the regular match.

• GySgt J. E. Hill won a second-place Silver Medal in small-bore rifle prone position firing. He lost by a single point to 18-year-old Peter Kohnke of Germany. Hill had three perfect rounds, faltered once with a 94/100 round that cost him the match. High winds threw him off, he said.

Top honors for Reserve annual summer training at Camp Lejeune went to:

• Capt J. D. Eddleman, Oak Ridge, Tenn., who fired 242/250 with M-1 rifle. The win extended his streak to three consecutive summers. In '58, he won at Little Creek, Va., topped all Reserve shooters at Camp Lejeune last year.

• Sixth Engineers, Knoxville, Tenn., won high unit average of summer Reserve shooters by qualifying 98.8 per cent. Their company commander: Capt Eddleman.

## Tapered Lines: A Better Fit?

Thirty-two years ago this month USMC brought forth a new uniform, shifted from standing collars to roll-type. Khaki shirts were introduced. A few Marines will recall an accessory: Sam Browne belts for officers; enlisted wore fair leather belts. Spitshined. Cloth replaced leather in '42. Ten years later the basic design of the coat was changed from four-piece back to two-piece back. Why? Better fit, less costly alterations.

The last pattern change, separate skirts, came in '54, prevented spreading, front and back. Problem: the belt. Usually it rode above or below the waistline seam, rarely matched coat in color.

If lightweight, all-weather greens are adopted the belt may go. Uniform Board asked Hart, Schaffner and Marx to design a belted coat. It's being wear-tested now, offers these features:

- Tapered lines for better fit, comfort to wearer
  - Reduced cost of alterations
  - Adapts to quantity production
- Test uniform has a slot for sword.



# SATS: Ready To Go

Marine aviation now has true mobility, ready today. That's the word from DivAv planners. Essential parts of SATS (see cut) are now available to each fighter or attack Marine Air Group.

Last key item, scheduled for delivery in September, was the portable mirror system. Already on hand: portable GCA, TACAN, the portable control tower, the Tactical Airfield Dispensing System (TAFDS) for bulk fuel, and the M-2 MOREST arresting gear. There's a stockpile of matting, with more coming monthly.

How about the catapult? Nice to have, not essential, say planners. 1stMAW test of SELF proved JATO-assist and a longer runway can do the job. Only the A4D needs JATO. Here's a rundown of latest developments:


- **Matting.** There's a center panel from which matting is laid out both ways. This allows bi-directional landing or takeoff.

- **Arresting Gear.** MOREST works, it weighs 35 tons. Before the end of this year 2dMAW is scheduled to test in a field exercise both the M4 water squeeze arrestor and the M19 Bliss device. The M4 weighs 30 tons; the M-9, 5½. FMFPAC has also gotten an M4 for test. The M19 is also designed to work in reverse as a catapult. Final development may be a year or more off, but development is expected to continue.

- **JATO.** A4Ds are being modified to use JATO bottles. A training allowance has been set for each wing.

- **Maintenance Shelters.** These are canvas hung from a "geodesic" skeleton. They're not ideal, but do work for field use.

- **Flotation gear.** Jet engines are sensitive to damage from flying stones, dirt, etc. This hazard exists until matting can be laid on maintenance areas and taxiways. Heavy jets with small wheel surfaces can even break through



Parts in the SATS package (not to scale)

light matting. A flotation rig is being designed to allow towing aircraft from the end of the runway to the maintenance area over unmatted taxiways. The SATS will be operational sooner, matting or asphalt can be laid later. The rig would also be useful to retrieve planes that overshoot the runway.

- **Summary.** There'll be improvements, but the big news is that SATS is now here—in the FMF. Marine aviation can now support the beachhead—from the beachhead. The air-ground team has made another giant stride.

## Missile Launchings

MCB, 29 Palms, now the third "Ground to Air Missile Range" in the US, fired its Terrier missile 12 Sept 60. Pulling the string: "B" Battery, 1st MAAM. Battalion commander is LtCol B. S. Ryder.

Meanwhile, back in Texas, other missile Marines were slated to unholster their weapon on the same day. Marines of Hawk Training Package One, 1stLAAM (Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion), wrapped up their training at Ft Bliss with a practice shoot of Hawk. Battalion commander is LtCol A. G. Daddazio.

## All-Time Low

1stMAW set an all-time low record for aircraft accidents during FY '60. Over the same period 1stMAW aircraft, fixed and rotary, logged 86,000 flight hours. Accident rate of 2.19 per 10,000 hours of flight time was a 36 per cent drop over last year's rate. These five squadrons went accident free: VMA-121, VMR-253, MARS-17, H&MS-11 and 12. VMR-253 stretched its no accident record to 25 consecutive months.

Iwakuni-based squadrons are getting an assist to help them to even better safety records this fiscal year: A new runway. Next month Japanese contractors begin pouring concrete on top of the old flexible strip, chewed up by jet blasts and heavy wheel loads. Light colored concrete has natural grainy surface, offers better night visibility, skid resistance.

## Aviation Safety

Naval Aviation cut the overall rate 25%, the pilot factor 5% (to 52%), reduced landing phase accidents, and for the first time in history dropped the yearly rate to under two accidents per 10,000 hours (it was 1.94). Also fewer aircraft were destroyed and there was a lower percentage of fatalities. Hotter birds, however, kept the fatalities per 10,000 hours even and caused more than 50% total strikes. These involved 357 aircraft at a cost of \$266 million.

Noteworthy in the FY-60 program: 117 ejections. There were more ejection casualties, but these included very low level ejections with new gear. Last year, pilots would have ridden in, had near-zero survival chance, the Navy said.

Marine winners:

|            |              |
|------------|--------------|
| VMA-121    | Iwakuni      |
| VMR-352    | El Toro      |
| HMR(L)-361 | El Toro      |
| H&MS-13    | Kaneohe      |
| VMF-333    | Beaufort     |
| VMCJ-2     | Cherry Point |
| VMA-233    | Norfolk      |
| VMA-213    | Minneapolis  |
| HMR-267    | New Orleans  |

Also given special awards: USS *Princeton*, USS *Thetis Bay*.

## Early Outs

Reserve officers, regular and reserve enlisted due for separation between 16Dec60 and 5Jan61, will be released between 8-16 Dec. Not eligible: Six-month reserves.

## Machines & Marines

Data processing is taking to the boondocks. The machines may increase firepower on some future beachhead. This summer the Marine Corps, after 10 years of development, activated four Data Processing Platoons (Mobile), FMF. Two more (for the 2d and 3d MAWs) are being studied.

Why mobile installations? More and more ways show up to mechanize complicated procedures. A partial list:

- Personnel accounting and reporting. This was the original reason for setting up the fixed installations. It's made big strides, the latest is HQMC's giant central "brain." Mobile machines will help in combat.

- Mechanized supply procedures. The machines have proven essential at the major Marine Corps supply activities. They also are a great help to Force Service Regiments and Division Service Battalions. The 3d MAW's MWSG, using a fixed installation, has pioneered mechanizing supply for about 50,000 Navy-supplied items, as well as about 8,000 Marine Corps items the wing uses.

- Fiscal and cost accounting. This has become a standard use.

- UP&T tables. MCS and FMFPac are pushing mechanization of embarkation data. It shows promise. Other logistic uses are being studied.

- Aviation safety. 3d MAW uses machine accounting to insure that all modifications to aircraft are made on schedule. This has helped avoid accidents.

How mobile are these platoons? The TO is two officers, 27 enlisted. The platoon works from four standard 21½-T shop vans. Two hold the six key machines (IBM), the others provide storage for forms. They're heated, air-conditioned. This feature is more for the comfort of the machines than the Marines, it eases maintenance.

### Locations of Platoons:

1st DP Plt—1stMarDiv, CamPen

2d DP Plt—2d FSR, CamLej

3d DP Plt—3d FSR, Okinawa

4th DP Plt—1st MAW, Iwakuni

Electronic data processing is not likely to go much below Division-Wing level. The platoons are tailored to serve the needs of a Division-Wing MEF. At lower echelons, reliance will be on the "Charge-a-Plate" type embossing machines (GAZETTE: Jan '60). These are being used in current troop tests.

## Kicking It

CMC presented speedster LtCol T. H. Miller with a Letter of Commendation, told the country's fastest closed-course jet pilot: "Flying today is more than pulling it back and kicking it . . . we're proud of your contribution to the science of flight."

Some of LtCol Miller's Labor Day contributions:

- External fuel tanks can be successfully dropped at supersonic speeds. (He unloaded two tanks eight miles over Chocolate Mountain at subsonic speed, dropped a third 30 miles short of the finish line travelling Mach 1.56—a first.)

- Fuel vs speed and rate of climb. (He started with over 20,000 lbs of fuel, burned it up at better than 600 lbs per minute, had 700 pounds left at end of 333-mile run.)

- High speed maneuver capability of the F4H-1. (At Lone Pine turn, Mach 2 speed, he cut sharply, passed within 700 feet of the pylon.)

- Aerodynamic heating. (At one time, he estimated cockpit temperature at 130-135 degrees. Conclusion: one or two degrees variation in ambient temperature at cruising altitude will determine intercept capability.)

LtCol Miller's 500 kilometer, closed-course record: 1216.7 mph, exceeding the old record by 400 mph, set last year by Air Force RF101. Highest air speed indicator reading: Mach 2.14, coming through the finish line gate.

## Revised SNCO Quotas

Number of promotions to the top two enlisted pay grades this fiscal year will be somewhat lower than originally announced. Selection Board now in session was given these quotas: SgtMaj 37; 1stSgt 251; MGySgt 178; MSgt 707. More MGySgts will be made, fewer SgtsMaj. Reason: a change in requirements.

To find out how many rank billets need filling, G-1 planners use a machine count of existing billets, add a transient factor. Example: the count this year was less than last year, showed fewer ground billets for SgtMaj. Why? These reasons were given:

- A billet change at small Marine Barracks (less than 150 Marines) from SgtMaj to 1stSgt.

- Elimination of some Marine Barracks.

- Other T/O changes (unannounced) to be effected this fiscal year in operating force troop list.

As of 30Jun60, there were requirements, including transient factor, for 322 SgtsMaj to fill ground billets; 64 SgtsMaj to fill air billets. On board: 407. This, planners say, is a healthy balance between on board strength/T/O billets and normal, expected attrition.

A contributing factor to determining projected requirements: the three-year service contract necessary for promotion to top two pay grades.

### Selection Board

The SgtMaj/1stSgt, MGySgt/MSgt selection board which convened 19Sep60 had these members:

Col R. M. Wood (Senior Member)  
Col W. T. Bray  
Col V. J. Gottschalk  
LtCol J. M. Kusiak  
LtCol F. F. Rotter  
LtCol R. J. Coates  
LtCol R. E. Baldwin  
LtCol W. L. MacQuarrie  
LtCol J. H. Tomlinson  
Maj R. E. Moody  
Maj U. Stoyanow  
Maj S. R. Lauer  
Maj E. A. Koster  
Maj W. L. Nolte  
Capt Grace Overholser

This board is expected to be in session about 12 weeks, will select 1,173 Marines for promotion. It is the only SgtMaj/1stSgt, MGySgt/MSgt selection board scheduled this fiscal year.



## **Staff NCO Promotion: There IS a System**

**By LtCol A. R. Cason**

*This was written before the new CMC change in SNCO promotion policy covered in the September GAZETTE (Marine Corps '60, p. MCA-1). Hence it doesn't mention the increased weight now given to time in grade. Otherwise, here's an up-to-date report on the SNCO selection system.*

✿ EACH TIME A SNCO SELECTION Board meets at Headquarters, scattered anxiety, some tension, and considerable speculation spread through the Marine Corps. When the selection list is published, the critiques begin. The decisions of the Board are reviewed and the mysteries of the system are analyzed in offices, barracks and clubs.

Some of the analyses are quite accurate; others are only distantly related to the facts.

The process of selecting and promoting Marines to Staff grades is of vital concern to all commanders from platoon level up, as well as to the NCOs. The system is devised to provide the backbone of our Corps. In view of this, and because there is a system with some specific rules, objectives, and procedures, a brief discussion is in order.

The Boards meet once a year, more often if necessary. The process begins at HQMC—in the G-1 Division and in the Promotion Branch of the Personnel Department.

The first step is for G-1 to determine how many promotions must be made to keep each rank up to strength. This is done by comparing the authorized strength with the number estimated to be in rank by the end of the Fiscal Year if no promotions were made. The number of retirements, transfers to the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, failures to reenlist, deaths, disability separations, and other attrition can be projected with reasonable accuracy for this purpose.

At about the same time, convening

dates of the Board are scheduled. Since Selection Boards of one kind or another are in session most of the time at Headquarters, coordination of Board room space and availability of members have considerable influence on the schedule.

Just before each Board meets, the projected number of vacancies is verified on the basis of the latest information. The total vacancies are broken down by Occupational Field, and become the promotion quotas when approved by the Commandant.

Staff NCO promotions must be made by Occupational Field to avoid getting a rank overstrength in one skill and understrength in another. As widely suspected, this division of the quota creates a difference in promotion opportunity among the various skills.

When an Occupational Field is overstrength in a Staff rank (as some have been for several years as a result of declining strength of the Marine Corps, T/O changes, and other factors), only a few "token" promotions can be made—one for each 20 or more NCOs who are eligible for promotion.

In a field where availability is about equal to requirements, promotion opportunity is usually from one chance in four to one chance in six. In the "shortage" fields the quotas are relatively large and the numbers eligible for promotion are relatively small. A man in one of these fields may have promotion opportunity as high as one chance for promotion out of two and a half or three.

For an NCO in an overstrength field, this is food for thought. Through retraining, he may improve his prospects of promotion. It is Marine Corps policy to encourage retraining from overstrength to shortage skills. Guidance is contained in Marine Corps Orders of the 1221.3 series (Retraining) and the 7220.12 series (Proficiency Pay).

Retraining is fine, but it doesn't happen overnight and it is not the solution for every NCO whose rate of progress is lagging. In some cases, it is just up to the individual to look to his laurels and quit blaming the system.

Nevertheless, many fine NCOs in the slow-moving fields, whose capabilities are needed in those fields, have been frustrated in their attempts to get ahead. Recognizing this, and because the Marine Corps needs the best talent it can get in the upper ranks, the Commandant approved an important change in procedure last year.

An additional quota, aside from the Occupational Field quotas, has been established to permit the "cream of the crop" to compete freely for promotion. In a sense, this is an expansion of the "token" promotions but it is different in that outstanding men are selected to fill this quota regardless of their Occupational Field. Men in the fast-moving fields are just as eligible for this quota as those in the slow-moving fields.

So far, this procedure has not had a serious effect on the "balance of skills." The caliber of men selected is such that their abilities are not limited to their MOS.

In general, promotion opportunity will remain closely tied to Occupational Field.

In all fields, there has been some recent improvement of outlook. The effects of reduction in Marine Corps strength after WWII and Korea, with top billets filled by men who still had a long time to serve, are being overcome.

During the past two years, an increasing number of transfers to the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, and the establishment of four ranks in the new pay grades, E-8 and E-9, have resulted in a fairly brisk promotion flow.

Last Fiscal Year (ending 30 June



60), about 60 Marines were promoted to Sergeant Major, 100 to Master Gunnery Sergeant, 245 to First Sergeant, 590 to Master Sergeant, 1410 to Gunnery Sergeant, and 2050 to Staff Sergeant. The 1410 to Gunnery Sergeant compares to an annual quota of 100 a year to the old rank of Master Sergeant (E-7) between Korea and 1958.

For the next four years, the promotion picture will probably be as good as it is now. For the next two years, it may be better. This is because the Corps is gradually "phasing in" to the new top ranks. There will be some future expansion of the Master Sergeant and Master Gunnery Sergeant ranks, and more will be going out at the top. Over 4,000 Marines, mostly in the upper ranks, have more than 18 years' service.

After the quotas and the schedule have been established, the Selection Boards take over the hard work. They are assisted by the Promotion Branch, which furnishes the necessary lists, records, and administrative help, and by policy guidance from the Commandant.

The Board usually consists of 12 to 15 field officers whose combined experience includes familiarity with all Occupational Fields. The senior member is a Colonel or a General. It is instructed by the precept to consider carefully the record of each eligible candidate for promotion and to recommend for promotion those found best qualified, within established quotas.

One paragraph of the precept states that successful completion of a tour as a Drill Instructor or as a Recruiter on independent or semi-independent duty is *prima facie* evidence of the requisite leadership capability for promotion.

Representatives of G-1 and the Director of Personnel brief the Board on the Marine Corps personnel situation, the promotion system, technicalities, and procedures used successfully by previous Boards.

When the Board sees the number of records it must study, it takes a deep breath. It may have over ten thousand cases to study (especially for promotions to Staff Sergeant) and a promotion quota of two or three thousand.

The individual records (called



**LtCol Cason** wrote this article before leaving his duties as Head, Enlisted Plans Section, G-1, HQMC. During most of WWII, he was a Company CO and ExecO. He has also served as an S-2, a Bn CO, an instructor at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, and a Division Adjutant. A 19 year veteran of the Marine Corps, he is now serving as Asst Head, Navy-Marine Corps Section, Military Branch, Plans Division, CINCPAC Staff.

"cases" at Headquarters) are sorted by Occupational Field and checked against a machine-made roster of eligible personnel by the Promotion Branch before delivery to the Board. They are also checked against test rosters and previous promotion rosters to ensure that every eligible man is considered. In the rare event that a man's record does not appear before the Board in spite of all precautions, he may be considered later by a special board at Headquarters.



Before actually beginning its study of the cases before it, the Board decides on its mechanical procedures, and reviews the criteria for selection. Among the most important considerations are:

- Leadership
- Overall value to the Service
- Performance of duty
- Total length of service
- Time in grade
- Performance under stress
- Combat record
- Initiative
- Efforts at self-improvement

One Occupational Field, or a group of related Occupational Fields, is usually studied at a time. Each member studies the MOS Manual to familiarize himself with the duties of

the men under consideration, and a member of the Board familiar with the Occupational Field enlarges on the contents of the Manual for the benefit of the Board.

Each member makes a detailed analysis of a group of cases. In this analysis—known as "briefing the cases"—he studies the entire record. Fitness reports are of prime importance, but he also studies all the Service Record Books, correspondence, and other material in the record. He makes careful notes on each case.

This briefing process occupies the greater part of the time a Board is in session (six to ten weeks). A great deal of information is contained in each record. After twelve or more years' service, a Marine's record is several inches thick.

Although Boards do not make their selections by mathematical formula, they usually do use some arithmetic in making comparisons among individuals. By assigning numerical values to fitness report markings, it is fairly easy to get a quick picture of the impression a Marine has made on his commanding officers. This is only one part of the process, however.

Everything in the record is considered. Sometimes an individual's overall markings may be less impressive than those of others being considered, or he may have had one or two low fitness reports, but yet his record of achievement may outweigh these markings. Similarly, high fitness report markings may be offset by other material in the record.

The rumor is true that reporting seniors tend to "mark high;" but the differences among Staff NCOs are fairly easy to spot in spite of this fact. The remarks in Section "D" shed a great deal of light on the remainder of the report. Also, the

Board can learn a good deal about "high markers" and "low markers."

There are clearly visible trends in fitness reports, even when the spread of markings is slight. The markings of some NCOs tend to rise over the years, while others drop. Some "fast starters" get their best marks from a reporting senior the first time he marks them, and thereafter the markings drop off. In other cases, the commanding officer's confidence is reflected in continually rising markings during the time he prepares the fitness reports.

The wealth of information available in each NCO record made possible the policy established last year of recommending an individual for promotion even though he had not passed a promotion test. Tests are strong evidence of individual qualification and are given considerable weight by Selection Boards. Only about four per cent of those selected last year had not passed promotion tests. Nevertheless, failure to pass a test is often belied by an outstanding record of achievement.

A pencil-and-paper test of the multiple choice question type has many limitations. It cannot tell everything about a man's ability, or even his knowledge. This is particularly true when the NCO has been working in a highly demanding assignment outside his normal specialty, or when his primary duties are of a practical nature seldom requiring paper work.

After the cases have been briefed, the Board goes into "executive session" to determine which men will be recommended for promotion.

Each member presents the cases he has briefed to the rest of the Board, describing all aspects of the individual under consideration. He makes his recommendations as to promotion of each individual, in order of preference. During the executive session, other members of the Board ask questions and make whatever notes are necessary to assist them in voting.

The Board votes on NCOs to be selected after completion of the briefing presentations. Some of those who are clearly the superior NCOs in the group receive unanimous votes on the first ballot while those who are clearly "not in the running" are eliminated on the first ballot.

Debate then centers on the "middle group." During this period the briefing officers reemphasize the relative merits of the NCOs under consideration. Every aspect of a record comes under the closest scrutiny. In its effort to select the best men, the Board often becomes involved in heated discussion and votes several times before the selection list is complete. This process continues through each of the Occupational Fields or Occupational Field groupings.



Frequently with great personal regret, Board members must leave an NCO off the selection list because the quota cannot accommodate all the fully-qualified candidates for promotion.

During its executive session, the Board also may prepare a list of NCOs it has found to be substandard. The usual indications of substandard performance are a pattern of below-average or unsatisfactory fitness reports, disciplinary problems, unjustified indebtedness, or overindulgence in alcohol. The number of substandard NCOs is small—less than one per cent of all those considered to date.

Even though the number is small, it is considered necessary to take every possible corrective action, since the Marine Corps has no room for NCOs who are not pulling their share of the load and who merely stand in the way of their juniors who are qualified for promotion. Frequent or timely transfers sometimes allow such men to escape corrective action by their Commanding Officers; the Selection Board, with

an individual's complete record before it, can correct this discrepancy.

In reporting substandard NCOs, the Board also recommends the action to be taken—ranging from a warning to administrative separation. Final action is decided by the Commandant, after further study of each case.

Having completed its deliberations, the Board submits its report to the Commandant. In addition to recommendations as to selection and as to substandard NCOs, it may prepare a list of NCOs particularly well-suited to Drill Instructor or Recruiting duty. It is normally required to furnish an analysis of the NCO group it has studied. This analysis is used in personnel planning at Headquarters. It may include remarks about quality, training, marking procedures, and the selection process.

After the Commandant has approved the Board's report, the Director of Personnel publishes the selection list, in order of precedence. The actual promotions are made when authorized by the Commandant. In some cases, there may be a considerable lapse of time between the selection list and the promotion warrant.

The reason for this is that the selections are made as early in the year as possible, but promotions are made on the basis of vacancies. Under a previous system, a fairly large number of vacancies was allowed to develop before a Board was held. Then selections were made and the NCOs selected were promoted at one time. This resulted in alternate shortages and overages of NCOs in any particular grade. The present system keeps actual strength in grade relatively close to requirements. Promotions are made in increments from the selection list.


While some of the selectees may grow impatient waiting for "their number to come up," they at least may have the satisfaction of knowing they have been selected.

There is no record of any Marine having agreed with every selection made by a Board. The Board members themselves are not in 100 per cent agreement on every case; but they do as careful and equitable a job as humanly possible. And there is a system. USMC



## FIRST PHONE CALL VIA MAN-MADE SATELLITE!

"Project Echo" satellite went into a near-perfect circular orbit 1000 miles high, circling the earth once every two hours. Its orbital path covered all parts of the U. S.



## BELL TELEPHONE LABORATORIES BOUNCES VOICE OFF SPHERE PLACED IN ORBIT A THOUSAND MILES ABOVE THE EARTH

Think of watching a royal wedding in Europe by live TV, or telephoning to Singapore or Calcutta—*by way of outer-space satellites!* A mere dream a few years ago, this idea is now a giant step closer to reality.

Bell Telephone Laboratories recently took the step by successfully bouncing a phone call between its Holmdel, N. J., test site and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in Goldstone, California. The reflector was a 100-foot sphere of aluminized plastic orbiting the earth 1000 miles up.

### Dramatic application of telephone science


Sponsored by NASA, this dramatic experiment—known as "Project Echo"—relied heavily on telephone science for its fulfillment...

- The Delta rocket which carried the satellite into space was steered into a precise orbit by the Bell Laboratories Command Guidance System. This is the same system which recently guided the remarkable Tiros I weather satellite into its near-perfect circular orbit.

- To pick up the signals, a special horn-reflector antenna was used. Previously perfected by Bell Laboratories for microwave radio relay, it is virtually immune to common radio "noise" interference. The amplifier—also a Laboratories development—was a traveling wave "maser" with very low noise susceptibility. The signals were still further protected from noise by a special FM receiving technique invented at Bell Laboratories.

"Project Echo" foreshadows the day when numerous man-made satellites might be in orbit all around the earth, acting as 24-hour-a-day relay stations for TV programs and phone calls between all nations.

This experiment shows how the Bell Telephone System is working to advance space communication. Just as we pioneered in world-wide telephone service by radio and cable, so we are pioneering now in using outer space to improve communications on earth. It's part of our job, and we are a long way toward the goal.



Giant ultra-sensitive horn-reflector antenna which received signals bounced off the satellite. It is located at Bell Telephone Laboratories, Holmdel, New Jersey.



## BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM



OCTOBER 1960  
VOLUME 44  
NUMBER 10

50¢

## ADVERTISERS' INDEX

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| American Telephone and Telegraph Company                     | 1         |
| Chance Vought  | 39        |
| First National Bank of Quantico                              | 56        |
| Food Machinery & Chemical Corporation, Ordnance Division     | 15        |
| Kaman Aircraft Corporation                                   | Cover IV  |
| Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Georgia Division              | 6, 7      |
| Marine Corps Association                                     | Cover III |
| Military Specialty Company                                   | 54        |
| Philco Corporation   | 16        |
| Radio Corporation of America                                 | 5         |
| Railroads of the United States                               | 37        |
| Raytheon Company   | 3         |
| Sikorsky Aircraft, A Division of United Aircraft Corporation | 25        |
| Sperry Gyroscope Company, Surface Armament Division          | 27        |
| United Services Automobile Association                       | 50        |
| Vickers-Armstrongs Ltd.                                      | 8, 9      |
| Vought Aeronautics   | 39        |

Advertising Representative: Thomas O. Woolf & Son, Inc., 225 Park Ave., New York 17, N.Y.; 226 S. Alexandria Ave., Los Angeles 4, Calif.; 151 Fleet St., London E.C. 4, England. Printed at 32d Street and Elm Ave., Baltimore, Md.

Opinions expressed in the Gazette are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Department of the Navy nor of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.

Copyright 1960 by the Marine Corps Association. Entered as second class matter at the Post Offices at Quantico, Va., and Baltimore, Md. All pictures are official Department of Defense photos unless otherwise credited. All reprint rights reserved.

Editor in Chief BGen W. R. Collins. Editorial Board Col R. M. Baker, Col W. P. Baker, LtCol N. D. Glenn, LtCol H. L. Beckington. Editor and Publisher LtCol T. N. Greene. Business Manager Maj H. Preston. Managing Editor Capt O. D. Newton. Promotion Manager F. T. Stolley. Art Director GySgt R. F. Fleischauer. Features Editor MSgt Joe Dodd.

# Marine Corps Gazette

## Professional Magazine for United States Marines

*Published by the Marine Corps Association in order to provide a forum for the expression of matters which will advance knowledge, interest and esprit in the Marine Corps.*

## IN THIS ISSUE

- |    |   |  |
|----|---|--|
| 10 | And the Sword                                   | James Burnham                          |
| 17 | Are You A 227 Pound Weakling?                   | Capt G. E. Otott                       |
| 20 | To Kill the Enemy                               | Col G. H. West and<br>Capt J. T. Smith |
| 28 | Malaya Jungle Patrols                           | Maj Bruce F. Meyers                    |
| 40 | Report from the Ready Forces: Organized Reserve | Maj T. Owens and<br>Capt J. A. Everett |
|    | Part One—Combat Readiness                       |  |
|    | Part Two—Programs to Improve Readiness          |  |
| 46 | Moment of Truth                                 | Capt Thomas R. Kelly                   |

## DEPARTMENTS

|                |    |                            |    |
|----------------|----|----------------------------|----|
| Message Center | 4  | Extension School Challenge | 38 |
| Salty Skipper  | 26 | Observation Post           | 51 |
| Reserve Column | 36 |                            |    |

Published monthly by the Marine Corps Association (unofficial, non-profit) Box 1844, Quantico, Va. Regular members: U.S. Marine officers, SNCOs (Reg., Ret., Res.); Associate members: loyal U.S. Citizens; Allied members: officers of U.S. Allies.

Rates: Officers, 1-yr \$5; 2-yrs \$9.50; 3-yrs \$13. Enlisted, 1-yr \$4; 2-yrs \$8; 3-yrs \$12. Messes, libraries, all others, 1-yr \$6; 2-yrs \$11; 3-yrs \$15. Foreign Postage: Add \$1.00 per year to above prices.

Free Writers Guide on request.

POSTMASTER: Forward to U.S. servicemen when address changed by military orders (except to FPO) per section 157.4 Postal Manual. Send Form 3579 to Marine Corps Gazette, PO Box 1844, Quantico, Va.

CHANGE OF ADDRESS: must be received by 10th of month before publication. A complete military or home address is required. Duplicate copies cannot be sent.

Marine Corps Gazette • October 1960



The Polaris will locate and destroy its target some 1200 miles away with the help of Raytheon Weld-Pak circuit modules. These Weld-Pak units, based on an M.I.T. Instrumentation Laboratory packaging concept, are vital elements of the Polaris guidance system. Polaris is one of 22 U.S. Missiles that rely on Raytheon components and equipment.

**RAYTHEON COMPANY**

WALTHAM, MASSACHUSETTS







# MESSAGE CENTER

For letters of professional interest. Length: up to 250 words. Rates: up to \$20.

## Blues and Bananas

... Col Donovan makes a good case against dress blues in the FMF. However, he slights past experience when he says they "... are of questionable publicity value" and "... the Corps should have more to offer ... than a gay uniform."

Out here in mid-America where a Marine is a rare sight many people refer to me as "soldier" unless I am wearing dress blues. We used to expect this when wearing summer service. Now it happens even when wearing greens (due to the Army's bad case of good taste when they adopted "modern Army green"). Dress blues are a real show stopper. Young men with a military bent are drawn to them like a magnet. There's a good reason for it. Just as the cross is a symbol of religion, so are dress blues a symbol of the traditions and achievements of the Marine Corps. While we perhaps should not maximize the wearing of blues, we should optimize them.

While I am in a contradictory mood, here is a footnote for Capt Martz. The article *King of the Banana Wars* may not be of the literary quality of those written by Baldwin, Toynbee, et al—BUT the author has as much right to have his views printed in the GAZETTE as Capt Martz has (*Message Center*: Sep '60).

Maj P. D. Reissner, Jr.

1&1, 20th Rifle Co  
Rockford, Ill.

## Check and Double Check

... On our return trip from Vieques, P. R., our battalion stopped at Kingston, Jamaica. While shopping for souvenirs (calypso blouses and Jamaican sport shirts) I ventured to use personal checks. Since I was in summer service "A" (from attending the Queen's birthday parade that morning) all that was needed was to see the store manager, write my unit's home address on the check, and my packages were mailed. Later I learned from British officer acquaintances that personal checks are rarely accepted.

1stLt P. R. Gottlieb

3/8 2dMarDiv  
Camp Lejeune, N.C.

## Pros and Cons

... Just received my August GAZETTE a few days ago. Got to *Message Center*. Wiseley's epistle hit me first, as I reckon you planned.

Somehow it just didn't ring true. So I dug out my June issue to have a look. Sure enough, Wiseley has hung his thesis on a rubber peg. It just won't hold. He didn't read before he wrote!

Let's take his first shot about Kaneohe. "What are its functions, and how do they fit into strategic planning?" Son, go back and read Report From the Ready Forces. The 1stMarBrig makes Kaneohe its home. It is over 2000 miles closer to the Far East

than units in California. This report will answer your questions on functions and strategic planning.

How about carrier deployment? Captain, I'll let you in on a secret. A lot of us haven't been aboard since Korea. A third of the Marine Corps is in aviation. Mark's article should give you an appreciation of something you know nothing about. It sure set me to thinking. Draw your own conclusions about how that deployment fits FMF employment. Have you ever made a

full scale, wartime landing? Where do you think you'll get your CAS?

As for personnel policies, reread, captain. The meat is there for a big idea about our future. One we are all interested in. A basic element. I agree—officers and men. But where is our future without them? Where do they come from and how good are they going to be?

Ideas are where you find them—big or little. Nobody is going to hand you a big one on a silver platter.

LtCol R. F. Steinkraus

COMSTRIKFOR SOUTH  
Navy #510 c/o FPO, N.Y., N.Y.

... Capt Wiseley's letter reads like an unkind gripe about a magazine, rather than the squeezing of sour grapes, which it really is. If the good skipper is in dire need of higher instruction and education concerning command and staff problems in the Corps, it is suggested that he review the values of the so easily disparaged Junior and Senior Extension courses.

As a military journal, the much im-

(Continued on page 6)

## Drill: A Tradition

... I suspect that Capt Grant's comments in the August GAZETTE relating to Close Order Drill were read with interest by Marines everywhere. Reactions, I am sure, were definite, for there is rarely any middle ground on the subject of drill. One either agrees with him or doesn't. I do not.

In rebuttal, I draw first on MSgt Crumb's article on leadership which appeared in the same GAZETTE. The leader's task is simplified, MSgt Crumb suggested, if he looks like a leader. Certainly the leader must be something more than a model for a recruiting poster, but the more closely he approximates the bearing of such a model, the more likely he is to gain an initial respect upon which his other—and, admittedly, more important—qualities can build. And where do we stress bearing more than on the drill field? It is there that the future leader is first told to stand up, to hold his head high, his shoulders back, his belly in, and his back straight. It is there that he develops command presence with voice to match. And it is there that he becomes most conscious of the shine on his shoes, the press of his trousers, and the manner in which he wears his cap. These things don't make him a fully developed leader by any means, but they do endow him with one of the many important attributes of leadership which few, if any, other facets of his training will provide.

Capt Grant might reply that bearing can be developed in ballet class. If that were the only benefit to be derived from the drill field, I might go along with him. But I think he neglects another of the basic purposes of drill and its adjunct ceremonies—that of maintaining tradition. While the observance of tradition can be overdone, a measure of it is essential. Our pride in our past gives us inspiration for the future. It helps define the standard of performance toward which we must constantly strive, and it acts as an impetus for continuing excellence. Without our traditions, and without knowledge of and respect for the history from which they stem, we would soon lose our claim to the title Marine.

Drill, parades, reviews, ceremonies—all are a part of our tradition. Few of us, I am sure, actually enjoy preparing for and participating in a parade or review, but when it's over and done with, we cannot help but feel a sense of pride and belonging at having been a part of it. We might look a long time before we find anyone who will admit to such feelings, and in our search we would surely hear many remarks about buttocks aching from the last shot of scarlet and gold. But I think we will agree that 90 per cent of such remarks are nothing more than a shield to cover true feelings.

If you knock off troop and stomp, you might as well go a few steps farther and secure the Marine Corps birthday celebration, abolish organizational colors, burn a few historical monographs about our past, and melt down the Marine Corps Memorial.

Maj T. H. Galbraith

MCS, Quantico, Va.



CREATIVE ELECTRONICS FOR DEFENSE

# STRANGE "FISH" UNDER THE POLAR ICE

## Revolutionary RCA Magnetic Video Tape Recorder to Speed Navigation Training of Submariners

Aboard the nuclear submarine Sea Dragon, the first undersea magnetic video tape recorder will record and store data on under-the-ice characteristics from externally installed TV cameras. Upon return to base the recorded information will be displayed for the benefit of undersea service trainees.

The RCA undersea recorder is a marvel of compact design (dimensions 20" x 20" x 100"). It nestles in a torpedo rack, and represents a 60% space reduc-

tion over existing video tape equipment.

Among the exclusive RCA developments are: the now famous "Tiros" satellite recorder; a radar system designed to take the first pictures of a nose cone re-entry vehicle; a unique tape cartridge completely adaptable to any size recorder. For literature describing new RCA defense and commercial products developments, write Defense Electronic Products, Radio Corporation of America, Camden, N. J.

*Out of today's defense needs...tomorrow's electronic advances*



The Most Trusted Name in Electronics  
RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA

(Continued from page 4)

proved GAZETTE provides a better, more up to date view of the Marine Corps. It is not intended as a replacement for the professional schooling available through other means. If the captain is in search of a military education through periodicals, I suggest he also complete his civilian education by reading four years' issues of *Business Week*.

If stimulation of thought is his desire, a visit to any good military library followed by some deep reading of present political, economic and military problems might assist him.

He complains of canned solutions and the dearth of issued ideas. A complete knowledge of his job, even at regimental level, might pose enough problems for the generation of a few small sparks in his own mental idea factory.

Capt Henry English

Inspector-Instructor  
81st Rifle Company, USMCR  
Springfield, Illinois

... Capt Wiseley makes me feel that perhaps I'm doomed to failure. Personally I have found a great deal of information in the new GAZETTE and I must also confess that up to this time I had high hopes of attaining high command and staff billets. Obviously my mentality isn't geared along that line though. I would like to know about carrier deployment because I might become involved with one some day. I

have an interest in Kaneohe because there is a strong possibility I might end up there. Just between us there would be great interest in its layout if a war started and undoubtedly some folks have planned a strategic role for it. Frankly I envy the captain his broad knowledge of what is going on in the Corps as he sits there in Malibu. Here I am a unit commander in the FMF and I learn things from the GAZETTE which haven't come to my desk through official channels. Last but not least, I have had experience since 1943 handling men and materials and there is still a lot I can learn which isn't written in official pubs.

Capt Paul E. Wilson

1st HARB, FAG  
MCB, 29 Palms, Calif.

... As an Army reserve officer who has enjoyed reading the GAZETTE for about ten years, I would like to second the thoughts expressed in Capt Wiseley's letter.

Parochialism and paternalism appear to have replaced the stimulating, broadly-oriented, and varied articles that once made the GAZETTE one of the best publications of its kind.

If the aim of the editors is to create a GAZETTE strictly for Marines, then they have succeeded—although Capt Wiseley's dissent cannot be ignored.

Capt Stanley L. Falk, USAR

4727 S. 29th Street  
Arlington, Va.

## By The Book

... Re Sgt V. R. Phaneuf's "Better Way" to remove "QM" from brass buttons (*Observation Post*: Sep '60):

The new style gold buttons were coated for a purpose, to aid in retaining their original and uniform appearance. Further, Para. 49500. 2a, MCM, discourages the use of abrasives or chemicals to remove the QM. Although the highly polished old gilt button may have been brighter if diligently maintained, due to differences in the metals' colors and the efforts employed in polishing, it was almost impossible to have a uniform appearance. It may come as a surprise to many Marines that Webster's first definition of uniform is "Having always the same form, manner or degree."

I would suggest, then, that a better way to maintain dress buttons is to keep a can of spray handy to recoat buttons when the QM chips off or, if severely marred, buy a new button.

Capt MacDonald Greer

HqBn, 2dMarDiv  
FMF, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

## Misquoted

... By incorrectly proofreading my letter to the editor (*Message Center*: Sept '60), you have done me an embarrassing disservice. I know it was not intentional, but ...

Your proofer did not follow correctly my quotes within a quotation in the second paragraph. This resulted in the last sentence being attributed to me, rather than to the Soviet colonel who wrote the propaganda in the first place!

I assure you that, as an ardent supporter





of capitalism and a subscriber to the bourgeois spirit, I just don't think that-a-way.

Maj William F. Alsop, Jr.

MCLFDC, MCS  
Quantico, Va.

### Authentic

... Congratulations to MSgt Crumb for the excellent article on old fashioned NCO leadership (GAZETTE: August '60).

His platoon sergeant, Bill Reeves, was not a hypothetical figure, but actually William G. Reeves, 09163. Major, USMC Retired. He went out in 1955 with over 31 years service, now lives at 116 Jean Circle, Jacksonville, N. C., where he is agent for the Washington Post.

The article is correct in all phases of date, time, place and organization. I was there, too.

CWO E. O. Smith

MCSFA, 100 Harrison St.  
San Francisco, Calif.

### Two Better Than One

... After reading so many letters on the subject, I must add my bit to the "cover controversy." I agree that very few Marines wear the utility cover in a uniform manner. However, I do not believe that suggestions of a beret as a substitute are well founded with regards to the utility cover.

Certainly the beret is distinctive, and it surely can be worn with a flair, but not in the field. It seems that everyone wants a cover that will be sharp in garrison and functional in the field. For this we must have two covers. I, for one, believe that we want something with a visor that will

keep the sun out of our eyes when not wearing the helmet. This eliminates the beret.

My suggestion: keep the utility cover as a work cover in the field. Let us have a simple non-reinforced, unstarched cover that is functional. We are not out there to be on parade, nor are we supposed to be part of a fashion show.

Something distinctive like a beret should replace the bulky barracks cap and also replace the assorted garrison caps which help us give such an assortment of head coverings.

1stLt F. M. Kauffman, Jr.

1/1 3dMarDiv  
FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

### Word Cutting

... Your Word Cutting item (MCA NEWSLETTER: Sept '60) quotes ALCOM 30 as stating "DEGRADATION CLARITY NOT INTENDED." I submit no message or other document should ever state intentions. To do so wastes space. It is beside the point what the writer intends.

Example: if a regimental commander issues an order stating that battalion commanders must secure his permission before opening fire, it is futile for him to add "this directive is not intended to limit the prerogatives of subordinate commanders."

Such notations are best left unstated.

LtCol D. D. Nicholson, Jr.  
USMC (Ret)

The Citadel  
Charleston, S. C.

### For More Pushups

... In comment to the letter of LtCol W. P. J. Drakeley, Jr., in MESSAGE CENTER

under *Better Troop Training*; I must say that I feel the last paragraph is extensively exaggerated.

Far be it from me to belittle calisthenics as one of the methods to bring Marines to a state of combat readiness; it is certainly one of the most important factors. However, I don't believe that it is possible to bring men to a state of combat readiness with only 20 minutes of calisthenics per week.

MSgt Floyd M. Burgess

Room 202, 1128 W. Mitchell St.  
Milwaukee 4, Wis.  
Ed: Please turn to p. 17.

### We Dood It

... All Marines are acutely concerned with reduction of non-FMF personnel commitments to increase FMF percentages. Concomitant to this are overseas figures and unit rotation.

I quote from a little known publication, dated 1 June 1933: The Marine Corps in Support of the Fleet, by Col E. B. Miller, at the time Asst Commandant, MCS, Quantico.

"In July 1928, with an actual strength of 17,363, the Marine Corps had 11,400 Marines on duty outside the continental limits of the U.S.

"I wonder how did we do it?"

The answer: A "can do" attitude.

In FY '60, the Corps pointed with pride to an increase in FMF personnel percentages (and combat readiness) from 52.7 to 54.6 percent. I wonder how did we do it?

Maj K. D. Morrison

516 Frances Drive  
Woodbridge, Va.

## BOUNDARY LAYER BREAKTHROUGH

# 50-ton BLC\*130 lands on 500-foot lightplane strips

At the turn-around point of a 2,000-mile round trip mission, Lockheed's new Boundary Layer Control C-130 will roll to a stop in 520 feet after touchdown. Takeoff is just as remarkable: lift-off in 500 feet—from an unprepared field. Stall speed: less than 50 knots.

The BLC-130 is built on a proved and paid-for airframe design. It adds true STOL capability to the other C-130 superiorities established in more than three years of Air Force service: fast loading and unloading; rough-field takeoff and landing; performance of diverse airfreight/airdrop missions at low cost; and direct-to-trouble-spot airlift, such as the recent Congo airlift in which C-130s played the major role.

A test bed BLC-130 has completed flight tests, clearly demonstrating the feasibility of boundary layer control on large airplanes.

## LOCKHEED

GEORGIA DIVISION • MARIETTA, GEORGIA

\*BOUNDARY LAYER CONTROL—High-speed air from pylon-mounted turbojet compressors is blown over flaps, ailerons, elevator, and rudder—causing airstream to hug the surfaces instead of being separated. The energization of surface air gives the BLC-130 its extraordinarily high lift.





# British Army orders **VIGILANT** for trials



## **ONE-MAN ANTI-TANK MISSILE**

*The only velocity guided Infantry anti-tank missile*



- Instant readiness
- Higher accuracy than any comparable weapon
- Lethal to the heaviest known armour
- Smooth, direct and stable control
- Only 5 hours simulator training plus 3 or 4 live rounds
- Complete concealment in attack

For further details, contact Christopher Clarkson, U. S.  
Representative, 10 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20, N. Y.

VICKERS-ARMSTRONGS (AIRCRAFT) LIMITED

Member Company of **BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION**





## ... AND THE SWORD

By James Burnham

An analysis of the military powers of Congress and the President in the nuclear age. Reprinted from *Congress and the American Tradition* by James Burnham. Copyright, 1959, by James Burnham. Published by Henry Regnery Company. \$6.50

THE IDEA THAT IN WAR TIME Congress sits back while the President takes charge of national affairs, both civil and military, as a kind of general director, has become so familiar since 1941 that we tend to take it for granted as a constitutional axiom. Actually, no one ever heard of the "war power" or "war powers" of the President until the Civil War. Even in the Civil War, Lincoln discovered that he possessed a "war power" only because, it being a domestic conflict, his constitutional duty "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed" was brought into coincidence with his constitutional role as Commander in Chief.

After the Civil War, the presidential "war power" slumbered for another seventy-five years until 1940-41. In the first world war it was not the executive alone but the executive in conjunction with Congress that asserted a new, peculiar and unprecedented war power. The assignment—as in Senator O'Mahoney's declaration, cited in the last chapter, that war is "an executive function; it is not a legislative function"—of not merely a war power but *the* war power to the executive is an offshoot of the years since 1941, of the administrations

of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower.

By the intent of the Founding Fathers and the letter and tradition of the Constitution, the bulk of the sovereign war power was assigned to Congress. Although the Constitution names the President Commander in Chief, it does not explicitly allot him any other element of the war power. Now it is doubtless true that a nation's first commander, particularly if the nation is actively at war, will inevitably exercise somewhat more than a technical military function. But it is certainly not the case that the Fathers thought of the President's military command as endowing him with the attributes of a general dictator, or with the legislative functions otherwise reserved to Congress. Nor were they reasoning in the abstract. The appointment of a commander in chief for a nation's armed forces was a procedure common in scores of governments of all political forms, from ancient times through their own 18th century, and it did not, as a rule, subvert the normally prevailing political system. Hamilton, explaining the Constitution's war provisions in *Federalist* No. 69, writes:

"The President will have only the occasional command of such part



of the militia of the nation as by legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the Union. The king of Great Britain and the governor of New York have at all times the entire command of all the militia within their several jurisdictions. In this article, therefore, the power of the President would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the governor.

"Second. The President is to be Commander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the *declaring* of war and to the *raising* and *regulating* of fleets and armies—all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature."

The older commentators, and Court decisions prior to our day, had no doubt about where the war power was lodged. The remarks of Professor Charles W. Bacon in the once well-known textbook, *The American Plan of Government*—written, significantly enough, just before the first world war—are typical of the traditional understanding:

"The framers of the Constitution turned over an ample measure of the powers of war to Congress because Representatives and Senators are delegates of the People and States of the United States whose commercial interests must be staked upon the issue of every conflict. The People pay the bill. Therefore, their representatives in Congress are of right the proper persons to control military affairs.

"The war making power,' according to the decision in the case of *Perkins vs. Rogers*, 'is, by the Constitution, vested in Congress and . . . the President has no power to declare war or conclude peace except as he may be empowered by Congress.'"

Today, with the experience of the first and more particularly the second world wars before us, many citizens are surprised to learn that Congress has any meaningful function of any sort in war time. "At the beginning of the [second] world war," notes Professor Roland Young

in the introduction to his study of *Congressional Politics in the Second World War*, "it was widely believed that Congress need not, or should not, play a very important role in fighting a war. A modern war required that the President be given the power necessary to direct the civil and military establishments." As if explaining that a senile old codger can still walk to the dining table, Mr. Young finds that Congress "was by no means the anachronism which many—including some of its own members—predicted it would be." It may be added as further comment that Mr. Young's is the only book so far published on what Congress had to do with the second world war, as against unnumbered hundreds on what was done by the two Presidents, their commander, and the civilian officials.

Under the Constitution, it was Congress, as we have noted, that was assigned the control over the size, composition and regulation of the armed forces. Congress alone was to authorize their domestic use ("to suppress insurrection"). And Congress alone could declare a foreign war. In the earlier (August 6) draft of the Constitution, the enabling phrase read "To make war" rather than "To declare war." This was discussed on August 17. Madison and Elbridge Gerry made the motion to change "make" to "declare." They explained that their purpose was to give "the Executive

the power to repel sudden attacks"; and Gerry, in order to dispel any possible misunderstanding, declared flatly that he "never expected to hear, in a republic, a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war." There was no dissent from George Mason's assertion that he "was against giving the power of war to the Executive, because not safely to be trusted with it." Connecticut's delegates, Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth, inclined at first against the verbal change from "make" to "declare," because, though they agreed that the executive, as commander, would properly act to repel invasion, they wished to be sure that the general war power granted specifically to Congress should not be "narrowed." Rufus King explained that "make" war might be understood to mean "conduct" it, "which was an Executive function." With these clarifications, which were the sense of the assembly, Connecticut's objections were withdrawn.

The distinctions can be made considerably clearer in form than in practice. Whatever the exact intentions of the Fathers and wording of the charter, in the traditional conduct of the central government the war power was fairly evenly divided between executive and legislature. The President's share was derived from his mission to command the forces and "conduct" operations, from his initiative in the conduct



**Before Lincoln, no one ever heard of the President's "war power."**

of foreign policy, and from his part in the governing process as a whole. Congress participated at the law-making, taxing and appropriating agency, through its confirmatory tasks in connection with treaties and with ministerial and military appointments, by its determination of the size and character of the armed forces, and by general policy decisions that affected the country's international relations.

During the past generation congressional control over the size, composition and regulation of the armed forces has largely been submerged in the same complex gigantism that has swamped congressional control of the purse; indeed, the loss of military control is largely a necessary consequence of the latter, since the primary method by which Congress can control the armed forces is through control of military appropriations. But in the case of the contemporary military apparatus, such control by Congress is nearly impossible to uphold.

The mere existence of a huge "standing army" is enough to make congressional control all but impossible. An army is under the operative orders of its commander. If the army is large and powerful in comparison with the community as a whole, then the commander is correlatively swollen, no matter what the formal limits of his jurisdiction. This the Founding Fathers comprehended perfectly, and it was for this reason that they were unanimous in their conviction that the new government ought not and would not have a large standing army in time of peace. The peacetime armed forces, such as they might have to be, were to consist, according to their conception, primarily in the militias of the several states, subject to the command not of the President but of the executives of the state governments. The decentralized militia organization of the armed forces would thus spread and fragmentize, under normal circumstances, the total military and war power of the nation, guarding against an executive tyranny springing from control of the sword. In a major war the risk had to be run. "If the defence of the community under such circumstances [of rebellion or invasion]



**Pearl Harbor, 7Dec41. Did FDR's moves make the attack inevitable?**

should make it necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those calamities for which there is neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided against by any possible form of government." A large force would, if the nation's defense demanded it, come together under the single presidential command; but only for the war's temporary purpose, and subject to lawful regulation by the legislature. With the war's ending, the large standing army would dissolve.


Among the Philadelphia delegates there were some who were opposed to there being any standing army whatever in peacetime. The absence of such a prohibition was, in fact, cited by Edmund Randolph among the many reasons that led him to vote against the Constitution and to oppose its adoption by Virginia. A number of others, like Roger Sherman and Elbridge Gerry, wanted to place explicit limits on its size. "The people," declared Gerry on August 18, "were jealous on this head, and great opposition to the plan would spring from such an omission. . . . He thought an army dangerous in time of peace, and could never consent to a power

to keep up an indefinite number. He proposed that there should not be kept up in time of peace more than . . . thousand troops. His idea was that the blank should be filled with two or three thousand." A few days later, Madison declared as a principle that "the greatest danger to liberty is from large standing armies"; and on September 14 he advised that "as armies in time of peace are allowed on all hands to be an evil, it is well to discountenance them by the Constitution." In the *Farewell Address*, Washington re-echoed Madison: "Hence, likewise, [all the parts of the country] will avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty."

This feeling against a large standing army was so strong in the debates over ratification that Hamilton felt compelled to devote three of the *Federalist* papers to it. Moreover, he can find no other defense for the constitutional latitude on the matter than that: (a) "the whole power of raising armies [is] lodged in the *Legislature*, not in the

**James Burnham** was born in Chicago 22Nov05. He attended Canterbury School, Princeton University, Oxford University. He has served as Professor of Philosophy at New York University. Now an editor for *National Review*, he is the author of several books in the category of Political Science, including "The Struggle for the World," "The Case for De Gaulle" and "Containment or Liberation." About his latest book, "Congress and the American Tradition," he says: "If Congress ceases to be an actively functioning political institution, then political liberty in the United States will soon end."





**Congress gave President Roosevelt unprecedented military authority.**

*Executive;*" and (b) there is "an important qualification even of the legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer period than two years. . . . The legislature of the United States will be *obliged* . . . once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not at *liberty* to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even so incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence."

Hamilton might seem to be writing about not so much another country as another world. In 1793 Secretary of War Knox felt called on to defend his request for an annual appropriation of \$50,000 as "not inordinate." (The total for 1791 had been only \$40,306.) In the government's first twenty years, the sum of all military and naval expenses, other than pensions, was \$54 million. Today our "standing army in peacetime" absorbs in a single year more than seven hundred times the total allotted during those two full decades.

Neither the size of its budget nor the numbers in its ranks reveal the full proportionate weight that the armed forces now have in our national society. Through the armament and procurement programs they reach into every corner of in-

dustry, commerce and agriculture; through the posts and missions abroad they are entangled with every aspect of foreign policy; through conscription they are linked with every home and school. Moreover, the strength of the armed forces is organized, and therefore of a heightened potential in relation to the other less tightly organized social forces. And the weight of the contemporary "standing army" has almost wholly left the congressional side of the governmental balance.

With very few exceptions, Congressmen, like the lay public generally, cannot understand the technical nature of modern military equipment. The votes on all the array of nuclear and electronic and aero and astronautical apparatus must necessarily be blind. Nor can Congress effectively judge—or, because of claims of secrecy, even find out about—the prevailing strategic doctrines upon which the security and survival of the nation must depend. Billions of dollars are spent by such secret agencies as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency without any detailed accounting, before or after, of where the money goes; in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency, without even a disclosure of the total sum, which is concealed by deliberately falsified entries. Because of the tremendous inertia of so vast a machine as the present military force, because of the long years needed to plan, design, develop and build modern armament, and because of the consolidation of predominant executive-bureaucratic

power, the two-year limit on military appropriations is rendered meaningless.

In truth, Congress is deprived almost altogether of freedom of action in relation to military affairs. Almost all of its actions in this decisive field of sovereignty are coerced. Formally, Congress must be asked to renew each year, or every two years, appropriations for such-and-such type of planes or ships or missiles or bombs; but in fact, once the long-term plans have been authorized, they cannot be stopped or greatly altered; and in the original authorization, Congress itself will have played a passive role. Formally, it is still congressional enactment that is deciding military policies, discipline, rules, purposes, missions; but in fact the great permanent military apparatus is a power auxiliary of the Commander in Chief and its own professional chiefs.

In the early conception, the key factor in the war power was thought to be that of "declaring" war, and this was given to Congress' keeping. The formal declaration never had quite the importance that was attached to it in theory. If it is for the commander to conduct military operations, and if it is his duty—whether or not specified by law—to repel invasion or other immediate threat to the lives and property of citizens; then he can always order fighting without a declaration, if he judges it necessary; and if the fighting spreads he can confront Congress with a *fait accompli* that makes the declaration no more than a symbolic recognition of what is already happening. From the early days (in dealing with pirates, for example, hostile Indians, or certain small nations of Africa and Latin America) the Presidents have not hesitated to order naval vessels or troops into small-scale actions without congressional authorization. All declarations of war by the United States, even the rather narrowly voted declaration of the War of 1812, have come after events had already ruled out any real freedom of choice. Still, until 1917 certainly, and possibly until 1941, Congress had always shared or even dominated in the prior determination of policies that led toward and into war. If the final decision was co-


erced, it was by the course of events, not by the executive or the military. And until the formal declaration by Congress, it was in the past always possible to draw back.

But in our day the act of formally "declaring" war, losing all substantial meaning, has been reduced to a legalistic ritual without important historical or social consequence. And in this case it is not that Congress has lost a right or power to the executive, as one further phase of the over-all congressional decline. Because of the change in the nature of war itself, the right or power "to declare war" no longer has much meaning, no matter who possesses it.

The high speed and long reach (spatio-temporal compression) of modern weapons, the world-wide deployment of the forces of the major powers, the saturation blows of surprise and deception—all such factors combine to eliminate the older preparatory period to a war. Wars—wars in the physical sense—now just start; before any legal note can be taken of them they are profoundly and irrevocably joined. And this follows not merely from the wickedness of governments and leaders but from the technical imperatives of the new weapons and the correlated shifts in strategy and tactics.

There is not the slightest chance that these technical conditions will change in ways to make possible the revival of the role of formal declarations, but rather the contrary. The development of ballistic missiles means that the first blow in a major war might well cause 50 or 100 million casualties and scores of billions of dollars worth of property damage. The decision on the counter-blow will have to be given within a limiting period of a few minutes, since no more than a few minutes' times will intervene between the first detection of the approach of the enemy blow and its arrival in the target region. Not only is the idea absurd that this decision could be referred back to a congressional vote; it is improbable that the President or even the Chiefs of Staff could participate in it.

Even where the war situation permits recourse to traditional forms, the executive now tends to assume



**Marines were ordered into Lebanon "without reference to Congress."**

full and autonomous power. Not only do the presidential acts, as in the case of Franklin Roosevelt's moves from 1939 to 1941, make a war inevitable, so that the Pearl Harbor occasion of its open start is, like the congressional declaration, a secondary incident; President Truman further demonstrated in Korea how one of the biggest wars in our history, in terms of casualties and cost, can now be entered and conducted without any legal authority from the legislature, simply by not calling it "war." President Eisenhower, seeking a constitutional form for the same presidential power, asked Congress to give advance authorization to any wars he might decide to make around Formosa or in the Middle East, and in July 1958 he ordered troops into Lebanon without any reference to the Congress then in session. This amounts to an assumption of the power to declare war, and is obviously not an extension but a contradiction of the traditional content of the Constitution.

Analyzed from another standpoint also, the significance of the power to declare war has evaporated. In our time the line between peace and war has largely disappeared. There is a continuous international struggle—now called "the cold war"—that is fought by varying methods with one or another degree of violence. The old fairly plain legal distinctions between war time and peace time, soldier and civilian, combatant and non-combatant, war industry and peace industry, war targets and open areas, no longer have clear applications. "Emergency" and "crisis"

are not special but routine. In its daily normal functioning the nation tends, in response, to act as it did in the semi-total Civil War and the first world war: with more and more of the total social power centering in the government, and more and more of the governmental power moving into the hands of the President (and bureaucracy) conceived as exercising emergency and war duties.

The nation comes to understand that the nature of modern war is such that ordinary constitutional limitations on the scope of federal sovereignty cannot be permitted to interfere with the mobilization of the country for victory. As a consequence, the limitations inherent in the American constitutional system which in theory made it a poor instrument for waging total war have been almost totally overcome.



... In the *Curtiss-Wright* case, the Court . . . asserted that the power to wage war was inherent in national sovereignty, antedated the Constitution itself, and was not dependent upon the enumeration of federal powers in Article I, Section 8.

It remained for Congress to perform the ironic ritual of formally recognizing, on the one hand, the central government's assumption of potentially unlimited power, and at the same time its own loss of a critical share in that power.

Both before and after Pearl Harbor, Congress enacted a series of critical statutes, all of which asserted vast federal powers for the prosecution of the war. These statutes were alike also in that they made tremendous grants of authority to the executive for the exercise of the powers over which Congress asserted its sovereignty.

USMC





(Left) Testing high-speed hull designs in FMC's new tow basin to determine hydrodynamic and performance characteristics.

## FMC's new concept in high-speed amphibious armored troop carriers and logistic support vehicles

For further information, write on company letterhead to Preliminary Design Engineering Dept., FMC Ordnance Division, P. O. Box 367, San Jose, Calif. Phone CYpress 4-8124.

High speed, to hit the beach faster and move rapidly inland to combat areas, is a key goal in modern amphibious assault and resupply operations. Applying new ideas gained from over 19 years amphibious experience, FMC's Ordnance Division has made model tests of advanced vehicle designs, which show water speed performance in excess of 15 knots, while retaining excellent cross-country capabilities. The basic chassis can be adapted to armored assault or unarmored logistic support.

FMC's ability to research and develop new and improved equipment for the armed forces is based upon the facilities, skills and experience gained through many years design, engineering and production of military tracked vehicles for a great variety of tactical uses. FMC's Ordnance Division is constantly striving to develop better, more efficient equipment with lower production and maintenance costs.

*Putting Ideas to Work*



**FOOD MACHINERY AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION**

**Ordnance Division**

1105 COLEMAN AVENUE, SAN JOSE, CALIF.

# What's up...and where?

## Philco airborne radar for ALRI extends the vision of SAGE

ALRI, the Airborne Long Range Input system of the U. S. Air Force, is the seaward extension of SAGE, the vast electronic network that warns of aircraft approaching the North American continent. Philco will develop, produce and modify the airborne height-finding radar as an ALRI team member under the system manager, Burroughs Corporation. Philco was selected for this vital work because of its long and extensive experience in the development and production of military airborne radar and its major contributions to radar technology. Here is further evidence of Philco's leadership in advanced electronics . . . for reconnaissance, communications, weapon systems, space exploration and data processing.


Government & Industrial Group, Philadelphia 44, Pennsylvania

# PHILCO®



*Famous for Quality the World Over*

Communications and Weapons Division • Computer Division  
Sierra Electronic Division • Western Development Laboratories





# ARE YOU A 227 POUND WEAKLING?

By Capt G. E. Ottott

Science has proved  
you can toughen up  
in five minutes  
a day. Here's  
how to do  
it.



A FAMOUS PHYSICAL TRAINING EXPERT HAS LONG ADVERTISED that he can make anyone into a "he-man." He requires only 15 minutes a day devoted to his system of training. Of course we know that all Marines are physically fit. We also know that a few of us have acquired a questionable displacement of adipose tissue. While this delights the management of the garment industry, it doesn't help our appearance as physically fit Marines.

Many of us are surprised when we return to the FMF to find that packs are heavier, the old familiar hills are steeper. When was the last time you were able to go hand over hand up the rope on the obstacle course?

A unique system of training, extensively tested in a series of controlled scientific tests in this country and in Germany, requires no apparatus, no workout area, and no more than five minutes of your valuable time per day. In fact, beneficial results accrue from only one minute per day.

How many of you would give five minutes of your time each day to a system of training that would double your muscular strength in six months to a year? The exercises can be done during the time it takes to advertise half a dozen TV commercials on reducing aids. If you like, they can easily be done during those commercials!

This system of "isometric tension exercises" will be of value to those performing duty which allows only a bare minimum of time for physical activity: higher ranking officers and NCOs who do not normally engage in vigorous physical activities or sports, retired Marines, those without access to space or apparatus for

athletic activities, in time of war to POWs, Marines in transit aboard ship. These are some categories; there are undoubtedly others.

The exercises were devised by a couple of eminent German physiologists, Dr Th. Hettinger and Dr Erich Muller, in 1953. A few years later, one of this country's leading physiologists, Dr Charles McCloy (original co-author of Army Physical Training Manual, FM 21-20) obtained the same startling results in a series of controlled experiments at Iowa University.

To begin with, these exercises will give a maximum increase in muscular strength, but will not materially increase circulo-respiratory response ("wind endurance"). Neither will they significantly reduce fatty tissue unless assisted by other exercises or dieting. However, muscular strength is the basis of physical fitness and is a most important step in acquiring, maintaining, and improving it.

Further, this system of exercise is *one* way to help keep fit. It is certainly not the only way, but it is perhaps the best way for those seriously limited in their efforts by outside influences or even by their own aversion to exercise in general. This includes those who are abnormally weak to begin with, those plagued by chronic illness or the limiting effects of past injuries, and those who just don't want to devote the time required by other systems of training or sports.

These exercises will not be of great benefit to the well-conditioned athlete or to Marines who regularly exercise vigorously. They will be greatly beneficial as a supplementary exercise for increasing strength in those individuals who like to devote all their exercise time to "endurance" activities such as handball, basketball, running, etc.

Isometric tension exercises are closely allied to the well known "Charles Atlas" system of dynamic tension in that they require no apparatus other than the body itself. The big difference is that they are not "dynamic" since there is no movement involved but only static muscular contraction against some form of resistance. Each exercise consists of a single contraction of a muscle or muscle group. The contraction must use at least 40 per cent of maximum strength, though at least 75 per cent is recommended since most people have no idea of their maximum strength. Only *one* execution per day involving a particular muscle is required for maximum strength.

Each contraction should be held for three to five seconds. Though a wide variety of exercises is possible, six to 12 should provide a satisfactory workout routine. It can be seen that 12 exercises could be performed in one minute if done consecutively without a break. It is believed, however, that best results can be achieved with from three to five repetitions of such exercise, since this will build muscular endurance as well as strength. The exercises are not tiring and can be performed in a few spare minutes at work, at home, or in the field.

Both Muller and McCloy found that the average individual could increase his strength approximately five per cent per week initially, and that in most cases strength was doubled within a year. After the first year this level of strength can be maintained by a five-min-

ute exercise program performed *once a week*. After two years, only *once a month* is required to maintain the same acquired level of strength.

A summation of Dr. Muller's findings state: "From the results reported thus far, one can say that there is no better way to increase muscular strength than one short, about half maximal, isometric contraction once a day. Contracting a muscle for a longer time, more strongly, or oftener, does not improve the increase in strength."

Here is a list of 10 good isometric exercises that can be used as a complete training program by any individual for increasing muscular strength. For the last three exercises, two pieces of rope are used to provide a little variety in the workout routine.



1) Either sit or stand with the upper arms raised so that the elbows are sideward and about at the level of the shoulders. With the hands close to the chest, push with one fist and resist with the palm of the other hand held against that fist. Push *hard* with the forearms held in a line very close to the chest. (An exercise for the chest muscles.)



2) Sit or stand, hold hands behind head about the level of a rim of a hat. Pull backwards with the arms,



**Capt Otott**, a Civil War buff, is also strong on keeping fit. He wrote this article to encourage physical fitness among all Marines. He does the same for civilians with articles in "Strength and Health Magazine." Now supply officer for 1/7 at Camp Pen, he served two years enlisted, was commissioned in 1952 via PLC after graduating from Notre Dame. In 1959 he was ExO of Parris Island's Special Training Unit which specializes in physical fitness problems of recruits.

elbows near the sides of the head, and resist by pulling against the hands with the back of the head.



3) Sit or stand. Legs flexed, hands against the knees, push down with the hands against the knees, and give resistance, hands against the knees. (For the development of the flexors of the thighs.)



4) Lie on back, hands behind head. Bend trunk forward with the lower back flat on the floor, but flexing trunk forward hard. (For strengthening the abdominal muscles.)



5) Lie on back. "Suck in" the abdomen, hard. Do this at least 10 times. (This will usually cause an overly fat abdomen to shrink a number of inches in a few months.)





6) Lie on back, legs straight, resting on heels. With fists on floor or bed and held beside crown of head, raise the whole trunk upward, resting on heels, and on fists and top of head. (For the back and extensors of the thighs.)



7) Lie on back, legs straight, feet crossed, and try to pull the legs apart, resisting with the two legs. (For development of the abductors of the legs.)

To perform the remaining three exercises, two pieces of rope or sash cord are required. Each piece should be approximately 40 inches long for an individual of average height. At each end make a loop of about eight inches in diameter.



8) Standing with a foot in each of the two loops, hands in the opposite loops, bring the trunk erect. Flex the forearms hard, in front of the elbows, palms up and forearms parallel to the floor. (For the biceps and shoulders.)



9) Stand with feet in the loops and hands in the opposite loops. Bend trunk forward about 90 degrees, arms backward and upward, elbows slightly bent and arms parallel to the floor. Pull hard upward on the handle loops. (For triceps, shoulders, and upper back.)



10) Stand with feet in loops and the hands in opposite loops. Bend trunk forward about 90 degrees. Raise arms sideways as far as possible, keeping hands in line with the feet. (For the upper arms and shoulders.)

As a word of caution it must be remembered that this program is no substitute for a variety of other vigorous exercise programs, which not only increase muscular strength but also improve respiratory endurance, stamina, coordination, flexibility, and other necessary attributes for all-around fitness.

Application of isometric exercises is the best answer for those who for some reason cannot, or do not desire, to participate in other developmental activities. These exercises will give a maximum increase in muscular strength. They permit absolute economy in training time and apparatus. Five minutes of stationary running immediately after the isometric workout is recommended for better respiratory endurance—and loss of fatty tissue.

USMC



# To KILL the Enemy

By Col G. H. West and  
Capt J. T. Smith

THE DI FACES HIS RECRUIT PLATOON, "What is your mission?"

"Kill the enemy!" comes the tough answer from a hundred throats.

Certainly this reply is in keeping with the high tradition of military excellence which characterizes our Corps. It is a part of the esprit and élan instilled in each recruit; it is a part of a tradition begun by the dead-eyed sharpshooters of the Revolutionary fighting tops, and nurtured by the unerring marksmen of WWI's muddy trenches, the sure-shooting Marines of the 20's and 30's in Haiti, China, and a hundred other places. The long life of the argument surrounding the accuracy of the M-1 signals that the DI is still doing his job of instilling this spark of military excellence in our present force-in-readiness. To assure the survival of this tradition, we must continually examine our efforts and methods to make certain that each Marine, in fact, has the ability to "kill the enemy."

Strangely, this excellence in weaponry found in our Corps historically was true of our nation as a whole from its earliest days until WWII, when a phenomenon occurred of too few rifles being fired in combat and too few hits being scored by those firing.

If BGen S. L. A. Marshall's often quoted statistics are to be believed, only one out of four US infantryman participating in combat during WWII actually engaged the enemy by discharging his weapon. This was so startling to a victorious Army that when the Korean incident provided opportunity to further inquiry into the American soldier's reaction to personal combat, great effort was expended to analyze his performance. The American public and many in the military have never realized that approximately 10,000 rounds of small arms ammunition were fired for each enemy killed or wounded. In this conflict, for the first time, commanders were seriously disturbed by the open lack of ability of a rifleman to hit his foe or even shoot his rifle in a fire fight.

While most of the research concerning this failure of the combat rifleman has been applied to Army units, it would be fatuous indeed to imagine that it did not apply in some degree to the Marine Corps. Our self-developed self-confidence and ego, if you will, make it hard for us to admit that we may be far less effective in combat—or as combat trained units—than we could be.

As a result of study of the problem of the inadequate rifleman, the Army has abandoned known-distance marksmanship training and

now uses a system called "Trainfire," specifically designed to develop confident and able combat marksmen.

The purpose of this is not to advocate the adoption of "Trainfire" or any other radical method of combat marksmanship training. Rather, it is written to recall attention to an existing directive and to illustrate how use of new ideas and training devices and imagination, coupled with a different type of annual marksmanship qualification, can produce Marine riflemen and infantry squads ready to face the demands of today's atomic threat battlefield.

To do this, we must teach, accustom, and indoctrinate Marines to fire in a combat atmosphere. Time is now too short to permit the old saw: "He'll be a great soldier when he's blooded in an engagement or two." Ideally, each Marine should be so trained that he will be totally effective in fire combat. This, of course, is not feasible since our process automatically rejects the "Pavlov conditioning" we found out about in Korea. We can, however, examine the reasons for combat failure and try to provide a means in our training to overcome this failure.

There are several known reasons why a man does not fire at the enemy. The primary reason appears to be a mental block, a psychologi-



cal inability to kill another human being. Fortunate for all of us that the influence of home, school, church and law are so strong. Yet this block must be removed or reduced before more men will fire. The unrealistic, and even sterile, training which characterizes so much of our everyday, peace-time experience needs spicing with some realism to help overcome this aversion to killing. The impact of battle cannot be duplicated, but we can try.

Another reason for not engaging the enemy is a failure to identify a combat target. The firer expects to see the enemy appear over the rise as the target did on the 500 yard line at the rifle range. He waits and waits—none appear. The WWII infantry company making the deepest D-Day penetration on Omaha Beach saw only six enemy troops though it suffered a high percentage of casualties. Marines were frustrated by the same lack of targets in campaign after campaign in the Pacific, except during Banzai attacks, until they learned from bitter experience how to spot the wily Japanese.

And still another reason: we over-emphasize economy of fire. We teach Marines not to add to the supply burden by indiscriminate firing at bushes and stumps; yet experience teaches that discriminating fire at these targets is exactly how to hit the enemy, for this is where he is.

There are many other explanations of why men do not fire in combat, but these few should suffice to indicate that there are reasons which present a tremendous challenge to our training ability.


There are many facets of great importance in developing Marines. Leadership, discipline, knowledge of weapons and tactics, aggressiveness and esprit are the qualities on which the Marine Corps has based its pride. These continue to be a happy result of our training system. They were exemplified in a traditional way during the last force-in-readiness employment in Lebanon and will be again at any time. However, it would be much more reassuring if the marksmanship training of this magnificent body of tough and confident combat men did not end at the 500-yard line each year. To consider the last shot fired on the Known Distance Range each year as an end to marksmanship training indicates a misunderstanding of the importance of this type training to the force-in-readiness. In fact, nothing about known distance firing will help overcome the tendency not to fire in combat. However, let's examine our marksmanship system to see if it helps to overcome our natural or instilled hesitations.

We are all acquainted with the details of training that teaches each of us intimate familiarity with and confidence in our rifle. From the initial agonies of the recruit assuming unnatural firing positions and nursing a bruised lip or shoulder, to the annual exercise of requalification, all learn to aim at and usually hit a target. What are the elements here? A beautifully tailored range, orderly rows of black target circles looming from glistening white backgrounds at specific distances; reasonable weather and light, and certain-

ly no high winds; adequate time to shoot and a handy coach to help rectify errors. Of course, this teaches Marines how to hit targets. But what about combat? Gone are the pleasant range facilities. No ordered targets are standing out at known ranges. Maybe it's stormy or night. Perhaps the rifleman is on his own to shoot true with his battle sight or possibly die trying. The rifle range is not much help here!

Admittedly, there is value in known distance qualification training. It does create confidence in his weapon and it does instill obedience to command. Both of these qualities are essential in a fighting man. But let's examine where known distance range firing leads us.

Once each year Marines must fire the range with the object of retaining or improving their ability to hit a known target at a known distance. The usual practice is one week of "snapping in," either part time or all day. This is followed by five working days of preliminary and record firing. How many hours of actual firing does a Marine get from this week? Maybe four hours. The result of this is that two weeks' time for each Marine is spent each year for the maintenance of a reasonable proficiency in a shooting gallery. In 1958, 144,000 Marines went through this routine. Ten working days times this (1,440,000 man days) were spent preparing each Marine to win a doll for his girl at the beach. No doubt that the hackles of all old shooters and many others have risen, but in all honesty, do you be-



**Rifle range targets stand out, are easy to see**



**But combat range provides battlefield realism**

lieve that we have the money and men to waste on a sport that doesn't completely train for combat?

You may object that only a small percentage of the Corps puts away its score books after requalifying, that there is immediate follow up in the FMF with combat firing in field ranges. Well, let's look at the picture in the Divisions.

Truly, the Divisions are heavily committed to exercises and maneuvers which are designed to keep them combat ready at all times. The result is good and the Divisions are as ready for a fight as the circumstances under which we currently labor will permit—except that the man with the rifle is not ready to shoot in battle. BGen S. L. A. Marshall makes a telling point in *Men Against Fire*: "We are on infirm ground when we hold to the belief that the routine of marksmanship training and of giving the soldier an easy familiarity with the rifle will automatically prompt the desire to use the weapon when he comes under fire." Generally, the FMF rifleman has very little opportunity to fire his weapon under circumstances approximating those he might expect to encounter in a fire fight. The reasons for this are basically three:

- Lack of command realization of this fact.
- Very limited and unimaginative combat-type range facilities.
- Unit commitments for other

**Col West**, a 1938 graduate of the Naval Academy, co-authored this article before being assigned as CO, 1st ITR, Camp Lejeune in June 1960. He is a strong advocate of realistic combat training. Commissioned in October, 1940, he has served with the Armed Forces Information Office, as an ExecO in Korea, and as G-2/G-3, MCB, Camp Lejeune. He graduated from Senior School in 1953, was aide to CMC 1954-56, and a Naval Attache in London 1956-58.



type training.

In this era of shrinking funds and manpower it seems that we are neglecting a fundamental element while decrying our reduced readiness brought on by the shortages. Let's require maximum standards of combat excellence from what we have and we will be ready. Let's examine current directives as a measure of our shortcomings.

All infantrymen and others will do well to re-read paragraph 24350 of the Marine Corps Manual. The requirements of this paragraph are as sound today as when written. How well balanced is the training in your unit against this comprehensive directive? Here's a picture of it: You are riding a teeter-totter with one end held firmly to the ground by an overweight known-distance playmate. When he lets up occasionally, you can barely touch your feet to the ground of combat marksmanship.


It's high time that a close look be

given the validity of training weight of known distance marksmanship in the Marine Corps' program, particularly in the case of annual requalification. As a suggestion, why does the rifleman in the FMF requalify each year under formal rifle range conditions? Wouldn't it make more combat-ready sense to have him qualify individually and with his squad on combat-type ranges? We don't forget how to shoot a rifle at a target but we need to practice at killing a man under battle conditions. Let's concentrate on using electro-mechanical "response" targets and ingenious firefight simulators on the best combat ranges we can devise. Let's get more ammunition for this type of training and less for plinking at the "V" in the black.


In an effort to make this article constructive and not critical, we would like to propose a redirection of the present method and emphasis used in training the Marine rifleman. This redirection carries out



**Figure 1—Individual Combat Transition Course**




**Figure 2—Squad Attack Range**



**Figure 3—Squad Defense Range**





**Capt Smith**, a graduate of Saint Peter's College, Jersey City, N. J., was commissioned through the PLC program in June '51. His background as range officer, at CamLej, from May '58-May '60, reading, conversation with Marines, and a view of TRAINFIRE at Fort Benning, convinced him that more could be done to improve our marksmanship training cycle. Capt Smith is now I&I, 11th Rifle Co, USMCR, Burlington, Vt.

the provisions of the Marine Corps Manual and will enhance our combat ability. This redirection uses known distance firing as an element, not an end, of the training.

We hope the problem already discussed has prodded new imaginative training ideas to arise, as well as a determination to re-examine the unit training schedule. As an aid in this re-examination, the following marksmanship program is outlined. Strong backs and initiative can provide facilities similar to those described. This redirection is offered not as the solution but as a point of departure. It is necessarily sketchy in places, since the details, the implementation, is left to you, the commander on the ground.

Each Marine is taught functioning and firing of the M-1 rifle at Boot Camp for approximately three weeks. This is excellent. It should not be changed, for this training serves as the basis for all later firing.

At Infantry Training Regiments


during Individual Combat Training, continued emphasis should be placed on field firing with the rifle, and with other company weapons. Every effort must be expended to insure that the greatest value is derived from realistic transition and other combat-type firing ranges. It is vital that stress be placed on target selection and detection, range estimation, and field firing techniques. After about 20 syllabus training days, the graduate recruit is prepared to take his place as a full-fledged member of a division ready to fight.

So far, little real change in the existing system seems necessary. A shift of emphasis is all that is needed to make it more effective. The Marine, once he leaves Infantry Training Regiment, must be ready for combat with an FMF unit where his ability to "kill the enemy" should be preserved and improved.


To do this we propose the following system for training FMF combat marksmen:

- Immediately upon joining a ground Fleet Marine Force unit from any source, including ITR, each Marine will fire a three-day Individual Combat Transition Course (Figure 1). The course would consist of a one-day refresher of the combat firing techniques learned in Individual Combat Training, a day of preliminary record firing, and a day to fire for record. The record course will require the Marine to engage eight targets at varying ranges displayed for five to ten seconds. Forty-two rounds would be fired in all; eight from a foxhole, eight prone, eight off-hand, eight from any position selected by the firer and eight rounds while advancing from the zero yard line toward the 50-yard line. One hundred and twenty rounds will be needed for this training period. A similar course of three days duration will be fired by each man in the FMF annually for record. No one in the FMF will fire the Known Distance Requalification Course.

- The next phase of the program calls for progressive squad training ranges. The Commandant has given much-needed emphasis to this phase of training by instituting the annual Squad Competition at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico. Here are the ranges which we believe will bring a squad to effective combat level. Enemy movements and positions would be simulated by electromech-



**Figure 4—Squad Independent Action Range**



**Figure 5—Reinforced Squad Assault Range**



**Pop-up targets provide combat realism**

anical "response" targets on all ranges where available.


- We then need a Squad Attack Range. The objective of this range is to teach the squad to work together as a team. The fire teams get the idea of working around the automatic rifleman. All learn confidence in themselves, their leaders and their combat formations. See Figure 2.

- Next comes a Squad Defense Range. An enemy advances and assaults the friendly squad as it establishes a defensive position. The leaders learn to select targets and to control fire; the men learn that every man must fire to hold the position against a determined enemy. See Figure 3.

- Logically following is a Squad Independent Action Range. The squad conducts a combat patrol and meets varying situations. The objective is the employment of principles taught during previous firing periods which, when repeated, will become Combat SOPs for the squad. See Figure 4.

- Finally, we have a Reinforced Squad Assault Range. The squad, reinforced, conducts an assault on a fortified position. During the reorganization phase an enemy counter-attack is experienced. The squads learn to work in close harmony with other weapons and formations. See Figure 5.

This series of ranges should be fired at least twice each year for record by each Fleet Marine Force squad and comparable sized unit. Preferably a blank firing rehearsal would be conducted prior to the live firing exercise. Infantry units should fire the course quarterly, if possible. While this will place a heavy strain on the training facility, the improvement in the confidence of the leader in his men, and the



*The machine gun simulator looks and sounds like the real thing*

men in their leader, warrants any extra effort needed. The devices used, the electro-mechanical target (3C52b) and small arms simulator (3C65b) will shortly pay for themselves in low maintenance costs and men released for other duties. The devices have an all weather capability and may be permanently installed on the range. Since the devices incorporate an automatic hit recorder and fall when hit, only one operator is required for any range described here, except the Transition Range, which will require an operator and a coach for every two lanes. As can be seen, with no grass to be mowed or targets to be pasted, maintenance costs and personnel overhead will be measurably reduced while combat readiness of the Marine Corps will be measurably increased.

These changes are directed mainly at the ground FMF Marine. For the air Marine, only the annual three-day transition course discussed above is felt necessary, just as aviation personnel now fire the "B" Course. For post and station and

seagoing Marines, the three-day "B" Course known-distance firing will provide for the maintenance of marksmanship ability. The few points of score added by two more days of firing the "A" Course do not compensate for lost man-days in a shrinking Corps. If a Transition Course is available, this should be used rather than a known-distance range.

By making these ranges as combat-real as is within the realm of imagination, safety and funds, and by putting as much physical and psychological pressure on the Marines firing them as possible, we will produce combat marksmen capable of "killing the enemy"—and we'll save money and manpower while doing it.

Combat training is our responsibility and our challenge. Means to achieve the most effective Marine Corps are never static but must be varied with changing conditions. Let's keep our thinking and our training dynamic and flexible in order to impart maximum combat ability to the men who compose our nation's force-in-readiness. USMC



### **Not A Confidence Course**

♦ IT WAS A ROUTINE inspection until the platoon sergeant snatched a rifle from a tall southern lad who sported a natural grin. Suddenly the Sergeant became enraged. For several minutes he expounded on the state of cleanliness of the weapon while the young officer candidate seemed oblivious to it all. Finishing up, the sergeant said, "In my entire career I have never see such a filthy weapon; what do you have to say for yourself?"

"Sir," snapped the OC, "I'd like to survey my weapon. I've lost confidence in it."

\$15.00 to 1stLt E. W. Butchart

Marine Corps Gazette • October 1960



## *CopterNews from Sikorsky*

**Marine helicopter test-fires Bullpup missile.** As a Marine HUS-1 helicopter hovered at 1,500 feet, a jet of flame streaked from near its starboard side. The Bullpup missile flashed away—out to take a bite of its prey, a target floating in the Chesapeake. The 12½-foot, 570-pound Navy Martin Bullpup missile was the largest and first radio-controlled missile ever fired from a helicopter. Once launched, the pilot guides the missile to target by a switch on his control stick. The two together, Bullpup and helicopter, may turn out to be the perfect combination to provide close ground support for troops. It would implement battlefield firepower with effective punch.

**Operation face lift.** Thirty U.S. Army H-37's, largest helicopter flying in the free world, are being flown to Sikorsky's Connecticut plant for modification. Major face lifting items include equipment for automatic stabilization and for the standardization of communications. Other improvements will step up operating efficiency...extend the helicopter's range...and cut down operating and maintenance costs. The H-37, ordered from Sikorsky in 1954-55, set a world speed record of 162.7 miles an hour in 1956. Driving the five-bladed, 72-foot diameter main rotor are two 2,100-horsepower engines from Pratt & Whitney Aircraft.


**Helicopters do the work of fire extinguishers.** A forest fire was raging in Carbon Canyon, south of Los Angeles. Seven Marine HUS crews of HMR 361, carrying special fire fighting kits, bombed with chemicals and water the woodlands ahead of the fires. The blaze was stopped from spreading. Next, the fire itself was drenched and then finally extinguished with the same solution. Runs on the target were made at altitudes of 40 to 100 feet at speeds of 40 to 60 knots.



*A New World of Mobility by*

**SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT**

Stratford, Connecticut/A Division of United Aircraft Corporation



# THE SALTY SKIPPER

SAYS

Good Teams are  
Three Deep



“BULL,” I SAID, “WE DID FINE ON THAT TACTICAL test division gave us. Col Coleman was surprised.”

“The Snorter was really snorting,” Lt Durham said, chuckling. “Every time he pulled a trick out of his bag, our men countered it just like that.” Bull snapped his fingers.

“Yeah, it looked like we’d been briefed.” I sat back and put my feet on the desk sighing contentedly. “We’ve got a real team!”

“I’d take it into combat tomorrow,” Bull said. “I better check the pay office, Skipper. I don’t want any slip-ups. Our lads need money to enjoy the long weekend they’ve won.”

After Bull left, I basked contentedly thinking how lucky I was to have him for my exec and Smoky Stover for my first sergeant. I mumbled to myself, “I’d be in a hell of a mess if I lost either of them.”

Suddenly an idea shook me, puncturing my rosy dream! “If you lost either of them and it fouled up your outfit, whose fault would it be?” I demanded of myself. I took my feet off the desk and sat up rubbing my chin. “Yours, you old salt!” After a moment I called the first sergeant.

“Smoky, I was just patting myself on the back for the way the company went through that tactical test when it suddenly dawned on me that if I lost you or my exec, I’d be in a hell of a shape and that’s *bad*!” I pounded the desk. “You can’t call an outfit well trained if the loss of two key men would ruin it.”

“I never thought of it that way,” Stover said. “You wouldn’t miss me but you’d have a hard time replacing Mr. Durham.”

“Come off it, Smoky, I couldn’t replace either of you and the fact that I can’t is a black mark against you,” I said.

“You’re right, Captain. It’s my job to train someone to take over in my absence,” Stover said nodding assent. “One isn’t enough either. Football teams are three deep at each position; the military can’t be any less. People get hurt in combat faster than in football.”

“That’s for sure!” I said. “Pass the word that I want to see all officers and SNCOs in my office this after-

noon at 1330.”

“Aye, aye, Sir.”

When everyone was seated, I said, “You were professional Marines on that tactical test. I’m proud of you. The way we knocked that test cold means we’ve completed the first training cycle.”

“First cycle?” GySgt Jacobs ejaculated. “We did everything Col Snorter—I mean Col Coleman gave us and then some. We’re *trained*!”

“Gunny, you’re right! We did everything Col Coleman gave us,” I said, looking each of them in the eye. “But . . . he didn’t give us the *final* examination.”

“What’s that, Captain?” Lt Durham asked.

“He didn’t assess casualties and have the seconds-in-command take over,” I replied.

“It wouldn’t’ve made any difference,” Lt Bozeman said. “Doyle could take over my platoon. No strain.”

“Fine, Bozo, but what if Doyle and Bull here became casualties about the same time?” I asked. “You’d have to take over as my exec. Could your platoon guide take over the platoon?”

“Brownie’s a good man but that’s a big jump,” Bozeman said dubiously. “He’s never had a crack at the platoon.”

“He’s gonna get one now,” I said emphatically. “1stSgt Stover pointed out to me earlier today that football teams are at least three deep at every position. We’ve got to be three deep and then some.”

“Captain, may I make a suggestion?” SSgt Doyle asked.


“Certainly.”

“Mr. Bozeman always goes somewhere else when he turns the platoon over to me. He doesn’t stick around breathing down my neck. I can try out all my ideas. I think we better all do the same,” Doyle said.

“That’s a good point, Doyle. When you turn your job over to someone else, go to the library and read *Fix Bayonets*. If you stick around, the new man won’t try his ideas, he’ll try to do what he thinks you’d do. He gets no training unless he can try his own methods,” I said. “Well, that’s our problem. We’ve got to be three deep. Let’s get at it!”

USMC





*Snapper four, this is Wizard...vector zero seven zero for bogey...climb to angels "xxx" ...bogey bears three o'clock...range "xxx."*

## For the U.S. Marines—ASSIGNMENT INTERCEPT



An advanced tactical early warning radar, Sperry's extended-range MPS-21 is scheduled for adoption by the Marine Corps. The air-transportable system sets up in less than eight hours to provide concise information for control of combat interceptors.

The radar antenna searches near and far skies providing the operator with range, height, and azimuth data. Height readout is numeric, requiring no calculation. The equipment can be adapted for track-while-scan operation. Radome is a dual-wall air supported structure, compartmented so as to remain effective even when a number of the sections have been pierced.

In all, the MPS-21 is an advanced example of U. S. capability today in the critical area of tactical early warning.



**SURFACE ARMAMENT DIVISION, SPERRY GYROSCOPE COMPANY, DIVISION OF SPERRY RAND CORPORATION, GREAT NECK, N. Y.**

# MALAYA JUN

JANG

SENGI  
PATANI

GRIR

TAIPING

IPOH

MALAYA

KUALA LUMPUR

SEREMBAN

KOTA  
TINGI

SINGAPORE





# JUNGLE PATROLS

By Maj Bruce F. Meyers

Violence and terrorism broke out in Malaya in June 1948. The Malayan Communist Party followed a plan that had proven itself elsewhere. Few British troops remained in the country and the Malayan Police Force was weak. The plan was simple: murder the British planters, miners and administrators; seize control of the country, and set up a Communist Republic of Malaya. Fortunately, execution of the plan was uncoordinated. A state of emergency was declared and troops were hurried in.

The mixed racial background of Malaya complicated the situation in 1948. Malaya has a population of about 6½ million. Over 3 million are Malays and 2½ million are Chinese. The rest are Indians, Pakistanis and a polyglot of other nationalities. The population is spread generally along the 700-mile peninsula stretching south from the Thailand border to Singapore. Political domination of this heavily populated area, as well as its rich holdings in rubber, rice, and tin, made Malaya an ideal target for the Communists.

The stage was set for trouble in Malaya in 1927 with the formation of the Malayan Communist Party. The party prospered until the Japanese invasion in 1941. In contrast to its pre-war, anti-British operations, the party allied itself with the British to form the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army. Successful guerrilla operations against the Japanese were aided by Allied air-drops of arms and equipment. After the Japanese surrender, the Malayan Communist Party went underground, and some of this same equipment—cached in the jungle—was used in the uprising in 1948.

At the height of the 11-year-old war, the Communist Terrorists (CTs) had a strength of over 11,000. In October 1959 there were less than 800, half in refuge just across the border in southern Thailand. An estimated 6,700 CTs were killed and another 1,500 captured in skirmishes with the security forces, mostly in patrol and ambush action. Some 2,600 surrendered because their political sympathies changed, they were starving, or they were simply "chased" out of the jungle.

During this same 11-year period, 9,000 non-Communists were killed or wounded. Half were civilians—planters, miners, and rubber tappers. The others were members of the Security Forces, made up of British and Commonwealth Forces, and Federation of Malaya Army, Police Force, and Home Guard.—BFM

THE 1ST NEW ZEALAND BATTALION is stationed in northern Malaya near the Thai border. Its mission is much the same as any Marine infantry battalion's: "... seek out and destroy the enemy in the jungle and its fringes." In the 18 months since its wiry, little commander, LtCol Kim Morrison, DSO, brought his men from New Zealand to the jungles of Malaya, the battalion has 15 counted "kills" and taken 13 prisoners.

The battalion is billeted at Taiping and operates its headquarters

and four rifle companies from this semi-permanent base. The rifle companies are commanded by majors and average 120 in strength. They operate from company bases which vary in location with the tactical situation.

I was assigned to Company "C", commanded by Maj Jock Harvey, which was operating in the Liman Kati area on the Thai-Malayan border. Liman Kati is the name of the *kampung* and one of the so-called new villages. Early in the campaign Security Forces found that Com-

munist Terrorists (CTs) were being fed and supplied by Chinese sympathizers working as rubber tappers and living as squatters along the fringes of the rubber plantations and jungle. In an effort to cut off supplies for the CTs, all civilian rubber tappers and jungle farmers were relocated in government-built "new" villages. Liman Kati is such a village. It is situated on the floor of a large valley with many rubber estates. A paved roadway connects it with the towns of Kuala Kangsar to the south and Grik to the north.

The village is quite typical. It is surrounded by two concentric barbed wire fences eight feet high and 20 feet apart. Entry is controlled through a central gate where Malayan police (male and female) check identification of all persons. By this means, the supply of rice and other food to the CTs is greatly controlled. All residents are under a nightly curfew and must be in their re-settlement villages by dark.

The terrain for Charlie Company's operations in the Liman Kati area is typical of Malaya. Rubber estates border the roadway down the center of the valley and extend a half mile inland on either side of the road. These estates consist of acre after acre of neat rows of trees, each with its bark slash dripping white rubber sap into a tiny cup. The edge of the rubber estates is a sharp dividing line with the dense secondary jungle. Primary jungle is relatively free of undergrowth. The area surrounding Liman Kati, however, is secondary—once cleared and now grown back. Every conceivable type of grass, creeper, vine, plant and bamboo grows together to make a nearly impassable tangle of undergrowth. Such was the area for our operations.

Most Malayan jungle operations are conducted on squad and platoon level. This is not to say there is little activity at higher echelons. Before any operations can be conducted, detailed coordination and control is required to prevent the clash or ambush of friendly forces. Needless to say there is also the very necessary logistic, communication and command support for lower echelons.

British rifle platoons, though smaller in size, bear some similarity to Marine rifle platoons. Usual strength is one officer and 31 men. Platoon headquarters consists of the lieutenant platoon commander, a platoon sergeant, a batman, a signaller and a rifleman. There are three nine-man sections (squads). Each is broken down into three, three-man groups: a reconnaissance or contact group (scouts), a support group (with the Bren gun), and a rifle or reserve group.

Charlie Company's camp was located about a quarter-mile from the new village of Liman Kati, 100 yards off the road on the edge of a large



*Author, second from left in front row, with deep patrol.*

rubber estate. It consisted of five tents similar to the Marine Corps' squad tent in size. One was the headquarters tent (including communications back to the battalion area); one each for the two platoons (7 and 8 Platoons—the British platoons being numbered consecutively from 1 to 12 in the battalion); a recreation tent (including the *charwalla*, a Chinese concessionaire with limited PX supplies); and a supply and medical tent.

Most of the patrols from Charlie Company's Liman Kati patrol base were of three kinds: ambush, curfew and jungle patrols (either combat or reconnaissance). I was fortunate enough to participate in all three types.

#### **Ambush Patrol**

Most ambush patrols are laid along known or suspected CT tracks (footpaths). Some are set up on the basis of information Special Branch (Intelligence) gains from interrogating prisoners or from informers. Seven Platoon (1st Platoon, Company "C") was scheduled for an ambush patrol during my first evening in Liman Kati. The 12-man patrol was led by Lt Gil Duncan. It consisted of three ambush parties and a three-man curfew "cover" party. The patrol was to leave base camp early in the afternoon, taking a route through the rubber estates

along the *lallang* grass parallel to the jungle edge. The route would take us in view of Chinese rubber tappers working the trees on the estate. Disguised as a curfew patrol, its real mission would thus be covered. The patrol would quietly drop off ambush parties along its route and continue back to the base camp at nightfall. Each of the ambush locations was covered in the patrol leader's briefing (the familiar five paragraph order). A lance corporal or senior private was in charge of each party. The party commander carried a Bren gun (similar to our BAR) and two riflemen had Stirling LMGs.

Our party was dropped off late in the afternoon about a quarter mile from our pre-selected ambush site. We took cover and rested in the tall *lallang* grass a half mile from the jungle edge. At about 1800 the smokeless cookers (similar to C-ration heat tabs) were broken out and the party "brewed up." A hot can of ration stew, some crackers and jam and the tea completed our meal. The jam, incidentally, comes in a tube like a tooth paste—a better method than our flat C-ration can of jam. Our last cigarette for the evening was snubbed out just before dusk and we backtracked to our ambush site.

The site was in the center of a large meadow-like area of *lallang*



grass bordering the rubber estate. It lay along the intersection of two trails cutting through a natural fence line of scrub brush. It seemed a logical route for any CT making a rendezvous for a food pickup. Moving as silently and as unobtrusively as possible (visual reconnaissance had been made earlier in the patrol as we passed the vicinity), we arrived just prior to dark. Our three ponchos were spread on the ground behind some grass cover two to three feet high. The Bren gun was set into position as the primary weapon and was centrally located for field of fire. Spare magazines were carefully positioned on the ponchos for immediate use. Wire was laid about 25 yards up the trails to RAF ground signal flares on both sides of the ambush. The flares, which burn four minutes, would box-in the ambush with adequate light.

Our party was in position and the ambush was set soon after dark. The three of us took up prone or sitting positions an arm's length apart, and waited. We were to wait there until 0200 and then return to base.

I was to set off the ambush by spotting the target with a three-cell flashlight. Pvt Bowdler, at my left, was to detonate the two ground flares and use his Stirling. The



**Maj Meyers** got his idea for making a Malaya patrol after talking to British friends during Operation SADDLE UP, a joint maneuver held in Borneo, June '59. A month later he arranged leave from 1/1, hopped a Marine plane for Hong Kong. He flew Air India to Bangkok (\$80), rode a train the rest of the way (\$26). He spent the next three weeks, made three patrols, with 1st New Zealand Bn, 17th Gurkhas. He's a graduate of Univ of Washington, now with G-3, HQMC.

Bren, sited to my right by the ambush commander, LCpl Houtre, was our main weapon. Site selection gave us grazing fire toward gently rising ground covered with short grass stubble.

One hundred per cent alert was maintained for the first three hours. After that, one-third alert status gave us each a bit of rest. Finally, we left the ambush position after seven hours of waiting, stiff, sore and disappointed. No contact. All had been bitten by the hordes of mosquitoes rising from a swampy jungle stream nearby. Insect repellent worked for a time but heavy perspiration progressively reduced its protection.

Incidentally, some patrols and ambush parties do not use repellent and rely on the twice daily tablet of Paludrine to prevent malaria. This is done because captured CTs said

they had been able to avoid many ambushes because of the tell-tale smell of various items used by British and Commonwealth troops. Mosquito repellent and scented soap were two of the items. Many patrols still use the repellent, but all now use non-smelling soap.


### Curfew Patrol

The curfew requires all civilians (primarily rubber tappers and small farmers) to be on a recognized track by 1600 enroute out of the rubber or jungle edge. Once they reach the main road, they can remain out of the *kampong* or resettlement village until dark.


Curfew patrols are made at irregular intervals and by different routes. The military turns those apprehended over to the police for investigation. But some patrols have made "kill" contacts, surprising CTs enroute into villages.

Lt Gil Duncan was again the patrol leader. Our briefing gave the route, time of departure and return and a review of the arm and hand signals to be used. The signals are similar to Marine Corps signals. "Halt" and "forward" are the same. "Silence" is a finger to the lips. "Listen" is a cupping of the hand to the ear. The most important signal is that for the enemy—a clenched fist with the thumb pointed downward. Friendly troops are the reverse—thumbs up.

Our four-man patrol left base camp in the afternoon during a heavy rain. It continued until our return at dark. Our jungle green uniforms, canvas boots and floppy jungle hats were quickly soaked and made us blend even more with the jungle. The canvas boots have rubber cleated soles and are about the same height as our boon-dockers. The hats, though soaked, did a fine job of keeping the rain from drip-



**Night ambushes were laid along suspected CT approaches.**



Patrols were resupplied by air.

ping down my neck. Weapons included an FN automatic rifle and three Stirling Patchett sub-machine guns.

A three-mile trek through rubber estates and up along the jungle edge gave the patrol quite a workout in the slippery mud and wet jungle floor. The rain helped considerably in silencing the movement of the patrol. It was pleasing to see a patrol moving silently by use of arm and hand signals, covering an area in a most thorough and professional manner.

Lack of contact and approaching darkness brought us back down to the road where we hailed a three-ton army lorry which returned us to our base camp.

Description of the ambush and curfew patrols with their unspectacular lack of contact is significant. Most patrols (more, lately, as CT contacts lessen) are boring, routine and without incident. Some units patrol for months without contact. Troop morale, it would appear, would be quite a problem, but it wasn't. Men of this battalion, from my observations, could be considered typical of those throughout Malaya. Many were National Service (British draftees) or short-service enlisted. As in the Marine Corps, most NCOs are long-term servicemen, the careerists. Without exception, after months of steady, monotonous patrolling, the morale remained very high. When a contact was made morale would soar, and then level

off until the next contact. It was indeed gratifying to see the professional attitude of these modern counterparts to Kipling's Tommy Atkins after nearly two years in the jungles of Malaya.

### Jungle Patrol

The deep patrol is the more common type now being conducted in Malaya. Going into the *ulu*, or jungle, for periods of a few up to as many as 20 days is routine. Depth from the jungle edge is really quite a relative thing. Once inside the overhead cover, the patrol's alertness and actions are the guiding factor, regardless of distance from the patrol base.

British classify patrols by mission, either reconnaissance or fighting (combat). Like Marine patrols, the recon party is small (three to four men) and travels so as to avoid contact. The fighting patrol is larger (platoon or more) and seeks out the CT.

Our patrol was scheduled for four days in the area west of Liman Kati. It was larger than the normal recon patrol and smaller than the average combat patrol. The patrol leader made his final medical check of personnel. This reduced the patrol to nine men. A twisted leg and recent hospitalization of two men, plus the normal leave and other administrative reasons, set the figure.

Lt Mervyn Stewart of 8 Platoon was the patrol leader. LCpl Hales was the second in command. Migan, a native Iban tracker, a signaller, four privates, and myself completed the complement. Weapons included an M5 .303 caliber Jungle Carbine carried by the tracker, three of the new FNs, and five 9mm L2A3 sub-machine guns (Stirlings).

We had two sets of jungle green uniforms, one worn and the other carried as a "dry" spare in the pack and worn at night when based up. We wore canvas jungle boots and carried a pair of tennis shoes ("hockey boots" to the British) to wear at night. These are of Malayan manufacture (Chinese) and don't leave the tell-tale track of the British jungle boot. They are identical to the type worn by the CTs.

Two different types of packs are used, the standard British model 1944 web pack (similar to a large

### 給 珍瓏、宜力、及第六寶連馬共區的馬共人員

看看後面這些圖畫！你們要選哪一張？  
一年以前，你們在吡叻的同志計有四百四十五人。  
今天現存的還不到一百人。下次可能輪到你們去送  
死了。

現在就立刻出來自新，和你們的家人朋友重新團聚，  
太遲就來不及的了。

記着：本邦寬大為懷的民選政府

### 保證給你們公平的待遇！

#### 安全通行証

受馬共人員：

1. 該受馬共人員，係以該受馬共人員為名，
2. 該受馬共人員，係以該受馬共人員為名，

受馬共人員：

1. 該受馬共人員，係以該受馬共人員為名，
2. 該受馬共人員，係以該受馬共人員為名，

#### SAFE CONDUCT PASS

THE BEARER OF THIS SAFE CONDUCT PASS WISHES TO LEAVE THE JUNGLE. TAKE HIM TO YOUR OFFICE.

### Security Force surrender leaflet.

Marine Corps haversack) and the Bergen rucksack. The pack holds mess gear, three days rations (for a four-day patrol), a blanket, a poncho or plastic rain sheet for overhead cover, a nylon hammock (made from two gores of a parachute that had been used for aerial resupply on a previous deep patrol), a small heat tab cooker, and miscellaneous toilet articles.

Our assigned area west of Liman Kati was to take us into dense secondary jungle three miles from the jungle edge. The route took us from an elevation of 200 feet upward to a ridgeline over 2,800 feet. The terrain was rough and broken. Many finger ridges with swift mountain streams gave us a complex of terrain compartments to patrol.

The patrol had been cleared for the area for four days. This meant liaison had been effected by Charlie Company and Battalion and any person contacted in the area was assumed to be enemy. The rules are basic. Once clearance has been obtained in an area, shoot on sight. Brevity of contact has been the history of most engagements. A unit may patrol for weeks and months and then when contact is established, the fire fight may only last from ten to 50 seconds. Obviously, it takes immediate recognition and accurate, well-aimed shots to get the "kills."

Men in the 1st New Zealand wear a blue ribbon sewn around the rim of their floppy jungle hats. Each unit has a different color or design.



In the split second before firing, the hat band serves to identify friend or foe. Fortunately, contacts between friendlies have been rare and with the close patrol coordination are now nonexistent.

The CT uniform, in contrast to the Security Forces', is khaki shirt and trousers and tennis shoes. Some wear a peaked soft khaki cap with the typical red star similar to those seen in Korea.

Prior to leaving the road and entering the jungle edge, Lt Stewart assigned primary sectors of fire. Techniques of patrolling were in most cases identical to Marine Corps methods.

Getting an early start in the morning, the patrol entered the jungle shortly after 0730. Winding upward toward our patrol objective, the high ridgeline west of Liman Kati, took most of the morning. The formation was a loose column through the *lallang* grass. Entering the jungle proper, the formation tightened. Interval varied from 15 to 25 feet between men and in particularly dense undergrowth, it was necessary to close up to about five feet. Stops were made every hour. During these breaks each man faced outboard toward his sector of responsibility. All communication between patrol members was by arm and hand signal.

When the patrol crossed a stream (which occurred sometimes five and six times a day), each man took a drink from his water bottle and replaced the water from the stream, not failing to add the purification tablet to prevent leptospirosis. (The British canteen is similar to ours. It has a larger mouth, making it easier to fill and empty. Another advantage is its noiseless soft rubber top.) Even on high ridgelines the nearest stream is usually only 400 yards down either side. On occasion, water vines were cut for drinking water. A two-foot section of vine furnished a quarter canteen cup of drinkable water. It had a slight peanut-like taste.

About lunch time the first day, the patrol came across an old Communist Terrorist camp, judged to be about a year old. It was on a small slope near a swift stream in an area relatively free of undergrowth. There

were three *bashas*, jungle shelters made of bamboo. These are small sleeping platforms about six inches off the ground with an overhead framework of bamboo poles covered with leaves to keep the occupant dry. Each shelter could bed two men and from this the camp was estimated to have been for six men. A small area had been leveled and cleared for a parade ground and evidence of a lectern and several benches indicated the occupants had undergone indoctrination even deep in the jungle. Coordinates were taken and an appropriate report made.

The patrol continued toward the ridgeline and then circled back down-slope to an area selected for a base camp. The site was some dis-

tance off the trail and near a stream for an adequate water source—but not so near that the noise of the water would drown out jungle sounds and thus reduce security. As the patrol moved into the selected area, Lt Stewart indicated a base or 12 o'clock position. Once designated, each group moved into its assigned defensive position. All hands faced outboard and listened for about a half hour. On occasion patrols doing this have detected CT camps in the immediate area by the sound of chopping.

Once the area is determined secure, men take turns standing security while their buddies set up one-man shelters. The jungle parachute hammock is strung between two trees some 12 feet apart; overhead is stretched the poncho or plastic rain sheet; the pack and other equipment is stowed on the deck below the hammock. Cooking on the small metal cooker with heat tabs is done under the shelter.

Most units base up early in the afternoon. A 20 to 30-minute period is set to cut poles, vines, etc. and all clearing must be done at this time. A quick bath in the nearby stream and change into dry uniform and tennis shoes does wonders for one's morale after a long day of patrolling. Individual weapons are always carried or within reach even when bathing.

On this patrol we had both the standard British ration and the local or Malayan-packed ration. Both were good. The standard British ration is similar to our C-ration with oatmeal, beans, bacon, corned-beef, cheeses, stews and other similar foods. The local ration included rice and curry and makes a tasty Mulligan curry.

Members of the patrol slept in their clothes with weapons at hand. Mosquito repellant was used and some of us slept with a portion of the nylon parachute over our faces.

The fact that most of the patrol slept at night may, at first, seem incongruous with the constant alert during the day. Such is not the case. Security Forces have found that in deep jungle, the CT does not usually move at night and bivouac sites are purposely selected away from jungle trails. Any move-



**Red Terrorist with Russian Carbine.**

ment at night through heavy jungle is quickly detected by the noise or the light from a flashlight that would have to be used.

The two most critical times in security are at dawn and dusk. All hands stand-to, each facing out-board, weapon in hand, in complete alert. Personnel on night security awake the patrol about 15 minutes before dawn. The stand-to is maintained until visibility allows security of the position. At dark the same applies, hence the early stop in the afternoon so all cooking and lights will be extinguished by dusk.

Standard drill for basing up calls for establishing perimeter and connecting trails. Jungle vines are used for communication at night. Sentries can alert the patrol leader (usually located in the center of the base) by tugging on a vine. Similarly all hands can be alerted.

After stand-to and an early breakfast, our patrol moved out next morning minus packs. Two men were left as base security. The patrol could move more quickly and silently without packs. A noon snack and tea were carried in a pouch on our web belts.

The patrol worked up the steep slope some 1,000 yards to the ridgeline. The aborigines and subsequently the CTs found ridgelines offered the most rapid means of movement in the jungle. Thus, many of the major ridgelines have

some form of jungle track or trail tracing their length, as did our ridgeline running up to Hill 2850. The tangle of creepers and vines which covers the slopes does not grow on the ridgelines. Instead, a plant called *atap*, which is 12 to 15 feet in height, grows here. Its large, narrow, spike-like leaves dry and drop to the ground, forming a noisy carpet. Only after rain is it easier to move with less noise.

Our Iban tracker stopped periodically to check for signs of CT movement. The Iban is a native of Sarawak in British North Borneo and is born in the jungle. His are mountain people. They are considered superior to the Dyak tribe who were used for a time for jungle tracking in Malaya.

Few wild animals were encountered on our patrol. On occasion, giant vultures could be seen through breaks in the overhead foliage, soaring over the tree tops. They would emit a distinctive screeching sound. Periodically, monkeys would spot the patrol and set up a howling and hooting almost human. Four wild pigs were surprised one day, and ran grunting through the undergrowth.

There are two main types of leeches in Malaya. The bull, or water leech, and the grass leech. The former is larger than the grass leech and is dark in color. The water leech lives in slow-moving streams



**Daily patrol reports were sent.**

and will attach itself to anything moving. Fortunately, we didn't encounter any of the water leeches. The grass leeches that attached themselves to us were about an inch and a quarter to an inch and a half in length and dark brown in color. Small in diameter, they are about the size of a piece of insulated wire. Once attached, they swell to two or three times in size as they fill themselves with blood. The grass leeches were found on the ground, vines, plants and grass. As the patrol made its way through this area, they would attach themselves to clothing and seek entry to the skin. It is amazing how they find even the smallest opening, such as the eyelet in the jungle boot, or small tear in the jungle pants. Particular care had to be taken after halts. Once inside the trousers, they attach themselves to the inside of the legs near the crotch. I was told that a small amount of insect repellent spread around the tongue and eyelets and down the back seam of the canvas jungle boot would keep them out. Leeches are difficult to detach once they have bitten. If brushed off, the head may be detached in the skin. This will infect and form jungle sores.



**Communist Terrorist armed with early model STEN Light Machine Gun.**





***Iban native trackers were attached to units of Security Force.***

Besides leeches, other medical problems patrols have are: scrub typhus, for which we hand-treated all of our jungle clothing with an oily substance called DPT, supposed to protect for two weeks; leptospirosis, for which we treated all water with the chlorine-smelling water purification tablets; and, malaria, for which we swallowed a twice-daily tablet of Paludrine.

Jungle sores are a modest problem. Most of us patrolled in the daytime with the sleeves of our bush jacket-like shirts rolled to the elbow because of the heat and intense humidity. During the course of the day, one was bound to be scratched by *tuta mati* or other sharp jungle vines. All scratches festered easily and by the end of the patrol, most

of us had a number of sores that had to be treated with gentian violet to dry up.

Lack of contact characterized the second day's patrolling. The patrol returned to base just prior to dark, having covered nearly 4,000 yards of heavy jungle.

Jungle navigation is difficult and made more so by heavy overhead cover which precludes orientation by resection from distant hills and peaks. In addition to constant references to compass and map, streams, stream intersections and ridgelines are commonly used. One technique, in deep rolling jungle with few landmarks, is the use of balloons. A large plastic, colored balloon is inflated with a small, lightweight, chemical generator. It is raised 50

or so feet above the jungle cover and an Auster liaison aircraft (similar to the OE) is contacted by radio. The aircraft, having altitude, can quickly and usually quite accurately tell the patrol leader his location. Care is taken that the plane does not circle the patrol's position and disclose it to possible CTs in the area.

Checking in on our pre-arranged radio schedule, the third day, we received a CW message on the small, battery-powered Australian VHF 510 set (similar to but smaller than an AN/GRC-9). A party of six CTs had been sighted several miles north of our patrol area. Decision was made to withdraw our patrol, give the men a day to refit, and then move with reinforcements into the area of the sighting on a 20-day deep patrol.

We returned to the company base camp at Liman Kati that afternoon, tired, wet, and disappointed again at the lack of contact. This was but one patrol of hundreds deep in the jungle day after day, year after year, with only an occasional contact. Small unit leadership is at its best to keep troops at a high peak of efficiency and morale under such circumstances—a tribute to the British and Commonwealth soldiers.

The author is indebted to many people of the British, Commonwealth, and US armed services for the hospitality and efforts displayed in making these patrols possible. Particular thanks are given to Col James Eales, USA, Military Attache, US Embassy, Kuala Lumpur, Malaya; to LtCol W. R. K. Morrison, DSO, Commanding Officer, 1st New Zealand Battalion, 28th Brigade, 17th Gurkha Division; and, to Maj A. M. Cranstoun, Staffordshire Regiment, Office of the UK High Commission, Malaya. Finally, thanks are extended to the men who made these remarks possible—the patrols.

US MC



### ***Fast Thinking***

ADVANCE WORD WAS THAT THE IG was particularly interested in seeing that the operating and safety instructions for all machines were displayed. The CO quickly concocted a set and at 1630 posted them conspicuously by the pressing machine where none had been previously.

The next morning the IG, eyeing the obviously new signs, asked the young private standing at the machine, "Son, how long have those been there?"

Came the quick answer, "They were put up yesterday, Sir. The old ones were all tore up and a damn mess."

\$15.00 to Maj George C. Fox

**BGen W. T. Fairbourn**  
Director, MCR

THE MARINE CORPS HAS COME up with an answer to some basic problems that could and probably would arise in the event of Reserve mobilization. The answer: Advance Mobilization Orders which would be executed automatically during a general mobilization or attack on the US.

Behind the Advance M-Day Orders lie two basic problems: 1) Will even ordinary conditions enable the Commander, Marine Reserve Training (COMART) and District Directors time to prepare and mail orders to active duty? Would reservists receive them and report by the time required? Overburdened mail and transportation could possibly throw a monkey wrench into things. 2) In the event of an attack on the US, these order-writing activities might be unable to prepare individual mobilization orders due to enemy action.

With these thoughts in mind ad-

vance orders were conceived and produced. COMART and Districts will begin issuing them to Ready Reserve officers late this year. Enlisted reservists may be included in the plan at a later date.

Not all Ready Reserve officers will receive the orders. Those who do will be directed to report to a Marine Corps or Naval activity sometime during the first month of a general mobilization. Actually, there is no difference between those who will be receiving the advance orders and those who would be ordered if a general mobilization were to occur today.

The important item is that reservists affected will have their orders in advance and need not concern themselves whether or not the mail goes through.

Also, those with advance orders will know well in advance that they have been selected and thus can take steps to assure their families are prepared for any sudden departure in event of war.

A copy of the new type orders is

shown in the illustration. The card is perforated down the center. The left portion will be signed and returned to COMART, the District Director or Organized Unit commander, as appropriate. The right side constitutes the orders and will be carried at all times, along with the individual's ID card. The orders state where and when he is to report and the type billet he will most likely fill.

Billet classifications include FMF, BS&A (Base Support and Administration) or Sec (Security Force, i.e. Naval Station or Marine Barracks). These classifications also will assist the Marine Corps in making appropriate active duty for training assignments in the future. First priority goes to those designated for the FMF; second to those assigned BS&A; third to Security Force.

Orders will be in effect for a maximum of two years. At that time, new orders will be issued. At the same time, as mobilization requirements change, some orders will be cancelled, others issued.

|  |  |   |  |
|--|--|---|--|
| NAME<br>SERVICE NUMBER<br>REPORT TO<br>PHASE   |  | NAME<br>SERVICE NUMBER<br>REPORT TO<br>REPORT BY<br>DYS<br>ISSUING ACTIVITY<br>ISSUING ACTIVITY USE ONLY  |  |
| <b>ACCEPTANCE OF ORDERS</b><br>THE TERM OF THESE ORDERS WILL EXPIRE AT 2400 ON THE LAST DAY OF THE MONTH AND YEAR SHOWN ABOVE "VOID AFTER" UNLESS SOONER TERMINATED BY AN APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL OF THE MARINE CORPS. I UNDERSTAND THAT UPON ACCEPTANCE OF THESE ORDERS I AGREE TO REMAIN IN THE READY RESERVE FOR THE TERM OF THESE ORDERS EVEN THOUGH I MAY OTHERWISE BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR TRANSFER TO THE STANDBY RESERVE. |  | <b>OFFICIAL MOBILIZATION ORDERS</b><br>UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE<br>IN THE EVENT OF MOBILIZATION, YOU ARE DIRECTED TO BY<br>OR<br>IF CODE "A"<br>MARINE AIR RESERVE TRAINING COMMAND   |  |
| DATE:  |  | DATE ISSUED   |  |
| SIGNATURE  |  | BY DIRECTION  |  |
| (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE)  |  | (DETACH HERE)   |  |
| AFTER SIGNING ACCEPTANCE OF THESE ORDERS, DETACH ORDERS CARD ALONG PERFORATIONS, AND CARRY WITH YOU AT ALL TIMES.  |  | ON THE REVERSE, ABOVE "Report to," You will report no later than the number of days following the announcement of M-Day" shown above "Report by." Commercial air priority II is certified. Reimbursement will be provided. Travel directed herein is chargeable to current year appropriation for travel of Active Duty Personnel. 4) For Civil/Military Defense Authorities—The bearer holds 1st priority mobilization assignment. Possession of this card and identification card constitutes authority for passing him thru Civil/Military Defense Zones. Report to: |  |

INSTRUCTIONS (printed on reverse side of above): 1) These orders cancel and supersede any previous orders or instructions you may have received from any source. 2) These orders constitute your orders to extended active duty under the following conditions: a. In the event of an enemy attack on the continental United States, or b. In the event of a general mobilization. These conditions will be announced by CONELRAD and/or other news media. 3) Under either of the above conditions, and without further directive, you will proceed at your own expense, by the most expeditious means of transportation available, to the activity named

on the reverse, above "Report to," You will report no later than the number of days following the announcement of M-Day" shown above "Report by." Commercial air priority II is certified. Reimbursement will be provided. Travel directed herein is chargeable to current year appropriation for travel of Active Duty Personnel. 4) For Civil/Military Defense Authorities—The bearer holds 1st priority mobilization assignment. Possession of this card and identification card constitutes authority for passing him thru Civil/Military Defense Zones. Report to:



# ONLY THE RAILROADS CAN HANDLE ANY MILITARY MOVEMENT

Whether it is one man or a division complete with equipment .... the Railroads can handle the job. The Railroads are America's most complete transportation system. They are experienced in matters of military movements .... more so than any other system of transportation. There is no transportation job too tough for the Railroads!

**the RAILROADS OF THE UNITED STATES**

*Reduced fares when on leave*

*...special discounts on Transportation Requests*

*Ask about Family Fares*

***The Best Buy — BUY TRAIN!***



ard  
The  
re-  
strict  
om-  
ight  
will  
with  
ders  
port  
ike-

MF,  
nin-  
rce,  
Bar-  
also  
mak-  
ain-  
first  
for  
ned

axi-  
new  
ame  
ents  
can-

NAVJAG 10475-DE (7-60)

10475-DE (7-60)

the  
"Re-  
I be  
pria-  
ense  
Pos-  
for

1960

# The Extension School's CHALLENGE

## BASIC SCHOOL LEVEL

- 1 A platoon has just taken its objective and is reorganizing. Who is normally assigned the task of resupplying ammunition?
  - a. platoon guide.
  - b. company supply sergeant.
  - c. platoon sergeant.
  - d. platoon commander.
- 2 Who originates the order for a frontline squad to move to supplementary positions?
  - a. squad leader.
  - b. section leader.
  - c. platoon commander.
  - d. company commander.
- 3 Final protective fires are designed to
  - a. force the enemy into preplanned "killing zones."
  - b. stop the enemy assault in front of the MLR.
  - c. protect crew served weapons.
  - d. limit penetrations by the enemy.
- 4 Camouflage of a defensive position should commence when
  - a. foxholes are completed and fields of fire are cut.
  - b. there is only sparse natural concealment.
  - c. troops arrive on the defensive position and be accomplished concurrently with other defensive construction.
  - d. it has been assigned as a priority of work.

## JUNIOR SCHOOL LEVEL

- 5 In the defense, pioneer assistance is usually limited to those tasks which (Select those applicable).
  - a. require special technical skills.
  - b. are too time-consuming for infantry units.
  - c. are beyond the capabilities of the supported unit.
  - d. require simple tools such as shovels, picks, etc.

- 6 The primary purpose of imposing restrictions on the use of mines by subordinates is to ensure
  - a. economy of force.
  - b. strong battle positions.
  - c. effective delay of the enemy.
  - d. success of future operations.

- 7 Which landing document graphically illustrates the landing of the scheduled and on-call waves?
  - a. landing diagram.
  - b. graphic landing table.
  - c. approach schedule.
  - d. wave table.

- 8 After the helicopter-borne forces are well established ashore, which of the following is the primary means of communication between separated units of battalion size or larger?
  - a. radio.
  - b. helicopter messenger.
  - c. radio relay.
  - d. wire laid by helicopter.

## SENIOR SCHOOL LEVEL

- 9 One of the measures embodied in the Constitution of the United States, which helps to ensure subservience of the military to the wishes of the people, has to do with the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive branches. Which of the below powers are vested in the executive?
  - a. to set up military governments in conquered lands.
  - b. to create military forces.
  - c. to declare war.
  - d. to employ the Armed Forces for the security of the nation.
  - e. to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in time of war.
  - f. to supervise and direct the Department of Defense.
- 10 The division fire support coordination center functions under the over-all staff supervision of the
  - a. division artillery officer.
  - b. division naval gunfire officer.
  - c. assistant division commander.
  - d. assistant chief of staff, G-3.


(Answers on page 56)



## WHY NOT

**Increase your worth to the Marine Corps through professional study?  
Enroll in *The Extension Course Program* NOW.**






#### Footnotes to the Crusader's 203,512th flight

This was a test flight for a new *Crusader* — the all-weather F8U-2N pictured here. It was a busy day for *Crusaders* all over the world. Over 700 of these carrier-based fighters have joined Navy and Marine squadrons since the first *Crusader* won the Thompson and Collier trophies. With the more powerful engine and armament, the advanced autopilot and radar of the new -2N, this fighter series is being improved for the third time at minimum cost and without interrupting Fleet readiness. This is "design growth." This is why, fighter for fighter, the *Crusader* has logged more peace-keeping flight hours than any other 1,000-plus-mph aircraft in U. S. service.

CHANCE  
VOUGHT



AERONAUTICS  
DIVISION DALLAS, TEXAS



# REPORT FROM THE READY FORCES THE ORGANIZED RESERVE

## PART ONE

## COMBAT READINESS

By Maj T. Owens and  
Capt J. A. Everett

20 JULY 1950—AT ANY TIME AFTER RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER . . . YOU WILL . . . ORDER TO EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY . . . ALL CLASS II MARINE CORPS RESERVE PERSONNEL, INCLUDING NAVAL RESERVISTS ATTACHED TO AND SERVING WITH YOUR COMMAND . . . /s/ C. B. CATES.

With this message, the Commandant of the Marine Corps launched a chain of events which within six weeks would result in complete mobilization of all Organized Marine Corps Reserve units. Twenty-two units, an aggregate of 4,830 officers and men of a total organized reserve of nearly 40,000, were mobilized on that day. It was barely three weeks after commencement of hostilities by the Communist North Koreans. The first of these units reported to Camp Pendleton only nine days after receipt of the mobilization order. By 11 September 1950, less than six weeks later, all organized (drill pay) units had been mobilized. The Organized Marine Corps Reserve, for a time, ceased to exist.

This was not the first time in its history the Reserve had responded to the call of the Commandant. Back in April, 1917, when our country entered WWI, three officers and 33 enlisted men were the entire Marine Corps Reserve. At the time of the mobilization of November, 1940,

when troubles in Europe made another world war seem imminent, the Organized Reserve had a strength of 236 officers and 5,007 enlisted reservists. But the mobilization for the Korean conflict was by far the largest in the history of the reserve program. This was true in terms of number of units and in total personnel.

In all, 94 separate ground reserve units were mobilized to help meet the Corps' commitments in Korea. Reserve aviation units at that time were organized into 30 fighter squadrons and 12 ground control intercept squadrons, all of which were mobilized by selective recall of individual reservists. Twenty-eight per cent of the Marines who participated in the Inchon-Seoul campaign were reserves. Most of them had been civilians only six to eight weeks earlier.

Just how good was the Reserve Marine who made up the 1950 mobilization force? By the standards set up at that time, all officers and about 50 per cent of the enlisted reservists were considered combat ready. Of those who were combat ready, most had served on active duty during WWII. Of the half who were not combat ready, most needed only brief refresher courses. Only a few had to be trained from scratch, beginning with recruit training.

Qualitatively, this most recent mobilization of the Organized Reserve sprang several unexpected though pleasant surprises. It had been thought that not more than 80 per cent of effective strength would be available on M-day. After all noses had been counted, however, it was found that 90.02 per cent had responded to the call. It mattered but little that physical defects and extreme hardship cases had pushed the final count back near the expected 80 per cent mark. What really counted was the enthusiastic display of willingness and sometimes downright eagerness to serve if needed. Maj Gen O. P. Smith, who commanded the 1stMarDiv during the early stages of the Korean conflict, probably gave the best evaluation of the product of the Organized Reserve when he said:

"Without the Reserves the Inchon landing on September 15 would have been impossible . . . They needed no particular refresher course to renew the amphibious skills they had learned during World War II . . . Reserves were quickly integrated into the division and they all became Marines with as splendid a Marine spirit as the regulars."

How does the Organized Reserve of 1960 stack up against its counter-



part of a decade earlier? As the new year began, some 3,500 officers and 35,500 enlisted reservists were training with 225 organized ground units and 86 aviation units. This is truly a formidable force. But numbers alone do not tell the real story. By far the most important change of the past 10 years has been the snowballing improvement in the quality of the individual reservist. And more recently, the units have started to show that they can join together and act effectively as integrated teams. These improvements are due to a host of factors. Not the least of these is the simple fact that the Corps has had almost nine uninterrupted years in which to rebuild and improve its Reserve component. However, there are at least three factors which seem more than any others to have played a major role in improving the mobilization stature of our Organized Reserve. They are:

- Emphasis on smaller units.
- The "Six-Month Training Program."
- Improved home-armory training as a result of the "multiple drill" schedule.

Each of these is of such significance as to warrant treatment in this article, for in these factors are found the real yardsticks by which the quality of our first-line mobilization force can be measured.

There is nothing new about emphasis on training in the smallest feasible units; in fact, for the Organized Reserve in the first years after Korea, the change was merely

a matter of scope. Where before Korea the program had had a total of 136 ground and aviation units, it was authorized slightly over 300 units for the post-Korea buildup. What this meant was that training henceforth could be conducted in units of about half the size of pre-Korea units. This was because the total strength allocation had not been greatly increased. The small-unit concept was certain to reduce the size of the recruiting problem, and undoubtedly it would make it possible to give more personal attention to the fundamental details of military training.

Beginning in October 1951, with the reactivation of an infantry battalion in Boston, Massachusetts, the Organized Reserve swiftly grew back to its pre-Korea strength. Most of the units in existence today had been activated by the end of 1952. The small-unit concept immediately began to pay off. Recruiting was the order of the day in those first years after reactivation. Every Commanding Officer/Inspector-Instructor team in effect was assigned the task of going out into the community to raise a company or battalion of Marines. And recruit they did. The units grew in strength, but the attrition was terrific! It was necessary in those days to recruit four or more reservists to end the month with a net gain of one.

This "recruit-four, lose-three" situation showed no signs of letting up until 1956. This was when the effects of two big changes in the Reserve picture started to be felt. The first of these changes was that the

total Organized Reserve strength started to level off. The word changed from "grow at all costs," to "just hold what you've got." And it was also in 1956 that the results of the Six-Month Training Program started to affect the units.

The Six-Month Training Program was swept in by the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, passed on August 9th of that year. Essentially, reservists who enlisted in this program would be required to perform an initial period of active duty of six months. This was to be followed by five and one-half years of obligatory reserve service. The Marine Corps Reserve approached the Six-Month program with caution. There were many skeptics, but it soon became abundantly clear that this program, if properly applied, offered a way out of the age-old dilemmas usually associated with the training of reserves. It offered unprecedented stability. There was no doubt that eventually it would ensure almost 100 per cent combat readiness within the ranks of the Organized Reserve.

The Marine Corps implemented the Six-Month program in the simplest possible way. Trainees are sent to the same recruit training as their regular counterparts. They are integrated into the same recruit platoons. No special treatment of any kind is allowed. After recruit training, trainees from aviation units go to aviation activities for schooling in aviation specialties. Of course, ground reservists go to Camp Lejeune or Camp Pendleton for Individual Combat Training. At first, all ground reservists went on to Ad-



*Hawaii's beaches are tailor-made for 27th Rifle Company, Pearl Harbor*

vanced Combat Training, but programs for occupational field training have since been set up for men from non-infantry units.

The success of the Six-Month program had the skeptics mumbling to themselves. It worked so well that in April 1957 the Organized Reserve ceased to offer initial enlistments of any other kind. The result was that every man who entered the Reserve during the past three years either had prior active service upon entry, or else he was required to commence six months of active duty for training very soon after enlistment. Today, about half the enlisted strength of the Organized Reserve is made up of Six-Month trainees. A huge slice of the other half have had full-term tours of active duty. That leaves only a few who have not had and will not have at least six months of active duty. It must not be forgotten that almost to a man this last group has been in organized units for three years or more, and that, by the standards of the mobilization for Korea, at least, they must be considered combat ready. The outcome of all this is that almost 100 per cent of the individuals who make up the Organized Reserve today are *trained and ready for combat*. Of course, there will always be a few who are undergoing the initial active duty for training tour or who are awaiting assignment to training.

The indoctrination into the Ma-

rine Corps which our Six-Month trainees get is of the highest quality. That's because the Parris Island and San Diego style of recruit training simply cannot be duplicated. But the fine results of the program do not end there. These reservists are sharp, hardened, dedicated Marines when they return to their units. Their enthusiasm and professional competence infects the entire Organized Reserve structure. They cause standards of unit performance to edge higher and higher. With the home armory program of recruit training and individual combat training now a matter of infrequent refresher classes, the units have time to try unit training and operations of a level which would have been out of the question a few short years ago.

Before 1958, the weekly two-hour drill was SOP for the Marine Corps Reserve. The Secretary of Defense had directed several years earlier that when more than one drill is held in one day, each must be at least four hours long. Marine Reserve ground units used this authority only for occasional field problems. Seeing a chance to get better training through longer drills in daylight hours, the Director, Marine Corps Reserve, started a massive program of persuasion. He aimed to convince unit commanders that they could push their units to a higher state of readiness if they would scut-


tle the short, weekly drill. A change to double drills meant that training would have to be scheduled on weekends (including the Sabbath, in most cases), and the Director did not wish to impose such a radical change without first giving the units a chance to adjust. Most unit commanders were not hard to persuade. Within a year nearly 70 per cent of the units had voluntarily converted to weekend drill schedules. The units which made the change reported such pleasing results that all hands were told to follow suit not later than October 1959.

With the advent of the multiple drill, the Organized Reserve entered the first stages of another great leap forward. A bit of simple arithmetic shows that the change has doubled the amount of time for home-armory training. It has diverted to useful training precious hours which before had to be used for administrative chores. This bonus is by no means wasted. Training has moved out of the classroom and into the field. Small-unit operations is still the order of the day. During the past year, however, many units have started to use the longer drills in a new way. Joint exercises with neighboring units, all within the confines of a weekend multiple drill, are now common. Units are traveling greater distances to use more lucrative field training areas; and in many units, organizational equipment



**Classroom sessions like these for Richmond's (Va.) 1st 105mm HowBn paid off during Operation Whipsaw**





**Multiple drill has doubled the time for all facets of training**

which had never before been out of the armory is now used as a matter of routine.

There is little doubt that the individual Marines in the Organized Reserve today are the most highly trained mobilization force the Corps has ever had. But what about the quality of the units as units? Aside from the obvious fact that first-class Marines are necessary ingredients of top-quality units, a couple of other points are pertinent to this question. For one thing, the entire Organized Ground structure was given a major overhaul during the last quarter of calendar year 1959. (More about this begins on page 44.) Secondly, a few selected units have been picked at annual field training the past three or four years to test their mettle as combined, operating units. This is done by organizing a dozen or more units at a time into teams

for joint air/ground exercises. To say that these exercises always work with clock-like precision would not be quite candid; but as a practical matter, it is neither possible nor desirable to run a "perfect" exercise under such circumstances. The true value of the air/ground exercises has been that the participating units have a chance to profit by their own mistakes. They bring to the surface weaknesses which can be corrected by future training. Even so, these integrated maneuvers always point up one fact: the individual performance of the man in the ranks is consistently high, no matter what the circumstances. To no one's surprise, the weaknesses that do crop up are in the areas of coordination, communication, and control.

The Organized Reserve and that part of the Regular Establishment which has been most intimately con-

nected with it do not try to conceal their pride in their product. They know, however, that they can no more sit back and rest on their laurels than can the FMF. A few nagging problems have continued to rise to the surface year after year, and a few brand new ones are just over the horizon. The most obvious inadequacy of the Organized program which cannot be solved within present resources is the matter of authorized strength. If the Organized Reserve is too small to meet even the initial mobilization requirements of the FMF, how will the requirements be met? The only sure thing is that the Volunteer Reserve at this time cannot respond fast enough, no matter how adequate the state of readiness of its individual members. Another problem is that of financing progressively higher units performance—attendance at drills and annual field training—within the now well-worn but still uncomfortable "level-budget" concept. It has been necessary to reduce by two or three the number of authorized drills in each of the past three fiscal years. There was just no other way to finance the unexpectedly high performance.

A problem yet to be faced is the coming drop in total Ready Reserve strength. Both the Organized Reserve and the Volunteer Reserve will lose members as a result of a "hump" period in the curve of completions of Ready Reserve obligations. Can this attrition be offset by an increase in enlistments into the Six-Month Program? Or, will the Organized Reserve get back into the business of enlisting reservists without imposing an initial active duty obligation, and as a consequence, accept the inevitable drop in percentage of combat readiness?

No matter what the outcome of the above problem, at least two things are crystal-clear. As the Organized Reserve enters a new decade, its Marines are "imbued with the will to fight," to steal a phrase from our 22nd Commandant. They have the skills with which to fight effectively. And no matter what challenges the future holds, the Organized Reserve will squeeze the last ounce of combat readiness out of its allotment of human, fiscal, and material resources.

USMC



**Rifle companies have moved out of the classroom and into the field**

# REPORT FROM THE READY FORCES

## PART TWO

# PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE READINESS

## THE ORGANIZED RESERVE

THE MISSION OF THE ORGANIZED Marine Corps Reserve is to provide trained individuals for the Fleet Marine Force, by specific ranks and MOS's, as required upon mobilization. This article explains how the OMCR is set up to meet this mission.

The troop list is shown as Figure 1. The first thing that meets the eye is the large number of combat-type units. This is important, because the FMF has mobilization requirements for the first 30 days after M-Day alone which are greater than the entire authorized strength of the drill-pay program. In the face of such urgent needs, it would make little sense to spend limited funds to train people for billets that will not be needed until well after M-day. There will be plenty of time to train these people after the whistle blows.

Figure 2 shows the proportion of reservists who are in combat units and other categories.

The emphasis on training for combat missions extends into the Tables of Organization, too. Generally, the T/O's are just about the same as the unit's FMF counterparts in unit and sub-unit structure. But they differ just a bit in composition of Military Occupational Specialties. Most of the differences are caused by the fact that certain MOS's cannot be trained adequately within the limited time available to reserve units; these were simply left out of the T/O's. Other specialties were lined out for no other reason than that they probably will not be needed until very late in a mobilization. And a few MOS's did not make the T/O because an ample supply can be had from the Volunteer Reserve.

The whole idea is that the reserve troop list and the individual T/O's are stripped down to the bare essentials. The one essential need is that the program must produce the greatest possible number of front-line combatants for call during the critical M-day to M+30 day period. Such specialties as cooks and bakers, bandsmen, and information services—important though they are—must come from other sources. This does not mean that there are no gaps and pockets in the mobilization picture. There are, because the manpower ceiling of 45,000—established for the OMCR by the Department of Defense—is too low to allow the Corps to place in drill status all reservists who are earmarked for the first few days of a mobilization.

Marine Corps Reserve organized units are located in over 200 cities

**Troop List  
Organized Reserve (Ground)**

|                               |    |                             |    |
|-------------------------------|----|-----------------------------|----|
| Air Delivery Co               | 1  | Reconnaissance Co           | 4  |
| Amphibian Tractor Bn          | 1  | Rifle Co                    | 14 |
| Amphibian Tractor Co          | 2  | Service Co                  | 3  |
| Antitank Co                   | 7  | Staff Groups (24 Drill-Pay) | 7  |
| Armored Amphibian Co          | 1  | Supply Co                   | 5  |
| Communication Co              | 6  | Tank Bn                     | 2  |
| Communication Support Bn      | 2  | Tank Co                     | 1  |
| Engineer Bn                   | 2  | Truck Co                    | 6  |
| Engineer Co                   | 11 | 75mm AAA Bn                 | 2  |
| Infantry Bn                   | 15 | 75mm AAA Btry               | 7  |
| Motor Transport Bn            | 3  | 105mm Howitzer Bn           | 8  |
| Ordnance Field Maintenance Co | 3  | 105mm Howitzer Btry         | 7  |
| Reconnaissance Bn             | 2  | 155mm Gun Btry              | 5  |
|                               |    | 155m Howitzer Btry          | 8  |

**Figure 1**



**Firing 3.5-inch rocket launcher**



across the country. Almost all metropolitan areas have a unit of some type. Very few reservists live so far from a unit that they cannot participate if they so choose.

This wide geographical distribution of units is responsible in no small way for the structure of the organized program. Insofar as possible, unit designations have been made compatible with geographical locations. All the amphibious vehicle units, for example, are clustered around the Gulf of Mexico and the San Francisco Bay area. And most important, the size and nature of the manpower potential in each area must be considered. Reserve unit T/O's cannot be filled by Marine Corps Special Order—they must be filled by direct recruiting within the home area. Because of this, unit strength is not subject to precise control. To meet this problem, reserve Tables of Organization have an "open end" instruction written on the cover sheet. As a unit grows or loses enlisted strength, the T/O and T/E fluctuate accordingly. The importance of this flexibility can be appreciated when one realizes that the actual strengths of infantry battalions, for example, range from 269 enlisted to 431 enlisted. The smallest separate rifle company has 60 enlisted Marines while the largest has 230 enlisted.

Each Reserve unit is a separately administered entity. Because the next echelon of command (the District Director) is nowhere near most of its units, in a physical sense, the reserve unit commander has an unusual degree of autonomy. He is supported by the Inspector-Instructor and his staff of regular Marines. The Inspector-Instructor is not in the chain of command, but he has a full share of responsibility for the performance of his unit. His staff handles most of the administrative and logistical details, leaving the unit free to get the most out of its limited training time.

Despite all its peculiarities, the important thing is that the tactical sub-units of most organized units are almost rubber-stamp replicas of the unit's FMF counterpart. To the man in the ranks, there is little if any difference.

USMC



2d Armored AmTracCo amtrac churns from handy San Francisco Bay




Figure 2



# MOMENT OF TRUTH



By Capt Thomas R. Kelly

*"To lack intelligence is to be in the ring blindfolded."*

*... remarks by CMC to Staff*

*4 Jan 60*

✱ DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS THE hue and cry has gone up throughout the Corps for more emphasis on intelligence, and a rededication to those principles of collection, reporting, evaluation and dissemination which we all hold to be so dear. Inevitably, with this upsurge in interest, we have had some changes in organization and equipment. Yet, as one who has labored off and on for the past nine years with my additional 0202, I cannot help but note that our battalion-level intelligence lashup has not changed materially since WWII. To paraphrase the bible of the "Two field," FM 30-5, "the primary source of intelligence is from the ground combat troops in the line, to wit: the infantry battalion." Yet in this nuclear, supersonic era of modern warfare, with stress on flexibility and unit separation, our primary source of intelligence still limps along on a setup that went by the wayside with the days of Tarawa, Iwo Jima and the like.

The need for a change seems obvious. Whether my own personal beliefs are categorically right or way out in left field is really immaterial. The purpose of this dissertation is solely to stimulate some constructive thought on the subject with a view toward eventually creating an intelligence organization that can *actually*

perform the task that we now demand of it.

Starting from scratch, let us begin at the front lines—from whence the bulk of our intelligence should come. Intelligence, even at the company and platoon levels, is a command responsibility. Yet during the thickest part of the fray, when intelligence collection and reporting are most vital, these commanders are too preoccupied with fighting the war to give more than a passing thought to the subject. The result is that the poor, frustrated battalion S-2 rarely hears anything more enlightening than "they're staging for another banzai, give me all the Arty you've got."

## The Problem at Company Level

Shifting briefly to the cloak of my primary MOS (0302), I must rise to the defense of the company commanders in this matter. During the more intense moments of combat, available speaking time on the Battalion Tactical Net is rather limited, to say the least. When the opportunity to get a word in edgewise occurs, there are always other vital messages to send, casualties to evacuate, ammunition and water to replenish, replacements for crew-served weapons that have been knocked out, tactical decisions and questions. About that time you are handed a long-winded report on enemy movements and unit identifica-

tions, which you are altogether too well aware of (but battalion isn't). Something has to give—and it usually is the report for the S-2.

Wire communication is a rarity these days, and even when the luxury occurs, it always seems as though that first incoming round knocks out the line to battalion. (For the benefit of any reader thinking of runners at this point, please return to the beginning of the article and start all over again—you're not with me!)

The solution to this dilemma is apparent: assign the company commander a competent Intelligence Scout to do the job and give him a Battalion Intelligence Radio Net to do it with. We are authorized four scouts. One can be assigned to each rifle company in the infantry battalion. In the past the employment of these four individuals hasn't been the same in any two units. It is also true that the capabilities, responsibilities and functions of the Scouts are possibly the most controversial and misunderstood items within the intelligence field. Let's say we finally place the scout in the position of an intelligence assistant to the company commander. We must consider the capabilities and qualifications the scout needs for his all-important mission.

The Intelligence Scout should be fully able to collect and report all information of the enemy and ter-



rain. He must be highly skilled at the processing of POW's and enemy equipment. He must be expert at scouting and patrolling as well as capable of briefing and debriefing patrols. To accomplish these tasks, the qualifications for such an individual should be as follows:

- Expert on map reading and compass work.
- Thoroughly trained in the reading of aerial photography.
- Expert on enemy tactics, identification markings, techniques, and equipment.
- Expert on all phases of scouting and patrolling.
- Well qualified in the operation of field radio and wire equipment.
- Expert at field sketching and overlay work.
- Well trained in the basic principles of POW interrogation, Order of Battle, Photo Interpretation, and other aspects of Ground Combat Intelligence.

These are but the broader major qualifications for the scout. One could ramble on ad infinitum on some of the more detailed points of refinement. Standards too high? Are we striving for the ideal rather than being realistic? Based on bitter experience it is my conviction that, considering the grave responsibility that can and should be vested in the scout, he must either be a number one boy or else we should ship him back to mess duty and dust off the old crystal ball!

Now that we have outlined the duties of the scout and set up some realistic—if high—standards for him, let us see what the machinations of the boys in personnel have endowed us with. The Provisional-1037 T/O reveals the shocking bit of news that we rate four privates



**Battlefield surveillance radar like this AN/TPS-21 needs trained operators who can maintain and repair it as well as decipher the sounds it makes. Also, is one per battalion enough?**

with an MOS of 0311 for our infantry battalion scouts. In the light of the duties and qualifications for the scout that we have just examined, this is not only ridiculous—it's downright tragic!

You can't just select the four privates with the highest GCT's in the battalion and dump them on the S-2's desk. The efficiency demanded of the men we need can only be acquired with the training and maturity that comes from years of experience. As a company commander, I want the man to whom I have delegated the majority of my intelligence authority to be at least a Staff NCO with an MOS which qualifies him in the intelligence field.

#### Surveillance Radar

Before leaving the subject of the scouts let us briefly touch on an expected event of the future. I am referring, of course, to the advent of the AN/TPS-21 (Battlefield Surveillance Radar). The wheel of fortune at the Personnel Branch was

spun around and the arrow came to rest on the word "SCOUT." Thus in the T/O of the battalion we see that the scout also doubles in brass as an AN/TPS-21 operator. To deny his services to the company commander by such a maneuver would be a fatal error. It would also appear to be a rather impractical arrangement since the AN/TPS-21 is a five-man pack and we have only four scouts—unless the S-2 is expected to tote the remaining part in his spare time.

In operating a piece of equipment such as the AN/TPS-21, it is not merely a question of training operators who can turn the machine off and on, and learn to interpret the "echoes." To be completely realistic about this thing we must provide a crew who can maintain and repair the "little Black Box," as well as decipher the sounds coming from it. That this is a task for personnel with 0311 or 0231 MOS's is, of course, absurd. Break out a five-man crew of communicators, with at least one Radar Technician (2741) in the group, and let them operate the equipment under the control of the S-2.

Before leaving the subject of Battlefield Surveillance Radar let me pose one question to the people who make up our T/E: Considering the limitations of the masking effect of terrain and the area surveillance requirements imposed on the battalion by the doctrine of unit separation, is one AN/TPS-21 sufficient?



**Capt Kelly** is concerned over the status of battalion-level intelligence. He feels it has not matured with the times. A graduate of the University of Southern California, he was commissioned under the NROTC program in June 1951. After Basic School, he went to Korea, was a PltLdr, Co ExO and Bn S-2 with the 1st MarDiv. He is presently CO, M/3/8.



**Scouts need adequate training in POW interrogation.**

Should we provide for more of this equipment, should it be mobile, or both?

#### **S-2 Personnel at Battalion**

Having attached the scouts to the rifle companies and delivered the "Black Box" into the loving hands of the communicators, we are admittedly going to be hard pressed for Marines to man the battalion OP, much less compose those specialized "cloak and dagger" patrols which many a battalion commander holds so dear to his heart. Reconnaissance battalion attachments will provide a partial solution to this problem. In due time, I am certain that we can shake loose enough CP personnel to man the OP on a round-the-clock basis. A start in the right direction will be much better than going "whole hog" and ending up with a big fat nothing for our efforts.

By now there are undoubtedly some readers with their bile sufficiently stirred up to raise the cry of "empire builder." As long as I have thus sawed my tree limb part way through, I may as well finish the job.

If the scouts are to be staff NCOs, then what of the section chief? Here, to my mind, is another much-neglected individual. Consider that the S-2 section is the only battalion staff section with but one officer. If the S-2 ends up "getting one between the horns" then the section chief must be fully capable of stepping into the gap. This questionable eventuality is compounded when you realize that the S-2 section chief (SSgt) is also the junior section chief in the battalion. My recom-

mendation: the billet should require a minimum rank of gunnery sergeant.

While we are in the domain of the battalion S-2 let us scrutinize the remaining individuals on his staff. The API assistant comes immediately to mind. He must be a man of the highest caliber and completely trained in his field. Often he's an individual who has demonstrated to the classification clerk that he knows what shadows are on an aerial photograph, and that with a little on-the-job training he could probably find north!

The intelligence assistant has always been a jack of all trades, and usually master of none. Here stands a fine broth of a lad who could do wonders to fill the gap we find in Order of Battle and POW interrogation at battalion level. He need

not possess a Ph.D. in either of these subjects. He should have the ability to guide the interrogation of POW's by linguists and supervise the techniques employed—in addition to keeping up the battalion's Order of Battle files.

The draftsman has always been much maligned. It is *not* sufficient that his talents be limited to copying the S-3's operation overlays and printing desk signs for the CP staff. He should be a fair to middlin' topographic draftsman, be enough of an artist to accurately sketch enemy fortifications and equipment, and be able to operate and maintain whatever form of reproduction equipment we finally end up with in the field.

#### **Equipment and Attachments**

A few words on battalion, equipment-wise. The scouts each need a set of binoculars and a compass. The API man must have an API kit (these have been hard to come by, no matter what the Quartermaster people say), and a decent battery-operated lamp to do photo interpretation work at night. With the standardization of the 1/50,000 map for use by all units we need some type of compact gadget that will enlarge the individual grid squares for eventual reproduction. Otherwise S-3's will lose their sanity trying to depict the battalion position on the head of a pin!

The philosopher who said "a picture is worth a thousand words" may



**For scouts: full knowledge of field radio and wire equipment.**



not have been Sun Tzu but he was with the program. Imagine what could be done by our patrols and OP's with a couple of Polaroid Land cameras. The added possibilities in terms of immediately available API material are unlimited. This investment could one day even conceivably save the life of the hard-nosed budget man who is even now having apoplexy reading these fiscally-unsound proposals.

The Spirit Duplicating Machine is not for field use at battalion level. It is too large and too heavy—and there is no tentage at this echelon that will provide for the outdoor operation of this monster at night. (Please don't anyone suggest that we have room left over in the S-2, 3 blackout tent.)

A final line about attachments before we briefly touch on the rear echelon intelligence picture. A BLT on an independent or semi-independent mission needs intelligence attachments as much as it requires those of the supporting arms and services. Bear this in mind, you planners, next time that you go shuttling us along on your own. I am certain that it would brighten the declining years of many of those in Order of Battle, API, Counterintelligence, and POW Interrogation to get a good taste of things up front. And don't forget some of those reconnaissance people—their primary mission is not to guard the division CP!

#### The Rear Echelons

I am going to be cagy enough to leave the joy of shooting down the regimental and division intelligence T/O's to the higher priced help who have their experience vest-



**Scouts must be able to sketch. And why not Polaroid Land cameras?**

ed in those echelons. Yet a couple of hasty shots cannot be resisted, so let me get back out onto that limb.

In time of war the battalion must look to its regiment and division for intelligence replacements. Even the best of us have had a "moment of truth" when we zigged instead of zagging. The howl will immediately go up that there just are not enough qualified men now, and that these humble proposals will make things even worse. They are dead right! The shortage of qualified people in fields like Combat Intelligence, Order of Battle, and POW Interrogation is downright critical. This is nobody's fault but our own! Linguists are not ipso facto interrogators, and they never will be unless properly trained. Order of Battle used to be the heart of the division G-2 Section, yet now we don't even rate an Order of Battle officer and are lucky to have one qualified enlisted man on hand. And don't tell me that we can run a crash program if "the balloon goes up." There simply isn't that luxury of time these days. These are intolerable situations that we cannot afford to ignore!

Let's shake loose the personnel people on those school quotas, particularly for enlisted men. If there are no schools, let's start our own! This is the time to start paying more than lip service to the crucial problem of intelligence in the age of nuclear warfare! We'll never do the job without the qualified people.

#### The Challenge

Gentlemen, my ranting and raving is at an end. If I have not written with the fervor of an evangelist working on his first sermon, it certainly is not due to any lack of conviction or purpose. As I stated before, I cannot expect everyone to concur with my personal convictions—if they did I would begin to wonder what had become of that rugged individualism for which our Corps is so famous. Rather it is my aim to throw down a challenge that will overcome the inertia that grips our primary source of intelligence, and fan the flames of constructive thought. Time may well be running out on us. We must either move like blazes or chuck the entire system out of the window and invest in a good Ouija Board!

USMC



#### Not A Score

TO LEND PROMINENCE AND COLOR to ceremonies officially opening the baseball season at a major Marine Corps post in California, the commanding general agreed to pitch a few balls before the game. The C/S, a colonel, would catch and Ralph Kiner, one of baseball's all-time great home run hitters, would make an appearance in the batter's box.

Confirmation of these plans was submitted to the general in the form of a typewritten schedule of events and times which contained the following item, among others:

"1328 . . . General will take mound, colonel take position behind plate and Mr. Kiner will step into the batter's box. General will throw several to Mr. Kiner and we hope he—Mr. Kiner—is able to knock one out of the park."

The surprised planning committee received the schedule back promptly with a scrawled notation in the margin adjacent to the item. Penned in a very familiar hand, it read:

"To hell with that. If Herb Score couldn't duck fast enough, how do they expect me to?"

\$15.00 to Capt R. B. Morrissey

# No Officer\* Can Afford to be Without the Coverage of USAA Insurance. Save on Insurance Costs with USAA!

Claims for accidents, damage and varied losses are in evidence every day—and insurance is needed to protect you and your family against these costly demands including legal and medical expenses.

Away back in 1922 a group of U.S. Armed Forces officers recognized that insurance costs could be a considerable bite in the personal budget. They organized United Services Automobile Association to make automobile insurance available to officers at cost.

Since that time more than \$75 millions of dollars have been returned in dividends and more than 600,000 USAA policies are now in force.

Active and retired officers continue to manage and direct USAA. Selling is done by mail and no commissions are paid.

USAA understands the problems of those in the service. Not only do USAA policyholders\* enjoy maximum protection at liberal savings but they are covered in almost every corner of the world where the U.S. Armed Forces serve.\*\* Claims are settled fairly and quickly even in the most remote areas of the world.

Enjoy the protection and savings offered with these USAA policies:

## Automobile Insurance

### Comprehensive Personal Liability Insurance

Gives protection from the most common claims that might be filed against the insured and members of his family for injury or damage to person or property.

### Household Goods and Personal Effects Floater

Insurance protection for personal property and family possessions against fire, transportation, windstorms, other extended hazards, and theft. Covers anywhere in the world at no extra cost.


Enjoy dependable insurance protection at low cost with USAA. Fill in the coupon and get the facts today.

\*Membership in United Services Automobile Association is limited to active and retired Regular officers, midshipmen, cadets and warrant officers of the United States Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Public Health Service, Coast and Geodetic Survey; Foreign Service Officers of the Department of State; Reserve and National Guard officers when ordered to extended active Federal duty for a period of six months or longer; the widows of such officers and warrant officers so long as their status is not changed by remarriage. Reserve and National Guard officers who retire, or who are released to inactive status and retain their commissions or warrants, may continue their insurance or renew their insurance with the Association at any time, provided membership in USAA was established while such officers were on extended active duty.

\*\*USAA operates in the United States, its possessions and territories; Canada, Cuba and the Canal Zone; Great Britain, Japan, the Philippines, and certain U.S. bases in the Pacific; as well as in Western Continental Europe when the policyholder is on active duty.



Charles E. Cheever  
Colonel, USA—Ret.  
President



## UNITED SERVICES Automobile Association

Dept. MC-14, USAA Building, 4119 Broadway, San Antonio 9, Tex.

Send information on insurance covering: ☐ World-Wide Household and Personal Effects Floater ☐ Comprehensive Personal Liability ☐ Automobile Insurance based on the following data:

|          |               |          |  |            |                                      |           |           |
|----------|---------------|----------|--|------------|--------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Car Year | Make          | Model    | Body Type                              | Pass. Cap. | Serial Number                        | Motor No. | No. Cyls. |
| Cost     | Purchase Date | New/Used | Current Car License<br>Year      State |            | Name in which car legally registered |           |           |

Is the automobile required by or customarily used in the occupational duties of any person except in going to and from the principal place of occupation? \_\_\_\_\_

Is the automobile customarily used in driving to or from work? \_\_\_\_\_

If the automobile is customarily used in driving to or from work, how many road miles is the car driven one way? \_\_\_\_\_

How many male operators (including applicant) are under age of 25? \_\_\_\_\_  
Age of each: \_\_\_\_\_ Relationship \_\_\_\_\_

Are any of the male operators under 25 owners, or principal operators, of the automobile? \_\_\_\_\_

Are all male operators under 25 married? \_\_\_\_\_

Is your automobile equipped with an air conditioner? \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_ Rank \_\_\_\_\_ Serial No. \_\_\_\_\_

Military Address \_\_\_\_\_

If car not at above address, give location of car \_\_\_\_\_

☐ Active-Regular ☐ Retired-Regular ☐ Retired-Reserve† ☐ Extended active duty  
☐ Inactive, but retaining commission† ☐ Widow of eligible officer

† Membership must have been established while on extended active duty.





# OBSERVATION POST



This department is for new, constructive ideas. They may be controversial; they must be short. Payment at regular rates on publication.

## Figurehead or Sergeant Major?

### CONCERNING FIGUREHEAD OR SERGEANT MAJOR? (Aug '60):

On the whole, Mr. Fawcett has mustered more froth than fact in support of his position. The total impression is of a personal antagonism projected Marine Corps wide into an all-inclusive indictment of Sgts Maj. The Marine Corps is not perfect. It needs and welcomes constructive ideas. But any suggestion for improvement should be dispassionate, objective, based on fact, and should lead to a system or condition which is demonstrably better than that which currently prevails. Mr. Fawcett's article meets none of these requirements. Let's examine it in detail.

First, Mr. Fawcett suggests that we go back to the "old time SgtMaj of yesterday," the Marine who ran the battalion office while the adjutant sat with his feet propped on the desk, ulcer free, piling up points with the old man on the strength of the SgtMaj's work. This picture suggests that it was the adjutant who was the figurehead while the SgtMaj was a super office pinkey. It is not an accurate portrayal of the historical role of the SgtMaj. I know a few people who served as adjutants during the period Mr. Fawcett has in mind who are going to take sharp issue with the implication that their effectiveness was largely the result of the SgtMaj's performance.

True, during WWII SgtsMaj became increasingly enmeshed in paperwork, a situation that was the result of the times. This was a period of feverish growth and change. Outfits were formed and shipped practically overnight. People made warrant with as little as six months' service. New bases mushroomed from wilderness crossroads. To maintain administrative order and continuity, more and more of the paperwork problems were channeled to the Marine having the depth of experience to handle

them, the SgtMaj. Eventually the shuffling of paper became accepted as his total function.

But the historic role of SgtMaj (and by historic I call up precedent far deeper in time than WWII) was top dog of the enlisted structure—the ramrod of the SNCO cadre, a symbol of uncompromising devotion to duty for every last trooper. This traditional concept of the office of SgtMaj, revitalized after the Korean conflict, exists today as it did in the time of SgtsMaj John Quick, Mickey Finn, Henry Good, etc. Once again the SgtMaj epitomizes troop leadership, not administrative efficiency. Once again his concern is with the total effectiveness of his unit. These considerations are not trivial and inconsequential, Mr. Fawcett.

That the SgtMaj is secretly laughed at by the other SNCO's who know he has nothing to do, is coasting, or waiting out his 30, is an unwarranted assumption by Mr. Fawcett. It is a gross insult to as conscientious and competent a group of Marines as we have in the Corps. Now I am as intolerant as any Marine of complacency in any rank or billet, and I am willing to stack the standards by which I measure duty performance against Mr. Fawcett's any time. I can't recall a SgtMaj who was delinquent when measured by these standards. SgtMaj selection is so highly competitive that the slothful, the inefficient, the personal opportunists are eliminated at the very outset. Those who do get the final nod are the best of the very best. From such an elite group we could expect no less than outstanding service. And that is exactly what we are getting.

Next, Mr. Fawcett states that the SgtMaj is so high in orbit that he can not be reached on vital battalion problems. First, some of the most effective

work done by SgtsMaj is spotting potential trouble areas or situations and preventing them from developing into problems. Second, I've always maintained close working relationships with SgtsMaj of units I've been with concerning unit problems and I've never, never encountered any attitude other than active interest, cooperation, and capable assistance.

I can see no direct relationship between the size of the office occupied by the SgtMaj and his effectiveness. His position certainly rates a private office when one is available. That his office should be more sumptuous than the ExO's is not a justifiable situation. However, I believe that the commanders concerned are at fault, not the SgtsMaj.

That a SgtMaj should make more than a junior officer is a pay principle that reaches further back in this Marine Corps than my personal memory and, probably, Mr. Fawcett's. That a SgtMaj should make more than a CWO-2 selected under the old system is an unsupportable pay inversion. Apparently Mr. Fawcett is caught in the pay squeeze accompanying the creation of the E-8 and E-9 pay ranks. I feel the inversion too, but I can't hold SgtsMaj responsible. And although time will not erase the inversion, the planned input into the warrant structure of only junior NCO's eventually will erase the inequity of the inversion.

It is not my understanding that the adjutant is the SgtMaj's "boss." I believe that he is supposed to work for the CO, the ExO and, yes, every last damn private in the rear ranks.

I find it pretty difficult to believe that any officer would begrudge a Division SgtMaj his own jeep. The Division SgtMaj has important responsibilities which can be effectively fulfilled only by frequent contact with SgtsMaj of all subordinate units. I, for one, will give him my own wheels rather than let him walk. And that company grade officers can't get wheels to accomplish neces-



## OBSERVATION POST

CONTINUED

sary official business—well, I just don't believe it.

Any reevaluation of the worth of the SgtMaj seems somewhat more than redundant. He has been searchingly reevaluated throughout the span of military history. The overwhelming testimony of time and military experience indicates that we are correct in our present approach. What Mr. Fawcett suggests is that the ultimate attainment in enlisted service should be a highly paid office clown, able to quote Marine Corps memos verbatim, and solve knotty administrative problems in a flash. I think Marines aspire to a greater challenge, a wider responsibility than this. I further think that confining a SgtMaj's talents to such a restricted field is the very essence of the thing Mr. Fawcett apparently wants most to avoid, manpower waste.

Finally, a note to SgtsMaj generally. If Mr. Fawcett's intemperate tirade offended you personally, forget it. I predict that his words will eventually react to your credit. Many Marines now having only a hazy notion of your functions will be jolted into a careful appraisal of your role in the Corps. This can only lead to a widened appreciation of your position. For this you can be grateful to Mr. Fawcett.

CWO Earl A. Pike

8th EngBn  
Force Troops  
Camp Lejeune, N. C.

... In answer to CWO Fawcett's article, I do not think a SgtMaj has to justify his position to anyone except his CO.

Does Mr. Fawcett realize that the same officers who were second lieutenants 15 years ago, and now wearing eagles and stars, are responsible for the change of duties for SgtsMaj? Before making this change I am sure they must have felt it would be in the best interest of the Corps.

CO's assign duties to personnel of their commands, including SgtsMaj. It does not seem probable to me that only an exceptional few are assigned duties that are not so limited and inconsequential as to be ludicrous. I would say the duties assigned a SgtMaj are those the CO feels are needed to assist him most. If CO's felt their SgtsMaj did

not earn their pay, I'm sure they would be the first to make a change.

As for office space and jeeps, it is again the CO's doings. If the CO did not concur, would the SgtMaj have them?

To keep the record straight, the SgtMaj is no longer part of the adjutant's section, but is carried in the headquarters section (the CO is his reporting senior). All the adjutants I know do not want the SgtMaj in the administrative chain except on a need-to-know basis.

The remarks "stooge for the old man," and "his number one cloak and dagger man ever ready to run in and tell him that a company head was without toilet paper on Tuesday," were uncalled for. I'm proud to serve as the old man's SgtMaj regardless of the duties assigned.

SgtMaj James R. VanHekken

MCSC  
Albany, Ga.

... I lost a great deal of faith in the GAZETTE for publishing such an article. Articles published in OP are supposedly for new, constructive ideas, and although they may be controversial, I think CWO Fawcett's story is closer to outright degradation than it is to constructive criticism.

These excerpts from the article bear particular weight:

"He (the SgtMaj) ran the office . . ."

"an adjutant with a good SgtMaj . . . could put his feet upon the desk and relax . . ."

"he (the SgtMaj) is secretly laughed at by the balance of SNCO's . . ."

"show me a SgtMaj today who can honestly say he has put out a full day's work for a full day's pay . . ."

Out of the 400-some SgtsMaj now serving in the Marine Corps, CWO Fawcett claims that "probably a few are worth their salt." Even by giving him the benefit of the doubt, it appears that the barrel has been judged by a few sour apples.

CWO Fawcett says that in the good old days the adjutant could put his feet up on the desk and relax. Later he states, "with our many commitments . . . we must use every Marine to his fullest potential." To further express

his disdain, he substitutes stoogism for devotion.

He says the SgtMaj is secretly laughed at by the balance of SNCO's. I'm wondering how many laughs (though probably not secret) CWO Fawcett has earned by his stand.

PS—I am a SgtMaj—one who puts in a full day's work for a full day's pay.

SgtMaj Edward B. Pullen, Jr.

HqBn, MCB  
Camp Lejeune, N. C.

... I am somewhat disappointed in the GAZETTE for publishing an article of such poor taste. It does not comply with the spirit of "gentlemanly limits" prescribed for writings within this feature.

Obviously, Mr. Fawcett is not only challenging the competency of the SgtsMaj as a whole, but that of the senior officers who comprise the boards that select these men, the CMC, who approves the selections, and the CO's with whom these men serve.

Your SgtsMaj of today are from the same cut as those of yesterday, but with a great deal more knowledge to absorb, and many new problems that would make some oldtimers cringe. I have been closely associated with SgtsMaj from both the new and the old school. I have equal respect for both.

I have yet to see a SgtMaj "literally with his feet on his desk." If this situation exists in your organization, speak to the CO and correct it.

Let's keep the GAZETTE professional rather than use it for ghost hunting.

SgtMaj George E. Matthews

Hq, 1stATBn  
1stMarDiv  
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

... CWO Fawcett took a real swing at the SgtsMaj of the Marine Corps. One thing is sure—the GAZETTE has done the Marine Corps more harm than good.

I have worked for years to prevent any matter which would reflect against officers or SNCO's from reaching the troops. The GAZETTE says, "this department is for new, constructive ideas." What is constructive about a system which allows a CWO to say, to all men



of the Corps, that a group of its leaders are: "over-emphasized . . . is the man with his feet on the desk . . . who can honestly say he has put in a day's work . . . duties assigned to most Sgts Maj are so limited and inconsequential as to be ludicrous . . . he has nothing to do and is coasting . . . there is no reaching him with the innermost problems . . . the SgtMaj as a stooge for the old man . . . these people aren't acting as Marines?"

I believe Mr. Fawcett has a right to any opinion he desires, just as I believe the administration of the Marine Corps is in better shape today than it ever was under the old time SgtMaj. I believe more harm has been done by this article than by all the SgtsMaj with their feet on their desks. We would be wise to remember that thinking is done with the brain and not the feet.

I believe the GAZETTE should drop any further discussion of this matter, and refuse to print any of the many letters they receive concerning it. Enough harm has already been done in morale, reenlistment, confidence of junior personnel, and bad feelings. Let us always place the good of the Marine Corps before any personal feelings and keep such items as this one from coming before the men. Let us not belittle our promotion system, criticize our CO's, degrade our senior enlisted personnel, and undermine a great magazine by turning the Corps' most powerful enlisted personnel against it. There is a proper way to air such problems, and we can be sure this was not it.

SgtMaj Robert C. Gray

8th MTBn  
Force Troops  
Camp Lejeune, N. C.

## ==How to Build Up the "2": Step No. 2==

By Maj W. J. Davis

Ed: Step No. 1 of Maj Davis' article appeared in last month's GAZETTE.

ONE FACTOR WHICH LOWERS THE peacetime standing of the Intelligence Section is the handling, or lack thereof, of the "enemy situation" in FEXes (Field Exercises). The writer does not possess sufficient experience to know what level, Bn or above, right up through FMF PAC or LANT, is the optimum operational level for effecting the following recommended change, but there must be more realism in the handling of Aggressors.

Some say that the Aggressor FMs are fine when one has the time for specialization. Then why don't we take the time to do just that? Do we have something more important to do with our time than to effect more realistic field training in the Marine Corps? Why can't elements of the two Force Reconnaissance Units and perhaps one Reinforced Infantry Battalion per Marine Division specialize in being Aggressors?

As the S-3/S-2, the Operations/Intelligence Officer could effect some intelligent operating on the part of the "2's" troops, i.e., the Aggressor Forces. Here again, facts must be faced. The normal Aggressors utilized by the Marine Corps are Marine Corps troops, with Marine Corps weapons, wearing Marine Corps uniforms, and using Marine Corps equipment, tactics and techniques (except for isolated cases such as the recent 3dMarDiv LEX (Landing Exercise) in which Marine utilities were changed by

Okinawan seamstresses to resemble quite effectively those contained in the Aggressor FMs. But the weapons, equipment, tactics and techniques, plus the highly touted Esperanto—this is realism?

Why does the Aggressor have to come from within our own Bn/Regt so that the Friendlies wave off the Enemy's officers and troops from the messhall noon meal and tell them "see you in the boondocks tonight"? Why not fly or ship the Aggressor BLT into Okinawa (or Vieques) one dark night, perhaps with all identifying marks un-snapped from their utilities so that they can get into position undetected, following which we could commence some fine field problems.

Or how about an Aggressor BLT waiting *truly* unbeknownst to our Navy's UDT men at Dingalan Bay in the Philippines, and dropping clues in the same manner a real enemy might, where the Bn and Regt S-3/S-2's would have to utilize high performance aircraft, recon and UDT personnel to go out looking for the situation to develop, rather than the omnipresent "canned" situation where everyone knows that his BLT hitting Dingalan Beach will contact nothing but empty huts, or a beerhall. All the troops get is a good, hard-walking, and harder-climbing workout, but no one gets a true mental operational workout! The

"2" usually knows there is no one "really" against him (although BLT 3/5 did act as Aggressors of the USMC thought, word and deed variety in early '58 in the Philippines). Thus the "3" is not really concerned with the unrealistic "intelligence" he receives, and so on down that boring road it goes, until the whole exercise is over. Then we can get back aboard ship and blame it all on the poor communicators. Overgeneralization, perhaps, but too true for the most part.

Where will we get the Russian and Chinese-speaking officers and troops for these BLTs? Well, we have quite a few Marines who have been school-trained in both, all over the Corps. Let's get them together, those who are not being utilized right now in billets at the embassies or on Formosa where their language capabilities are actually needed, and use them as a nucleus. What better refresher training is there for these Marines, both during and between FEXes and LEXes, than improving their own linguistical skill while teaching other young hardchargers?

Then, when a Marine BLT/RLT is needed quickly, as it was in the Korean or Lebanon crises, we could send at least one of these Marine Corps-trained linguistic fighting men over to each rifle company as a reliable interpreter. Or wouldn't you rather have a brother-Marine-interpreter with your unit than some local high school boy, as we did in the Pusan-Inchon-Reservoir campaigns? Or can you think of a more ideal place for a Red "plant" than as an interpreter with a Marine rifle company or infantry battalion?

Now, as a former HQMC G-1 type, this writer realizes that the foregoing cannot be put into effect in three or four minutes, or even three or four weeks, but with the advent of tactical nuclear warfare, there is no denying, that the "2" must be recognized as one of our most talented gents. We *must* get our troops behind him and his Aggressor training, and we do need reliable interpreters. Also, ideally, but perhaps not too realistically, it would be nice someday if *all* fighting Marines had a basic knowledge of their potential (or actual) enemy's key words and phrases. This would enable those in the rifle companies actually in contact with the enemy to know what was going on *before* the Regimental S-2's interpreter talked to the first captured POW (they had sent to the rear) four or five hours later and then passed down the word as to just what your rifle company was facing!

Maybe the foregoing is not the answer, but this is one reader of the GAZETTE for over a decade who feels that



perhaps these two basic ideas would put the intelligence section up where it belongs, on a level with the Operations section, which is, after all, supposedly planning and operating on the intelligence received from the "2" section. It could train some Marine infantry battalions in Red tactics (perhaps at least one Russian company and one Chinese company in each, with a sprinkling of Japanese, Korean, Arab, Lebanese and other type squads for patrolling and the like), plus Russian, Chinese, and others' tank tactics, and all the rest, right down through the gamut of tactics and techniques. Actually, haven't we been doing the same thing for years in football training throughout the land, where part of our team acts out the plays of the oncoming Saturday's "enemy" team until both sides know them well?

Thus, let us not too quickly slough off this as something like the TV commercial where "they said it couldn't be done!" And it does seem that this type of training is a bit more important than next Saturday's ballgame, when we get out there in the boondocks and train for that slightly more decisive contest, war!

It would bring together the language experts we have spread all over the world in Marine Barracks, Recruiting, and other non-FMF billets which fail to effect maximum utilization of these linguistic talents and former training.

In doing the foregoing, perhaps we will partially solve some of the problems raised by Maj Jefferson in his article, "Innocents Abroad" (GAZETTE: Jan '59), stressing the importance of training linguists in the Marine Corps; BGen Cushman's article, "Closing the Gap" (GAZETTE: July '59) on reviving and revitalizing the art of intelligence within the Corps; and Capt White's offering concerning the use of Aggressor troops (OBSERVATION POST: July '59).

If you, the reader, do not agree with the foregoing, shoot this dreamer down with the nearest automatic typewriter; this writer will stand corrected; and our grand and glorious Corps will gain from it all!

"Any questions? It is now—time to get with it! Move out!"

USMC

NROTC Unit  
University of Pennsylvania  
Philadelphia, Pa.

## Fighting a New Kind of War

By Capt James W. Hanker

ON 1 OCTOBER 1959 THE COMMANDANT signed MCO 1560.14. Unlike the majority of orders aimed at one major component of the Corps this directive is of vital interest to all Leathernecks. Its stated purpose is:

"To increase awareness within the Marine Corps of the necessity for an 'all-hands' contribution to the national 'Cold War' effort."

"Huh, that doesn't apply to me. That's high level stuff. What ideas could I have that could affect such a vast problem?" Let's examine this particular order a little more closely before hurriedly putting our chop on it and flipping it into the outgoing basket.

Sub-paragraph D states in part: "Because ideas can originate at every level of organization and command, procedures should be formulated for forwarding them upward through the chain of command until they reach a level at which they can be comprehensively considered and, if feasible and practicable, acted upon."

This means that all of us, right down to that proverbial last private in the third rank, are enjoined to submit any

enough, out of 25 persons I questioned its meaning was explained to me in varied ways by many, and not at all by a few. I believe that the following definition adequately identifies it both for those who currently have a good idea of its meaning and those who, perhaps, are a bit vague, or to date simply haven't given it much thought:

*Cold War* is a term applied to the vigorous non-combatant actions between the United States and Russia, the expressed purpose of which is to influence "middle-of-the-road" nations and thus win them over and gain their support for the achievement of certain objectives.

We in the United States know that our government seeks to gain the confidence and support of all nations with the objective of creating a better world. We help nations to help themselves so that they might become independent countries, not an enslaved people. We help them to create new industries that will improve their standard of living, not ours. Ours is an unselfish job of giving, helping and building for the sole purpose of enhancing world peace through the elimination of impoverishment and illiteracy.

Not so the Russian rulers. Despite their statements and promises, their true purpose is known to most of us in the free world. Despite their efforts, the Iron Curtain has not concealed all of their practices. The murder of the Hungarian nation can never be erased, no matter how many promises and boasts of the future benefits of Communism are broadcast.

More than any other category of professional persons in the world, you, the military man, should be concerned with the promulgation of ideas that could well increase the understandings between Americans and the people of other lands in the interest of world peace. There is an old Chinese saying: "No one loves more the quiet of the garden than the soldier who has heard the sounds of war."

In the hope that they might give birth to an idea I have noted a few



sound idea we might have with regard to the Cold War.

So now that we have established that we can, and in fact are encouraged to submit Cold War ideas, let's make certain that we realize just exactly what this term Cold War means. Surprisingly



thoughts for your possible study:

- 1) Military school exchanges on an enlisted level.
- 2) Offering of scholarships for enlisted and officers to other lands, supported by Congress.
- 3) Exchange tours by representative groups, not just VIP visits.
- 4) Actual service by Marines in other military organizations for limited periods of time.
- 5) Participation by Marine military missions in varied activities of the populace of the country where they are stationed.

One of the greatest soldiers of our time had named after him one of the greatest humanitarian projects of our time—the Marshall Plan.

Think well of this order, Marine. Perhaps you might well conceive the idea that could prevent us from having our training in a "hot war." USMC

HQMC

Ed: Address suggestions to:

"Cold War Ideas"  
The Secretary, Cold War Advisory Panel  
OP-614, Room 4D558, Pentagon,  
Washington 25, D. C.

## —The Way to a Chemical Pearl Harbor—

By 1stLt Joseph M. Gratto

A BASIC NEED IN THE MARINE CORPS exists for an imaginative program of Chemical Warfare training at all levels. The need will not be met by simply demonstrating a smoke pot, showing a chemical grenade, or running the annual gas chamber exercise.

Consider chemical warfare from a positive rather than a negative approach. Conceding the probability that except, perhaps, for the first Marines to be hit by a chemical attack, our defensive measures might be adequate to neutralize, to a large extent, the effect of most chemicals. Let's talk first about how to avoid a chemical Pearl Harbor, and next about an heretical approach to the whole question—namely a re-evaluation of our theories regarding only retaliatory use of chemicals.

The whole approach hinges on training. Much effort has gone into the vertical envelopment concept—yet how often have field troops attempted a heli-lifted operation of any size at all, wearing protective masks or protective clothing? Are the pathfinders who enter the landing zone prepared to detect mustard gases? Do they have their protective masks readily available? Or might each succeeding wave discover, as they dispersed in the landing zone, that they had walked into a chemical trap? How many landing signal officers or flight officers have attempted to signal a 'copter in while wearing a mask? What about radio contact if your unit, widely separated from others in a landing force, is attacked even with a harassing agent?

I maintain that to simply operate, as the Russians do, on certain days wearing a protective mask is not enough. In fact, it's a questionable sort of training. We are fairly certain that we can operate routinely while masked. We will also manage better than most troops because our mask is better than any other in the world. The important question is, can we operate in the extraordinary


situations when the relative isolation of units makes ideal targets for a chemical attack, or the complexity of the operation lends itself as a target for gases to confuse and then destroy? If our best techniques of warfare are to be effective, they must be practiced in a realistic environment. So much for a chemical Pearl Harbor. Any CO can analyze his command and prevent his men from being the first victims.

Now for the heresy. To deny ourselves the available chemical agents is to waste lives, and to approach an important military consideration most unrealistically. There are two points to consider. First, not all gases are lethal. Some are relatively harmless, but have characteristics which make them most worthy of consideration. Secondly, you can't just suddenly make chemicals available without having integrated their offensive use into your training. Chemicals are a tactical weapon and company grade officers should be prepared to call for and employ them with any other weapon available in the field. If you've never been exposed to the possibilities of a good weapons system it is difficult to use it effectively. In the Marine Corps there is a gross indifference to, or gross ignorance of, the tactical possibilities of chemical agents.

Under a variety of circumstances, the most obvious being when Marines are landed to protect American lives and property in a riot torn area; or in circumstances similar to those in Lebanon, to fire on a road-block manned by a group of students, for example, might cause an international storm of protest. The same obstacle might well be breached by a mortar round of tear or vomiting gas. Non-lethal agents could be valuable if used properly in a situation short of war.

In a combat situation, non-lethal agents could make the frontline trooper's life a little easier if he were pre-

U. S. MARINE CORPS



PLAYS  
MARINE  
CORPS  
HYMN

You'll be proud to use your Musical Marine Corps Pocket Lighter every time the "smoking lamp" is lit! And you'll be just as proud to give it to someone special.

**In Forest Green with  
GOLD COLLAR ORNAMENT  
EMBLEM**

**\$4.95**

Shipped, anywhere in the world post-paid with an iron-clad money back guarantee if you are not satisfied.

**TO ORDER:**

Enclose cash, check or money order in the amount of \$4.95 for each Marine Corps Musical Lighter wanted together with your name and address. Mail your order today to:

**MILITARY SPECIALTY COMPANY**  
Dept. G-2, Box 22  
Beverly Hills, California

pared to use extensive, simple, chemical booby traps. It is much tougher to breach a mine field or a barbed wire obstacle wearing a mask, but impossible without one if the chemical agent happened to be vomiting gas, for example.

A masked enveloping force might gain a precious few moments in the assault if the enemy suddenly had to fight both their attackers and the effects of even a harassment gas. We are ingenious people. Consider for yourself a few ways that you might be able to use chemicals in the field. You can leave the "G" gases and blood series for the high planners and just think in terms of the easily deliverable, locally effective, non-persistent agents like tear gas. Think of the innumerable ways to use it, especially against night infiltration or mass attacks!

The best equipment, chemicals, and means of delivery will not deter an aggressor from using chemicals if he is trained to better use even inferior equipment than our troop leaders are.

I hope to stimulate, with this article, a little interest in chemical warfare. The Corps has a need for more of it.

D Co, 1stBn  
LST 1178  
c/o FPO, New York, N. Y.

# THE SCHOOL SOLUTION

(Answers to questions on page 38)

① (a) Reference: MCS 3-30, paragraph 12. The platoon's reorganization is ordered by the platoon commander and supervised by him, the platoon sergeant, guide, and squad leaders. The platoon guide is normally responsible for ammunition resupply.

② (d) Reference: MCS 3-34, paragraph 19d(1). All-around defense is the responsibility of the front-line rifle company. Normally the defense is oriented toward the front; but to protect the flanks and the rear, the company or the battalion commander can order occupation of supplementary positions. The company is the lowest echelon whose commander has the authority to originate an order to occupy supplementary positions.

③ (b) Reference: MCS 3-33, paragraph 37a(4). Final protec-

tive fires consist of the machine gun FPLs plus the barrages of mortars and artillery, principal direction of fires of BARs, and the individual rifles' sectors of fire. Authority to call for FPLs is usually delegated down to frontline platoon commanders. These fires are the heaviest concentrations that the enemy will meet; they are designed to stop the assault short of the MLR.

④ (c) Reference: MCS 3-30, paragraph 35g(4). Camouflage is a continuing requirement from the initial occupation until a position is left. The improvement and maintenance of camouflage must be accomplished concurrently with any and all other activity within and around the position.

⑤ (a and c) Reference: TIP (ENG)1, paragraph 12a(2)(c).

In the defense, the need for engineer assistance is too great for them to meet all demands. Therefore, they are usually used only where their special skills are needed or in cases where the task is beyond the capability of the supported unit. Tools can be made available, and the time element is equally as important in the work of the pioneers as it is in the infantry units.

⑥ (d) Reference: FM 20-32, paragraph 79. FM 20-32, *Employment of Land Mines*, states that failure to impose restrictions may hinder future operations in that your own mines may become an obstacle to you as well as the enemy. However, undue restrictions should be avoided to allow subordinate commanders to achieve economy of force, strengthen battle positions, and to delay or disrupt the enemy.

⑦ (a) Reference: LFM-6, paragraph 409a. a. The question describes the landing diagram. b. There is no such document as the graphic landing table. c. The approach schedule indicates for each scheduled wave the time of departure from the rendezvous area, from the line of departure, and from other control points and the time of arrival at the beach. d. There is no such document as a wave table.

⑧ (c) Reference: TIP (COS)1, paragraph 5c; TIP (COS)2, paragraph 9. Radio relay is the primary means of ground-to-ground communication used by the Marine division down to infantry and artillery battalion level, except during the ship-to-shore movement, when radio is the primary means. As soon as practicable after the ship-to-shore movement, radio relay equipment is installed and it then replaces radio as the primary means.

⑨ (a), (d), and (f). Reference: MCS 1-6, Section 2. In general, the Constitution gives the power to employ the military forces to the executive, and gives to the legislative the power to create these forces. Also, to further separate the powers, the Congress was given the power to declare war and, if deemed necessary, to abrogate, among other rights, the writ of habeas corpus.

⑩ (d) Reference: LFM-22, paragraph 303a. Coordination of fire support is a command responsibility. The fire support coordination center is under the over-all general staff supervision of the assistant chief of staff, G-3.



Marines at home and abroad keep their accounts at the First National Bank of Quantico. They know that for over 35 years the First National has been serving the men of the Corps faithfully . . . keeping their accounts straight and giving them fast, efficient service wherever they may be stationed.

Stay with the First National . . . you know where you stand!

**Savings • Checking Accounts • Loans • Christmas Clubs**  
**Auto Financing at Low Bank Rates**

**The First National Bank**  
**OF QUANTICO**

**4 offices**

Next to the Marine Exchange, Mainside • On Route #1, Triangle  
On Potomac Avenue in Quantico • On Route #1 North, Dumfries





# PROFESSIONAL SCRAPBOOK



## HELOS or VTOL in 1965?

The July 1960 issue of the *Journal* of the American Helicopter Society critically examines future development of helicopters vs VTOL aircraft. Here's a digest of some main points:

R. B. Lightfoot, Chief Engineer, Sikorsky Aircraft—

• "A compound version of the helicopter offers the most satisfactory solution to date. . . . The downwash characteristics of the high disc loading aircraft such as the lift fan and tilt wing are prohibitive due to high fuel consumption, short hover time, and super hurricane wind effects. The operating costs of the helicopter type vehicles are lower than the other proposed VTOL aircraft. The hovering endurance of the helicopter is superior."

R. L. Lichten, Chief Experimental Project Engineer, Bell Helicopter Co.—

• "The helicopter today is a proven VTOL aircraft whose original development cost has been amply justified. . . . Recent test programs have indicated that several other advanced VTOL types can be successfully developed from the technical standpoint. . . .

### "Low-Disc-Loading VTOL Airplane—

" . . . Those VTOL types, like the helicopters, can operate in unprepared areas by virtue of having reasonably low downwash velocities (10 lbs/sq ft maximum). The above types may have practical cruising speeds of from 175 knots to 350 knots. In comparison to the helicopter, for equal hovering performance, payload capacity is reduced.

### "High-Disc-Loading VTOL Airplane—

" . . . All those types which require a prepared hard-surface takeoff and landing area. . . . Relatively limited maneuverability at low airspeeds is

normally available. For equivalent hovering performance, the payload capacity of these types may be expected to be inferior . . . while speed may vary from 175 knots through supersonic. . . .

"Based on a realistic technical comparison, advanced VTOL airplane designs cannot compete with equally advanced helicopter designs in short-range transport work. However, for airlift ranges in the vicinity of 200 miles, the transport productivity of the VTOL airplane approximately equals that for a competitive helicopter, and for distances over 400 miles, shows a substantial advantage. On this basis, low-disc-loading VTOL airplane types are worthy of support for development into operationally useful air mobility systems.

John P. Reeder, Head Operations Branch, Langley Research Center, NASA—


• " . . . The helicopter is in a fairly well developed state and is here to stay. Further improvement in speed and range is desirable and is technically feasible. . . . It is quite logical to expect continued development of the compound helicopter, for it will have improved range, speed, and productivity. . . . These aircraft could be in operational use, both military and commercial, in 5 to 10 years. . . .

"For VTOL capability over ranges of about 400 to 800 miles it appears that other VTOL types as, for instance, the tilt-wing airplane, have great advantages over the pure (or compound) helicopter."


Maj Robert G. Ferry, USAF—

• "USAF is now looking to STOL rather than VTOL as a solution to their problems of long runway requirements


(Continued next page)



Tilt Wing



Convertiplane



Lift Fan

**VTOL**



and dispersion of aircraft. The VTOL fighter airplane appears to be out of the picture for the next decade as far as the USAF is concerned. . . . My pessimism for the fighter VTOL . . . does not preclude possible development of a VTOL supersonic transport. Such a craft could not be with us for 15 to 20 years, however, and would operate only from well-prepared and well-supplied bases.

"... I do not think, however, that the compound helicopter offers greater potential than the fixed-wing tilting-prop-rotor aircraft."


V. Keith Putnam, Chief, Aviation Test Office, U.S. Army transportation Materiel Command—

● "It can be concluded from Mr Lichten's and Mr Lightfoot's papers . . . that the VTOL can offer some very specific advantages such as high speed and ferry range, but the customer must be prepared to pay a rather high cost:



- Long development period.
- High cost of operation.
- Poor payload-range performance below 400 miles range.
- Deficiencies compared to helicopter are:
  - Downwash velocities (on most configurations).
  - Low speed maneuverability.
  - Hovering performance.
  - Engine out characteristics (dead man's curve).
- Poor takeoff performance if designed for low altitude."



### Advanced Helicopter



### Compound Helicopter





## Reach for a Rifleman Instead of a Rifle

Two fragments of information fouled up a certain new lieutenant during his first moment of truth in Korea.

It all began in Basic School shortly after the frozen Chosin operation. With the returning Marines came stories that the only weapon which could be counted on was the trusty M1.

Several students, including our hero, decided right there to carry rifles in combat.

At the time of this decision, the lieutenant was reading S. L. A. Marshall's book, *Men Against Fire*. The author reported that only one in every four WWII GIs had used his weapon in combat. Although the consensus in our hero's barracks was that Marines might do better than that, a doubt remained in the lieutenant's mind.

It was still there when, rifle at port arms, he led a reinforced squad on a routine patrol one day in Korea.

They soon made contact with the enemy.

Our hero proceeded to lay down a base of fire which would have done credit to a LMG. When he stopped shooting, the battle was over and the Marines held undisputed control of the ridge.

Fortunately they had met nothing but a little ambush which did them no fatal harm. Had it been a larger or more determined force, the Marine patrol might not have had it so easy since its leader was too busy shooting to provide leadership.

The lieutenant had been more intent upon making a liar out of S. L. A. Marshall than in leading the patrol.

As a matter of fact, however, Marshall came out smelling like a rose, since one BAR-man and our hero were the only members of the patrol who fired more than a round or two. The lieutenant had neglected his duty to direct some dozen rifles in favor of the thrill of shooting his own weapon.

It was a poor return for the government's investment in him.

Our hero should have:

- Armed himself with his T/E weapon. It was adequate for self-defense. It would not have interfered as much as the M1 with the movements required of a combat leader. It would not have been such a temptation to shoot.

- Made his troops aware of the report that only one out of every four soldiers returned enemy fire in WWII. Those 12 Marine rifles would have melted in the effort to better the Army statistic.

- Schooled his Marines in the principle that visible targets are not a pre-

requisite to returning the enemy fire. The enemy does not know that you cannot see him. Bullets whizzing anywhere near him dampen his spirits and reduce his fire.

This has been a touchy subject with Marines. Unaimed fire is indeed wasteful and not very deadly. Yet, it is a fact that the only way to gain fire superiority is to shoot. If you held fire pending a view of your adversary, you might not squeeze off a round all day.

One reasonable compromise is to fire at likely hiding places such as the lower edges of stumps, logs, rocks and shadowed areas. This technique should slow the enemy's fire while minimizing the waste of ammunition.

The limited, but true, experience described earlier highlights a characteristic of firefights anywhere and anytime. They explode so fast that the small unit commander often is reduced to relying on certain conditioned reflexes.

One reflex to cultivate might be to

reach for a rifleman instead of a rifle. Direct *his* fire. Get *him* shooting. Then move down the line to the next man and repeat the process.

This sounds simple. It is not new, but it needs repeating. The tendency in combat is to fight back personally or not at all. The platoon leader's job—like a good golfer's swing—is an acquired skill. The platoon leader's weapon is his platoon, not his side arm.

There comes a time when the commander must lead by example—when he must fire in anger. This action, I submit, should be the last resort—not the first.

The uncomplicated act of building fire is half the battle. Once your troops have the hang of it, you can focus their fire wherever you want it.

And that would indeed make a liar out of S. L. A. Marshall, who, I'll bet, would not mind a bit.

Capt P. R. Clapper

### New M-60 MG—How to Fire It

Condensed from FM-23-67, June 1960

First step: Learning basic principles of machine gun marksmanship on the bipod mount. This is something new; previous training dealt only with tripod-mounted guns.

#### Position and Grip

1) Gunner assumes prone position to rear of gun so that a straight line, extending through barrel and receiver, passes through right shoulder and center of right hip. Southpaws need not apply. Due to ejection pattern, gun cannot be fired from left shoulder.

2) Grasp rear of feedcover with left hand, palm down. With right hand grasp grip with index finger on trigger. With both hands exert pressure down and to the rear to hold gun firmly in the shoulder. Right cheek rests against feedcover.

3) Make small adjustments by shifting shoulder in hinged shoulder rest. Shoulders must be level at all times. Do this by moving both elbows closer together or farther apart when adjusting for elevation during firing.

#### Sighting and Aiming

1) Front sight blade is centered vertically in aperture of rear sight slide with top on front sight blade, bottom resting on top or rear sight slide.

#### Zeroing

1) Zero bipod mounted gun on 500" range. Set rear sights at 500 meters, align windage zero. Fire six-round burst.

2) Note strike on target. Use mil relation formula (each click on traverse knob is one mil) to make deflection correction.

3) Correct for elevation error. Each click on elevating knob equals one mil.

4) Aim at new target, fire confirming burst.

5) Loosen range plate screw, raise or lower range plate until upper left edge of the rear sight slide is even with 500-meter graduation.

# PROFESSIONAL SCRAPBOOK

Continued



## Principles of War: An Analysis

Condensation of article published in the  
*Army Quarterly and Defense Journal*, July 1960

"Weapons change but the principles of war and our geographic situation remain constant." Such statements are common in military journals, and should be examined critically before being accepted. One difficulty: what are the principles?

Table 1 shows principles of war set forth during the last 100 years. No two are the same. The table also reveals a second difficulty: many of the "principles" will not stand examination against the definition of the word in the *Oxford Dictionary*.

A summary of the basic business of waging war is needed. This is a poor substitute for full and detailed study, but in view of the short time most officers are able or willing to give to the study of this aspect, it is probably of some use.

The object of this article is to try to produce a list of true principles which apply to all situations of war at all levels of command.

**Selection and Maintenance of the Aim:** This principle must be included to make commanders at all levels consider what they are trying to achieve.

**Concentration:** Liddell Hart says all principles of war can be condensed into one word—concentration. This principle involves four others—surprise, mobility flexibility, and security. Napoleon said "the art of war may be reduced to a single principle—to unite on a single point a greater mass than the enemy." Concentration is worthy of a high place and should come after Selection of the Aim only because it is useless to concentrate strength over weakness without knowing what we are trying to achieve.

**Offensive Action:** No great military thinker has denied that offensive action is necessary to achieve victory. It is therefore the next logical step in the military thought process. First, we select the objective, next we concentrate force over weakness, and last we take offensive action with force we have concentrated.

**Public Opinion:** It is necessary to undertake military action which has a large measure of public support, and to relate both objective and offensive action to what public opinion will allow. This principle, however, does not apply to all levels of command.

**Other So-called Principles:** Objective, Concentration, and Offensive Action comprise our list. There is not enough space to examine all the remaining principles in Table 1. Most are merely methods by which the three stated master principles are achieved.

To summarize, these three principles are believed to apply to all situations of war at all levels of command:

- Selection and maintenance of the aim
- Concentration of force over weakness
- Offensive action

This list is not a panacea for all the problems of a student war. But if the analysis has made readers more critical of future statements on the subject, then the aim of the article will have been achieved.

USMC

| PRINCIPLE OR AXIOM                        | List of Principles as stated by:<br>(Showing relative importance given) |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|---|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|   | 1830  | 1899 | 1903 | 1912 | 1921 | 1929 | 1929 | 1929 | 1932 | 1935 | 1944 | 1945 | 1945 | 1950 |
| 1. Ability of Commanders                  |   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 2. Administration                         |   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 3. Air Power                              |   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 4. Armament                               |   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 5. Concentration of Force (Mass)          | 3   | 2    | 3    | 3    | 1    | 4    | 2    | 4    | 6    | 5    | 8    | 6    | 4    | 2    |
| 6. Cooperation (Unity of Command)         |   |      |      |      | 9    | 6    | 8    | 3    | 8    | 7    | 7    | 9    |      |      |
| 7. Don't lunge if your Opponent can parry |   |      |      |      |      | 6    | 4    | 5    | 8    |      |      | 7    | 8    |      |
| 8. Economy of Force                       |   |      | 1    | 4    | 2    | 1    | 5    | 4    | 5    | 8    |      | 7    | 8    |      |
| 9. Exploitation of Success                |   |      |      |      |      | 4    | 5    | 2    | 8    |      |      |      |      |      |
| 10. Flexibility                           |   |      |      |      |      | 5    | 3    |      |      |      |      | 5    | 8    | 7    |
| 11. Free Disposal of Forces               |   |      | 2    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 12. Freedom of Action                     |   |      | 3    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 13. Mobility/Movement                     | 4   |      |      | 5    | 5    | 4    | 7    | 8    | 7    | 4    | 9    |      |      |      |
| 14. Morale                                |   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 15. Never reinforce failure               |   |      |      |      |      | 7    | 5    |      |      |      |      | 3    | 2    | 1    |
| 16. Offensive Action                      |   |      |      | 4    | 2    | 5    | 2    | 6    | 3    | 2    | 6    | 3    | 3    | 3    |
| 17. Public Opinion                        |   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 18. Pursuit                               | 7   | 4    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 19. Quality and Quantity of Divisions     |   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 20. Security                              |   | 1    | 4    | 2    | 7    | 7    | 6    | 5    | 6    | 1    | 1    | 4    | 6    | 5    |
| 21. Selection of Aim                      |   |      |      |      |      |      | 2    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 8    | 4    | 1    | 1    |
| 22. Simplicity                            |   |      | 3    |      |      | 8    |      |      |      |      |      | 8    | 6    |      |
| 23. Stability of the Rear                 |   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 24. Surprise                              | 5   | 6    | 6    | 3    | 3    | 3    | 1    | 7    | 3    | 5    | 3    | 4    | 5    | 2    |

We still need contributions for Scrapbook, including cartoon feature (next column). Payment on publication.—Ed

## IT ISN'T IN THE BOOK, BUT...



boot and salt are both around,  
who know how the buckle can open a round.  
Yet, they don't know...its an obvious sight  
that the buckle snaps shut, when fastened right.

LCpl Guy Corriero



## ★ General Officers ★

### Transfers

Bowser, A. L. 9903  
Fr ForTrps FMFPac WDOct  
To HQMC  
Wade, S. S. 9903  
Fr MCB CLNC WDOct  
To HQMC

### Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Churchill, W. A., TemAcDu, Asst  
Comdr, MCAS, CPNC, Pd 19-30  
Sep 60  
Luckey, R. B., CG, MCB CamLej  
Rottet, R. K., CG, 2dMAW  
Tharin, F. C., Comdr MCABases  
Eastern Area & CG MCAS CherPt  
Tomlinson, G. E., TemAcDu, Asst  
Comdr, MCB, CLNC, Pd 19-30  
Sep 60  
Weller, D. M., CG, 3dMarDiv

### November

Dawson, M. L., Comdr MCABases,  
Western Area  
Jack, S. S., CG, MCAS, El Toro

### December

Kline, R. L., AWC, 1stMAW  
Leek, F. E., ADC, 1stMarDiv  
Robertshaw, L. B., COMART, Glen-  
view, Ill.

### Deaths, Retired

King, L. N. 31Aug  
Cleveland, Ohio

## Colonels

### Transfers

Ahern, T. J. 9907  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To Ofc of CNO  
Benson, A. R. 9908  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To HQMC  
Bohnet, J. R. 9907  
Fr MAG-28 WDSep  
To 2dMAW  
Finn, E. V. 9907  
Fr 1stMAW WDSep  
To Ofc Asst SecDef  
Harris, A. W. 9906  
Fr MCAS CherPt WDSep  
To 3dMarDiv  
Parry, F. F. 9906  
Fr The Pentagon WDSep  
To 1stMarDiv  
Reeve, F. N. 9906  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To MCB CampPen  
Ridge, T. L. 9906  
Fr MCS Quant WDSep  
To San Juan PR  
Sweeney, J. B. 9906  
Fr 1stMarDiv WDOct  
To HQMC

### Retired

Funk, G. C. 1Sep  
Houser, R. H. 9906  
5thMCRD 31Oct  
Kantner, G. B. 9906  
Ofc Asst SecDef 30Sep  
Van Orman, E. G. 1Sep

### Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Buckner, J. H., CO, HqBn, MCS  
Quant  
Elder, A. A., AsstDeputyDir, Div  
Res, HQMC  
Fox, L. F., CO, MAG-12, 1stMAW  
Griffin, D. R., CO, 11thMarRegt, 1st  
MarDiv  
Hines, O. M., DeputyDir, DivRes,  
HQMC  
Hoyler, H. M., C/S, 3dMarDiv

Kurdziel, E. G., CO, NROTC Unit,  
Marquette Univ  
Lundin, W. M., ExO, MCAS, Beau-  
fort, S. C.  
Metzger, L., C/S, 1stMarDiv

## ★ Lieutenant Colonels ★

### Temporary Promotions

Carey, R. E. Sep  
Kunz, G. M. Sep  
Low, S. D. Sep  
Lundin, W. M. Sep

### Transfers

Barreiro, J. R. 3502  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSEP  
To MCB CampPen  
Baughmann, L. D. 3002  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To HQMC  
Caulfield, W. M. 0302  
Fr Yorktown Va WDSep  
To FMFLant  
Challacombe, A. D. 0802  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To MCS Quant  
Coffey, M. J. 0802  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To 1stMarDiv  
Cook, H. E. 7331  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 2dMAW  
Crawford, P. L. 7333  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 2dMAW  
Dominick, R. L. 0302  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To HQMC  
Ellis, G. W. 1302  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To 1stMarDiv  
Foos, D. 1802  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To I&I SDiego

Gregory, M. C. 7333  
Fr 1stMAW  
To NavMslC Pt Mugu, Calif

Gregory, M. C. 7333  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To MCAS Beaufort

Hale, M. J. 0115  
Fr Ofc JCS WDOct  
To HQMC

Hilton, K. N. 3002  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To MCS Barstow

Jacobson, J. P. 0302  
Fr CEHott SDiego 30Sep  
To 1stMarDiv

Kujovsky, P. T. 2502  
Fr FMFLant WDOct  
To London Eng

Legan, S. F. 3002  
Fr 3dMAW WDOct  
To 1stMAW

Lindsay, J. A. 0302  
Fr MCS Quant WDOct  
To 3dMarDiv

Maas, J. B. 7333  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To MCAS Beaufort

Matsinger, H. 3002  
Fr MCSFA Sfran WDOct  
To 3dMarDiv

Patterson, R. M. 7331  
Fr MCS Quant WDSep  
To MCAS El Toro

Vaughan, W. P. 3002  
Fr 1stMarDiv WDOct  
To 3dMarDiv

Voorhees, E. H. 0302  
Fr FMFLant WDSep  
To London England

Weir, W. A. 7331  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To AirFMFPac

Wells, W. C. 0802  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To 1stMarDiv

### Retired

Elliott, J. H. 1Sep  
Hughes, J. W. 18Sep  
Roach, R. E. 0802  
HQMC 31Oct

### Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Ridder, H. H. Sep

## Attending Senior School Academic Year 1960-61

Allen, Paul L.  
Atwater, William L.  
Averill, Gerald P.  
Beckett, John W.  
Bristow, John B.  
Carlson, Alfred G.  
Carrington, George W.  
Case, William N.  
Conroy, Donald  
Cronin, James T.  
Cummings, Daniel L.

Dees, Harry C.  
Dillow, Rex O.  
Emils, Arnold L.  
Estey, Ralph F.  
Farish, George B.  
Fields, John R.  
Graves, James B.  
Harper, Edwin A.  
Harris, Donald R.  
House, Charles A.  
Hughes, Orlin A. P.  
Jackson, Owen G.  
Jerue, George E.  
Johnson, Victor M.  
King, George W.  
Lettner, Warren A.  
Lupton, Edward I.  
Mahon, John L.  
McBarron, Alden  
McCaleb, Edwin H.  
McClane, George E.  
McMaster, Robert G.  
Mesko, John  
Mickelson, Laurel M.  
Mize, Charles D.  
Moos, Kenneth L.  
Morrison, Gene W.  
Mulvey, William H.  
Panchison, Walter  
Pawloski, Stephen K.  
Petty, Douglas D.  
Phillips, James H.  
Pope, Eugene J.  
Sabatier, Henry S.  
Stockwell, Thomas D.  
Sullivan, John B.  
Witt, William T.  
Wojcik, Michael F.  
Wortman, Harry D.

### Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Barr, H. R., ExO, MAG-16, 1stMAW  
Lemke, W. C., CO, VMA-533, 2d  
MAW  
McIntyre G. B., AdminBr, HQMC  
Noren, W. C., CO, 3dBn, 6thMar,  
2dMarDiv  
Peebles, R. R., CO, VMF-232, MCAS  
Kaneoh Bay  
Port, R. M., AsstDirRes, 12th  
MCRD  
Price, E. F., CO, HMR-161, MCAS  
Kaneoh Bay  
Stewart, R. A., HeadPersSect Avn  
Br, HQMC  
Welland, C. P., S-3, MCAS, Beau-  
fort, S. C.

## ★ Majors ★

### Transfers

Allen, W. C. 0130  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To MCRD SDiego  
Anderson, G. B. 3002  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To ForTrps FMFLant  
Barrett, M. F. 0302  
Fr MB Sfran WDOct  
To MCRD SDiego  
Berge, J. H. 7302  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 2dMAW  
Bibee, A. J. 9901  
Fr 1stMAW  
To 3dMAW  
Carrubba, H. D. 0302  
Fr 4th MCRD WDOct  
To MCS Quant  
Clay, R. E. 7304  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 2dMAW  
Colella, R. L. 0302  
Fr Rome Italy WDOct  
To MCS Quant  
Critchett, E. W. 1802  
Fr 3dMarDiv  
To 1stMarDiv

Davenport, L. L. 2502  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To 1stMarDiv  
Davis, P. L. 3302  
Fr MCB CampPen WDOct  
To 3dMarDiv  
Dawson, T. E. 7331  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To MCAS CherPt  
Deeds, W. E. 7304  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 2dMAW  
Downen, R. E. 0302  
Fr 2dMarDiv  
To MAAG Djakarta Indonesia WDOct  
Fitzmaurice, C. W. 1803  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To MCS Quant  
Flann, N. W. 7331  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 3dMAW  
Frazier, A. C. 0802  
Fr MB Ptsmh WDSep  
To 2dMarDiv  
Gaughf, O. O. 7333  
Fr 2dMarDiv WDSep  
To NAS Pncla  
Hall, D. L. 1302  
Fr Tengan Okinawa WDOct  
To 1stMarDiv  
Helm, S. E. 7333  
Fr 2dMAW WDSep  
To MCS Quant  
Henzel, H. W. 0302  
Fr 2dMarDiv WDOct  
To AdakAl  
Hill, M. A. 7304  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To MCAS Beaufort  
Hoch, K. L. 0302  
Fr AdakAl WDOct  
To 2dMarDiv  
Houser, F. O. 7307  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To MCAS CherPt  
Howland, W. T. 3002  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 3dMAW  
Humphreys, R. D. 0302  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To 2dMarDiv  
Hunt, F. J. 0302  
Fr 1stMarDiv WDOct  
To Whidbey Is Wash  
Johnson, R. M. 0302  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To 1stMarDiv  
Kennedy, D. H. 7302  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 2dMAW  
Killeen, C. J. 0802  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To 1stMar Div  
Kingsley, D. R. 7331  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 3dMAW  
Koester, O. J. 7333  
Fr MCRD SDiego WDOct  
To 3dMAW  
Lafayette, C. B. 7302  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 3dMAW  
Mathis, J. F. 1803  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To ForTrps FMFLant  
McCain, G. M. 1802  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To Las Vegas Nev  
McGuigan, J. R. 3002  
Fr 3dMar Div WDOct  
To HQMC  
Merrill, W. D. 1802  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To ForTrps FMFLant  
Moian, J. T. 7304  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 2dMAW  
Norton, L. C. 3502  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To FMFLant  
Opeka, F. C. 7332  
Fr 2dMAW WDSep  
To HQMC  
Phillips, G. A. 7331  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 1stMarBrig  
Probst, A. E. 1302  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To 1st MarDiv  
Sammartino, A. J. 0802  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To MCB CampPen  
Schick, E. S. 0802  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To ForTrps FMFPac

Schoenberger, L. 2502  
Fr 3dMarDiv  
To HQMC WDOct

Selleck, L. M. 0302  
Fr 3dMarDiv  
To MCRD SDiego WDOct

Sinclair, L. B. 7333  
Fr 1stMAW  
To MCAS El Toro WDOct

Smith, L. R. 7331  
Fr 1stMAW  
To 3dMAW WDOct

Stewart, H. D. 0302  
Fr 3dMarDiv  
To FMFLant WDOct

Sumerlin, E. B. 7333  
Fr 2dMAW  
To MCS Quant WDSep

Swindall, L. B. 7307  
Fr 1stMAW  
To 3dMAW WDOct

Varley, W. J. 1502  
Fr MCS Quant  
To HQMC WDOct

Via, B. A. 7304  
Fr HQMC  
To AirFMFPac WDSep

Wears, L. G. 3002  
Fr MCRD SDiego  
To 1stMAW WDOct

Webb, J. O. 0302  
Fr 1stMAW  
To MCRD SDiego WDOct

Webb, M. A. 3502  
Fr MCS Quant  
To 3dMarDiv WDOct

Weber, W. E. 7336  
Fr 1stMAW  
To LFTUPac WDOct

Wessel, W. 7333  
Fr 3dMarDiv  
To 3dMAW WDOct

Wetzel, R. M. 7304  
Fr 1st MAW  
To 2dMAW WDOct

White, A. A. 3002  
Fr ForTrps FMFLant  
To MCS Quant WDSep

Ziebler, L. E. 3002  
Fr 3dMarDiv  
To MCB CamLej WDOct

#### Retired

Nelson, E. V. 18Sep  
Stansberry, R. E. 3002  
HQMC 30Sep

#### Deaths

Bacasuskas, W. J. 7335  
1stMAW 2Sep

McGeehan, D. E. 29Aug  
MCB CamPen

#### Deaths, Retired

Barker, L. E. 13Aug  
CamLej

Fagan, L. E. 11Jun  
Balto Md

Tucker, J. R. 23Jul  
Trail Ore

#### Attending Senior School Academic Year 1960-61

Anthony, William S.  
Baeriswyl, Louis  
Barrett, Roscoe L.  
Beach, William L.  
Blankenship, Clifford P.  
Browne, John A.  
Buchanan, Fitzhugh L.  
Bushnell, Richard H.  
Clark, Truman  
Connolly, Martin F.  
Crowley, John F.  
Curwen, Bertram H.  
Engelkes, Ernest L.  
Ezell, Don D.  
Gibson, John A.  
Hecker, James S.  
Hines, Cloyd V.  
Hoereth, Wayne H.  
Johnson, Thiri D.  
Kelly, William D.  
Knocke, Jack K.  
Knowles, Harold R.  
Leidy, Alfred L.  
Leon, James  
Mader, John F.  
Mayo, Dwight E.  
Metcalfe, Robert B.  
Morel, Oscar J.  
Parker, George W.  
Peck, William H.  
Phelan, Don G.  
Platt, Robert M.  
Scheffer, Cornelius  
Schwartz, Leo R.

Seminoff, Nicholas M.  
Seward, Robert F.  
Shook, Frank A.  
Smith, Ardath C.  
Swetnam, William E.  
Taylor, Wilber F.  
Taylor, William W.  
Thomas, Jay J.  
Webster, William J.  
Welch, Robert N.  
Whitaker, James L.  
Woodruff, Paden E.  
Yingling, James M.  
Zaudtke, Wilbur K.  
Zeugner, Robert

#### Attending Junior School Academic Year 1960-61

Alderman, Harry L.  
Anderson, Tilton A.  
Brown, Dale L.  
Brown, Robert G.  
Buss, Kenneth M.  
Cory, Orie E.  
Dauphine, George M.  
Defenbaugh, Neil F.  
Devine, Lewis H.  
Ebert, James R.  
Fegley, James E.  
Finney, Henry F.  
Flores, James R.  
Fox, George C.  
Francis, Richard H.  
Galbraith, Thomas H.  
Gibney, Jesse L., Jr.  
Good, Robert N.  
Hall, Edward C., Jr.  
Hayward, George E.  
Hess, John J.  
Hittinger, Francis R., Jr.  
Izzo, Robert E.  
Karukin, David S.  
Libbin, Eugene L.  
Lynch, Duane G.  
Magness, Byron L.  
Maiden, Robert F.  
Marchette, Donald E.  
McCurdy, William B.  
Millette, Eugene  
Newsom, Rollie D.  
Palmer, Thomas A.  
Peterson, Willard S.  
Rall, Raymond R., Jr.  
Ringwood, Thomas E., Jr.  
Scruggs, Robert L.  
Shepherd, George E.  
Siegfried, William G., Sr.  
Slennings, Bradford N.  
Smith, George E.  
Squires, Gordon R.  
Stuart, Vaughn R.  
Talbot, Richard B.  
Troen, Luther G.  
White, James H.  
Woods, Harry D.  
Worster, Lyle H.  
Yount, Vance L., Jr.

#### Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Bekins, R. Q., CO, H&HSBn, MCB  
CamPen

Biehl, J. W., Asst OinC ResBr, 8th  
MCRD

Buckley, R. J., Provost Marshal,  
MCRD PISC

Chambers, C. B., CO, HMR-163, 1st  
MAW

Clay, R. B., SafetyOff, MWSG-17,  
1stMAW

Cordes, A. M., CommOff, MCAS,  
CPNC

Cox L. J., CO, 1stAnti-TankBn, 1st  
MarDiv

Dixon, G. T., ISO, 1stMarDiv

Longfellow, W. J., CO, H&HS-27,  
2dMAW

Mitchell, R. L., ISO, MCB CamPen

Nolan, J. L., Chief Range Off, WTB,  
PISC

Rinehart, J. H., ExO, MARS-17 1st  
MAW

Walker, J. M., ServGrp S-1, 2dMAW



#### Captains



#### Selected for Promotion to Major

Abraham, J. W.  
Adams, W. C.  
Anthony, A. W., Jr.  
Armstrong, P. F. C.  
Baker, F. J.  
Bannan, J. M.  
Barrett, H. L., Jr.  
Bartleson, T. P., Jr.

Beattie, G. E.  
Bench, A. E.  
Bittick, A. E.  
Bittick, W. C., Jr.  
Bjorklund, D. E.  
Bonin, L. A.  
Bonney, R. A.  
Brady, E. R.  
Buckley, C. C., Jr.  
Burnett, R. H.  
Buschmann, C. P.  
Buskirk, W. K.  
Buynak, J. E.  
Cameron, R. A.  
Campbell, R. E.  
Carter, D. I.  
Chamberlain, C. C., Jr.  
Chen, B. T.  
Clegg, F. X.  
Coffey, S. R.  
Colvin, H. C.  
Conard, J. W.  
Cooney, R. W.  
Cooper, C. G.  
Cowie, F. G., Jr.  
Craig, R. W.  
Crosswait, P. M.  
Cumming, G. D.  
Cunha, U. F.  
Cushing, F. C., Jr.  
Darbyshire, L. L.  
Davis, J. K.  
Davis, L. O.  
Delaney, F. L.  
Doss, J. G., Jr.  
Doud, F. E.  
Driscoll, E. J., Jr.  
Duncan, J. W.  
Dunnagan, C. G.  
Erway, D. E.  
Erwin, J.  
Finne, D. D., Jr.  
Fleetwood, W. W.  
Fontaine, W. F.  
Frank, E. W.  
Galyon, W. J.  
Gardner, W. E.  
Geston, J. S.  
Gillespie, L. M.  
Goodiel, C. D., Jr.  
Guell, E. M.  
Helms, K. H.  
Hertling, E. F., Jr.  
Hiett, C. O.  
Houck, G. W.  
Howard, D. E.  
Howard, R. E., Jr.  
Howell, P. E.  
Hunter, D. J.  
Hunter, R. E., Jr.  
Jacks, E. K.  
Kelley, P. X.  
Kennedy, H. T.  
Kiser, C. E.  
Koonitz, G. C.  
Laine, E. R., Jr.  
Lamoureux, W. D.  
Lancy, J. M., Jr.  
Lasefer, J. W.  
Leder, F. D.  
Lindsley, R. A.  
Linman, L. G.  
Lundquist, C. R.  
Macho, D. C.  
Manley, T. F.  
Manning, P. A.  
March, R. B.  
Martin, H. V.  
Martz, J. G., III  
McCarthy, F. D.  
McCool, W. G., Jr.  
McCrary, N. B.  
McEnaney, J. R.  
McKeon, D. N.  
McNutt, R. W.  
Menjes, J. H.  
Meyers, J. F., Jr.  
Mickelson, R. D.  
Miller, R. E.  
Montgomery, R. R.  
Moss, R. B.  
Mulr, W. B.  
Mulford, R. L.  
Niesen, P. W.  
O'Mara, J. R.  
Overgard, W. E.  
Parcell, W. K.  
Penico, E. F.  
Percival, R. E.  
Persons, H. D.  
Presson, R. E.  
Redfield, H. J., III  
Rees, G. J., Jr.  
Reilly, M. B.  
Rhykerd, C. A.  
Rice, D. L.  
Rockey, W. K.  
Roessle, P. A.  
Rutty, E. J.  
Ruvo, V. A.  
Sadaski, A. G.  
Sadowski, J. L.  
Schmidt, C. M.  
Seaton, B. W.  
Sedora, S.  
Serrin, D.  
Severson, R. I.  
Sewell, C. A.

Shadrick, U. W.  
Shutt, G. H., Jr.  
Smoke, F. R.  
Stewart, A. M.  
Stiver, D. R.  
Stowell, D. V.  
Strope, J. H.  
Swisher, C. R.  
Tatem, L. E.  
Tatum, W. M., Jr.  
Thomas, W. E.  
Thurston, F. H.  
Todd, J. A.  
Treado, M. J.  
Trout, J. A.  
Vincent, H. W.  
Vobora, G. J.  
Wade, D. E.  
Walker, R. A.  
Wallace, R. D.  
Warren, G. P.  
Webb, J. N.  
Westling, D. Y.  
White, W. V. H.  
Whitesell, R. D.  
Whitfield, C. K.  
Wilson, D. M.  
Wilson, J. W.

#### Temporary Promotions, Reserve

McCloskey, P. N. Sep

#### Transfers

Adrian, D. H. 7304  
Fr Home Silver Spring Md  
To ActDu 3dMAW

Andrews, R. E. 0302  
Fr MB WashDC WDOct  
To 1stMarDiv

Beach, A. D. 2502  
Fr 1stMarBrig WDOct  
To 2dMarDiv

Beal, D. D. 1802  
Fr ForTrps FMFLant WDOct  
To HQMC

Bergey, H. W. 7331  
Fr 1stMar WDOct  
To 3dMAW

Blankenship, L. I. 7333  
Fr 2dMAW WDSep  
To CNABATRA

Bosbonis, S. 7307  
Fr 2dMAW WDSep  
To MAG-32

Bradley, R. L. 3025  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To MCSC Albany

Brennan, J. J. 7333  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 3dMAW

Bryson, W. C. 3002  
Fr MCB CamLej WDOct  
To 3dMarDiv

Burin, M. 2502  
Fr Pt Lyautev WDOct  
To ForTrps FMFLant

Burke, B. T. 3102  
Fr MCB CamLej WDSep  
To MCS Quant

Burnette, L. R. 1801  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To MCB 29 Palms

Cannon, G. W. 7333  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 3dMAW

Capinas, D. J. 0801  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDAug  
To MCS Quant

Casey, F. M. 0701  
Fr Yale Univ WDOct  
To Ft Bliss Tex

Cash, R. A. 2502  
Fr FMFPac WDOct  
To 1stMarDiv

Clark, M. M. 7333  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 3dMAW

Clewes, J. E. 0302  
Fr USS Essex WDOct  
To MCS Quant

Clek, J. C. 0302  
Fr 8th MCRD WDOct  
To 1stMarDiv

Chiff, D. K. 0802  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To MCS Quant

Coates, T. S. 0302  
Fr 9thMCRD WDOct  
To MCB CamLej

Conlon, R. J. 7333  
Fr 3dMAW WDSep  
To NAS Pncla

Crain, M. W. 3010  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To MCRD SDiego



|   |               |  |               |   |               |  |               |
|---|---------------|--|---------------|---|---------------|--|---------------|
| Cummings, J. M.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To MCSC Albany        | 2502<br>WDOct | Maxwell, J. L.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To NAS Pncla                  | 7333<br>WDOct | Wills, D.<br>Fr 1stMarDiv<br>To US Taiwan DefComd         | 0302<br>WDOct | Roach, Colin D.<br>Roberts, Stanley D., Jr.<br>Robertson, John W. P.<br>Roth, Harold B., Jr.<br>Sautter, Melvin H.<br>Schramel, Raymond F.<br>Searles, Robert M.<br>Seaton, Baxter W.<br>Serrin, Dalvin<br>Sewell, Charles A.<br>Siegmond, Paul L.<br>Slawter, Louis Z., Jr.<br>Smigay, Daniel B.<br>Smith, Thomas C.<br>Smoke, Frank R.<br>Snell, Bradley S.<br>Strandquist, John H.<br>Thurston, Francis H.<br>Twohey, Richard B.<br>Vanderswag, Irwin J.<br>Wallach, Albert W.<br>Watson, Clarence E., Jr.<br>Weinert, Frederick R.<br>Westling, David Y.<br>Weston, Walter A.<br>White, Robert E.<br>Whitfield, Charles K.<br>Wood, Rondell K.<br>Woodruff, Richard L. | 4106<br>WDOct |
| Darr, B. C.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To 3dMAW                  | 7333<br>WDOct | McCue, M. W.<br>Fr HQMC<br>To 3dMarDiv                       | 4106<br>WDOct | Retired   |               |  |               |
| Davidson, B. E.<br>Fr 12thMCRD<br>To 1stMarDiv        | 0302<br>WDOct | Milbrad, R. L.<br>Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To MCS Quant                | 0802<br>WDSep | Brackett, W. D.<br>MCS Quant                              | 0130<br>31Oct |  |               |
| Dille, D. E.<br>Fr 3dMAW<br>To 1stMAW                 | 7302<br>WDOct | Monagle, E. J.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To NAS Dal                    | 0130<br>WDOct | Garrett, W. D.  | 18Sep         |  |               |
| Doran, E. J.<br>Fr NS Bermuda<br>To NAS Pncla         | 7399<br>WDOct | Montgomery, R. R.<br>Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To MCSC Albany           | 1802<br>WDOct | Head, S.  | 18Sep         |  |               |
| Eaton, C. G.<br>Fr USS Hornet<br>To MCS Quant         | 0302<br>WDOct | Mosier, T. E.<br>Fr Home Glen Ellyn Ill<br>To ActDu 2dMarDiv | 3095          | Hukle, E. J.<br>McFarland, R. L.                          | 18Sep         |  |               |
| Ernst, V. M.<br>Fr MCAS Kaneohe<br>To NAS Pncla       | 7335<br>WDOct | Nelson, R. H.<br>Fr NAS Pncla<br>To 3dMAW                    | 7332<br>WDSep | Morris, F. L.<br>ForTrps FMFLant                          | 3510<br>31Oct |  |               |
| Esterline, C. S.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To NAS CorpC         | 7305<br>WDOct | Ortman, T. J.<br>Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To 1stMarDiv                 | 0802<br>WDOct | Skinner, N. S.<br>MCS Quant                               | 7304<br>31Oct |  |               |
| Farrell, F. L.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To NAS Pncla           | 7333<br>WDOct | Paige, E. C.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To 3dMAW                        | 7305<br>WDOct | Stein, S. W.<br>1stMarDiv                                 | 3020<br>31Oct |  |               |
| French, R. W.<br>Fr NAS Pncla<br>To 3dMAW             | 7332<br>WDSep | Palmer, I. P.<br>Fr ForTrps FMFPac<br>To Tengan Okinawa      | 0702<br>WDOct | White, C. H.  | 18Sep         |  |               |
| Gamble, R. M.<br>Fr ForTrps FMFLant<br>To MCAS CherPt | 3002<br>WDOct | Plantadosi, L. J.<br>Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To FMFLant               | 1803<br>WDSep | Attending Junior School<br>Academic Year 1960-61          |               |  |               |
| Gemske, J. R.<br>Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To MCRD PISC          | 0802<br>WDSep | Powers, W. T.<br>Fr 1stMarBrig<br>To 2dMarDiv                | 2502<br>WDOct | Attending Communication<br>Off School, Course 1-61        |               |  |               |
| Gillis, J. E.<br>Fr 3dMAW<br>To NAS Pncla             | 7335<br>WDSep | Resnik, E. D.<br>Fr HQMC<br>To ForTrps FMFLant               | 2502<br>WDOct | Barnard, William R.<br>Farley, Clifford                   |               |  |               |
| Gray, R. L.<br>Fr ForTrps FMFLant<br>To 2dMAW         | 7335<br>WDOct | Ripley, G. H.<br>Fr 5thMCRD<br>To Louisville Ky              | 0302<br>WDSep | Recent Command and<br>Staff Assignments                   |               |  |               |
| Hall, J. E.<br>Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To CamLej               | 1310<br>WDOct | Runkle, H. M.<br>Fr 2dMarDiv<br>To 3dMarDiv                  | 0802<br>WDOct | Hollen, K. D., Asst Provost Marshal,<br>MCRD PISC         |               |  |               |
| Hammel, C. F.<br>Fr 1stMarDiv<br>To USS Hornet        | 0802<br>WDOct | Saucier, F. W.<br>Fr 1stMarDiv<br>To COMPHIBRON One          | 0302<br>WDDec | Holmberg, H. H., CO, ReconCo, 4th<br>Marines              |               |  |               |
| Hammons, E. G.<br>Fr Bridgeport Calif<br>To 1stMAW    | 3502<br>WDOct | Schiavone, R. L.<br>Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To MCB 29Palms            | 3010<br>WDOct | Jenkins, C. E., Adjutant MAG-24,<br>2dMAW                 |               |  |               |
| Harding, F. L.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To 3dMAW               | 7305<br>DOct  | Singleary, W. C.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To 3dMAW                    | 7305<br>WDOct | Ritchie, R. F., SpecServ Off, MCSC,<br>Albany, Ga.        |               |  |               |
| Harrell, J. T.<br>Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To 3dMAW             | 3035<br>WDOct | Smith, J. V.<br>Fr Home<br>To 2dMAW                          | 7333<br>Sep   | Webb, J. N., S-2 Office, 4th Marines                      |               |  |               |
| Hastler, F. R.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To 2dMAW               | 3402<br>WDOct | Stephens, G. A.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To 2dMAW                     | 7335<br>WDOct | 1st Lieutenants   |               |  |               |
| Hawley, R. R.<br>Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To 3dMAW              | 3010<br>WDOct | Sypniewski, W. A.<br>Fr 3dMAW<br>To NAS Pncla                | 7335<br>WDSep | Temporary Promotions,<br>Reserve                          |               |  |               |
| Hemmingway, R. E.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To 2dMAW            | 7331<br>WDOct | Taber, R. B.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To 3dMAW                        | 7331<br>WDOct | Allen, K. R.  | Sep           |  |               |
| Hilgart, V. F.<br>Fr MCAS El Toro<br>To HQMC          | 0115<br>WDOct | Taylor, J. R.<br>Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To HQMC                      | 3402<br>WDOct | Armstrong, M. L.  | Sep           |  |               |
| Humbert, W. S.<br>Fr 3dMAW<br>To NAS Pncla            | 7335<br>WDSep | Turner, D. C.<br>Fr HQMC<br>To MCAF NRiver                   | 3402<br>WDSep | Barrett, R. D.  | Sep           |  |               |
| Huntzinger, R. A.<br>Fr Charleston, WV<br>To 3dMarDiv | 1302<br>WDSep | Udegrave, M. S.<br>Fr NAG Korea<br>To ForTrps FMFLant        | 0302<br>WDOct | Byrne, R. W.  | Sep           |  |               |
| Hutchinson, R. N.<br>Fr England<br>To NAS Pncla       | 7333<br>WDSep | Ustach, V. A.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To 2dMAW                       | 7333<br>WDOct | Evans, R. M.  | Sep           |  |               |
| Irwin, R. J.<br>Fr 9th MCRD<br>To MCS Quant           | 1802<br>WDOct | Vandenberg, O. W.<br>Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To MCS Quant             | 0302<br>WDOct | Grant, L. A.  | Sep           |  |               |
| Jerrell, J. D.<br>Fr ForTrps FMFLant<br>To 3dMarDiv   | 0802<br>WDOct | Vaughn, B. T.<br>Fr 3dMAW<br>To 3dMarDiv                     | 3402<br>WDOct | Kirchner, D. J.   | Sep           |  |               |
| Kirkpatrick, R. H.<br>Fr 2dMarDiv<br>To 3dMarDiv      | 0802<br>WDOct | Wallace, R. D.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To 2dMAW                      | 7333<br>WDOct | Kling, W. F.  | Sep           |  |               |
| Kunkle, F. P.<br>Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To Ft Belvoir Va      | 1310<br>WDOct | Wamel, W. W.<br>Fr MAD Memphis<br>To El Toro                 | 7305<br>Oct   | Lampe, A. J.  | Sep           |  |               |
| Lastavie, N. M.<br>Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To 2dMAW            | 3402<br>WDOct | Waters, G. J.<br>Fr 1stMarDiv<br>To Monterey Calif           | 0802<br>WDSep | Liddle, L. A.   | Sep           |  |               |
| Lindquist, F. W.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To FMFLant           | 0130<br>WDOct | Whaling, R. W.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To 3dMAW                      | 7333<br>WDOct | Littlejohn, W. L.   | Sep           |  |               |
| Linman, L. G.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To 2dMAW                | 7333<br>WDOct | Wheelock, R. J.<br>Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To MCRD SDiego             | 0802<br>WDOct | Long, A. H.   | Sep           |  |               |
| Lowrey, H. S.<br>Fr ForTrps FMFLant<br>To NAS Pncla   | 7335<br>WDOct | Williams, A. L.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To NAS Pncla                 | 7333<br>WDOct | Majer, J. A.  | Sep           |  |               |
| Marquette, J. H.<br>Fr HQMC<br>To MCB CamPen          | 4002<br>WDOct | Willoughby, R. D.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To MCAS El Toro            | 3000<br>WDOct | Minardi, R. J.  | Sep           |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Morrison, J. M.   | Sep           |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Nickos, L.  | Sep           |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Poole, R. T.  | Sep           |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Rice, J. G.   | Sep           |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Rine, R. F.   | Sep           |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Rogers, J. G.   | Sep           |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Rogers, T. J.   | Sep           |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Sauer, F. J.  | Sep           |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Shaver, T. R.   | Sep           |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Sprong, E. F.   | Sep           |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Vantassel, L. T.  | Sep           |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Vischer, E. P.  | Sep           |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Winberg, W. B.  | Sep           |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Transfers   |               |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Amis, T. W.<br>Fr 2dMAW<br>To NAS Pncla                   | 7335<br>WDSep |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Baker, E. D.<br>Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To 1stMarDiv               | 0802<br>WDOct |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Bauer, W. D.<br>Fr MAD CorpC<br>To 3dMAW                  | 7398<br>WDOct |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Bivens, D. R.<br>Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To ForTrps FMFLant        | 9901<br>WDOct |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Blatz, F. H.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To 2dMAW                     | 6720<br>WDOct |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Breckinridge, A. D.<br>Fr MCS Quant<br>To ForTrps FMFLant | 9901<br>WDOct |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Brigham, D. A.<br>Fr 1stMAW<br>To NAAS Kingsville         | 7305<br>WDOct |  |               |
|   |               |  |               | Browne, E. R.<br>Fr 1stMarDiv<br>To Ft Sill Okla          | 0802<br>WDOct |  |               |

Buss, R. H. 1302  
Fr ForTrps FMFLant  
To Monterey Calif WDOct

Cagle, D. J. 7335  
Fr 3dMAW  
To 1stMAW WDOct

Cook, B. M. 0185  
Fr 3dMarDiv  
To 3dMAW WDOct

Cooper, H. C. 0302  
Fr 1stMarBrig  
To MCS Quant WDOct

Curtis, B. B. 7335  
Fr 3dMAW  
To 1stMAW WDOct

Davis, J. M. 7333  
Fr 1stMAW  
To 3dMAW WDOct

Dunning, C. L. 7333  
Fr 1stMAW  
To 3dMAW WDOct

Elgaard, R. J. 0302  
Fr 1stMarBrig  
To MB Pearl WDOct

Fix, H. M. 7333  
Fr 1stMAW  
To 3dMAW WDOct

Fraser, J. H. 2715  
Fr 3dMarDiv  
To 2dMarDiv WDOct

Garner, J. T. 7398  
Fr MAD CorpC  
To 3dMAW WDOct

Getchell, J. A. 3010  
Fr 3dMarDiv  
To MCS Barstow WDOct

Getz, A. C. 7333  
Fr 1stMAW  
To 2dMAW WDOct

Gillespie, T. E., Jr. 7398  
Fr MAD CorpC  
To 3dMAW WDOct

Gobel, R. L. 2502  
Fr 3dMarDiv  
To MCS Quant WDSep

Geforth, R. K. 7335  
Fr 2dMAW  
To NAS Pncla WDSep

Golden, G. 0802  
Fr 1stMarDiv  
To Ft Sill Okla WDOct

Grossfuss, G. H. 7335  
Fr 2dMAW  
To CNABATRA WDSep

Hale, W. H., Jr. 7398  
Fr Chase Field Tex  
To 1stMarBrig Nov

Harms, J. E. 1803  
Fr 3dMarDiv  
To MB NorVa WDOct

Homer, E. A. 7333  
Fr 1stMAW  
To 3dMAW WDOct

Johnson, W. A. 7333  
Fr 1stAnglico  
To CNAVANTRA WDOct

Jones, A. L. 6406  
Fr 1stMarBrig  
To NAS Pncla WDOct

Kent, D. E. 4106  
Fr MCSC Albany  
To 3dMarDiv WDOct

Keshian, R. 0185  
Fr 1stMAW  
To MCRD PISC WDOct

Kieselbach, P. J. 0302  
Fr MB Pearl  
To MCS Quant WDOct

Kowalczyk, E. S. 7333  
Fr 1stMAW  
To CNAVANTRA WDOct

Langrock, D. A. 7333  
Fr 1stMAW  
To NAS Pncla WDOct

Lanigan, J. F. 7398  
Fr MAD CorpC  
To 3dMAW WDOct

Legge, J. B. 1803  
Fr ForTrps FMFLant  
To Newfoundland WDOct

Mackey, W. W. 7305  
Fr 1stMAW  
To 3dMAW WDOct

Manning, R. W. 0302  
Fr 1stMarBrig  
To 2dMarDiv WDOct

Manidin, P. D. 7335  
Fr 3dMAW  
To 1stMAW WDOct

Monson, C. L. 0901  
Fr 3dMAW  
To MCS Quant WDOct

Murdick, P. H. 0901  
Fr MAD CorpC  
To 3dMarDiv Oct

Pancione, P. R. 0802  
Fr 3dMarDiv  
To FMFLant WDSep

Quanrud, R. B. 2502  
Fr ForTrps FMFLant  
To FMFPac WDOct

Quist, J. W. 7398  
Fr MAD CorpC  
To 3dMAW WDOct

Ramirez, J. A. 7304  
Fr 1stMAW  
To 2dMAW WDOct

Robinson, L. W. 7333  
Fr 1stMAW  
To NAS CorpC WDOct

Seuechl, G. D. 7335  
Fr 3dMAW  
To 1stMAW WDOct

Shannahan, J. K. 1302  
Fr 3dMarDiv  
To ForTrps FMFLant WDOct

Shaw, R. E. 0302  
Fr 1stMarBrig  
To FMFLant WDOct

Smith, E. F. 2710  
Fr Redstone Arsenal  
Huntsville  
To ForTrps FMFPac Nov

Sprick, Doyle R. 7398  
Fr MAD CorpC  
To 3dMAW WDOct

Svec, M. R. 3010  
Fr 1stMAW  
To 3dMAW WDOct

Sydnor, G. C. 7398  
Fr Chase Field Tex  
To 1stMarBrig Nov

Thames, S. E. 1803  
Fr ForTrps FMFLant  
To Argentina NF WDOct

Tiffany, R. B. 0302  
Fr 1stMarBrig  
To MCRD PISC WDOct

Tinsley, D. L. 7304  
Fr 1stMAW  
To 2dMAW WDOct

Waggoner, K. L. 7335  
Fr 1stMarDiv  
To 3dMAW WDOct

Walte, H. D. 6402  
Fr 1stMAW  
To 1stMarBrig WDOct

Wimmier, C. A. 7335  
Fr 3dMAW  
To 1stMAW WDOct

Yates, C. E. 7335  
Fr 3dMAW  
To NAS Pncla WDSep

Yusup, E. D. 7399  
Fr 2dMarDiv  
To NAS Pncla WDOct

#### Extended Active Duty

Andersen, W. G. Feb61  
Doyle, C. M. Jun61  
Ellefson, D. C. Mar62  
Esposito, R. J. Mar62  
Ferries, D. W. Dec63  
Gibson, H. J. Jun61  
Gluck, R. J. Feb61  
Hammond, J. C. Dec61  
Hill, I. C. Dec61  
Houtchens, B. A. May61  
Johnson, W. B. Nov61  
Kanaley, T. F. Sep62  
Lattimore, G. J. Jun62  
Lee, R. B. Sep62  
Marsh, F. H. Jun62  
Marshall, L. A. Jun61  
McCauley, D. C. Jun61  
Mittrick, C. L. Sep61  
O'Brien, J. F. Jan62  
Pierce, R. B. Sep62  
Schulteis, H. A. Jun61  
Schuyler, G. W. Dec61

#### Attending Communication Off School, Course 1-61

Allen, Robert R.  
Benjamin, William D.  
Bredderman, Paul J.  
Chwatek, Walter T.  
Creamer, James J., Jr.  
Crisuolo, Gerard P.  
Cullen, Robert F.  
Durrant, John D.  
Dziarnowski, Ronald F.  
Harte, James H., III  
Jezsik, Louis C.  
Johansen, Peter J.  
Knowles, Robert C., Jr.  
Macoubrie, David F.  
Mayberry, William B.  
O'Brien, Charles D.  
Polynak, George R.  
Pozza, John R.  
Price, Allen R., Jr.  
Yenerall, Grant L.

#### Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Inglis, A. M., Ordnance Off, WTB,  
PISC  
Revell, J. E., CO, A/1/4

#### 2d Lieutenants

#### Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Bode, C. B. Sep  
Burns, R. G. Sep  
Campbell, R. H. Sep  
Donnelly, A. J. Sep  
Faulkner, J. P. Sep  
Sheldon, A. G. Sep  
Stone, D. M. Sep  
Thrasher, G. J. Sep

#### Transfers

Baker, D. S. 9901  
Fr MCS Quant WDOct  
To USS Hancock

Delbert, J. C. 7335  
Fr 2dMAW WDOct  
To 1stMAW

Hirsch, N. R. 9901  
Fr NAS Pncla WDSep  
To MCS Quant

Norton, J. J. 9901  
Fr MCS Quant WDOct  
To USS Little Rock

Thatcher, A. D. 9901  
Fr USS Hancock WDOct  
To 1stMarDiv

White, J. M. 9901  
Fr MCS Quant WDSep  
To 2dMarDiv

#### Attending Communication Off School, Course 1-61

Donnelly, Andrew J.  
Jenkins, Raymond S., Jr.

#### Warrant Officers

#### Transfers

Beyer, H. H. 2710  
Fr Ft Bliss Tex WDOct  
To ForTrps FMFPac

Chapel, R. L. 4602  
Fr NAS Anacostia  
To MCAS El Toro

Christ, A. J. 2502  
Fr MCSC Barstow WDOct  
To 3dMarDiv

Cinotti, W. J. 0202  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 1stMarDiv

Elkins, J. L. 6402  
Fr 1stMAW WDSep  
To MCAS Beaufort

Greene, R. W. 2710  
Fr Redstone Arsenal  
Huntsville Ala  
To ForTrps FMFPac

Loesch, R. J. 0702  
Fr ForTrps FMFPac WDOct  
To NAG Korea

Marshall, K. J. 5502  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To MB Pearl

McIntyre, A. 0130  
Fr MCAS CherPt WDSep  
To MCRD PISC

Miller, E. H. 4102  
Fr 2dMAW DSep  
To MCB 29Palms

Olesak, A. M. 5502  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To MCB 29Palms

Pietrzak, W. 3402  
Fr Tengan Okinawa WDOct  
To MCRD SDiego

Purdy, S. J. 2010  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To 1stMarDiv

Rima, R. R. 2010  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To ForTrps FMFLant

Roberson, J. H. 3402  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To ForTrps FMFPac

Rust, E. S. 0302  
Fr Rota Spain WDOct  
To 2dMarDiv

Schroeder, E. J. 0130  
Fr MCSC Barstow WDOct  
To 1stMAW

Smith, P. H., Jr. 2502  
Fr Redstone Arsenal  
Huntsville Ala  
To MCSC Barstow

Taylor, James R. 2710  
Fr Redstone Arsenal  
Huntsville Ala  
To ForTrps FMFPac

Wickstrom, E. C. 2020  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To 1stMarDiv

Woodbury, L. 0130  
Fr 1stMAW WDOct  
To 3dMAW

Young, G. A. 3402  
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct  
To MCSC Albany

#### Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Humphreys, A. A., Photo Off, MCB  
CamLej  
Johnson, R. W., Asst ISO, 1stMAW

#### Retired

Abbott, W. H. 9901  
3dMAW 30Sep

Edwards, J. J. 0130  
MCSA Phila 30Sep

Kincaid, J. E. 1Sep

Mills, A. V. 1Sep

Pritchard, W. B. 3402  
2dMarDiv 30Sep

Stone, D. M. 1Sep

Strong, H. R. 0302  
MCB CampPen 30Sep

Whitehouse, W. W. 1Sep

#### Deaths, Retired

Davenport, F. T. 18 May  
Columbia, SC

Wallace, F. F. 20Aug  
SDiego Calif

Stagg, H. W. 16Aug  
SDiego Calif

You Get Orders

We Know It

BUT...

The post office won't  
forward 2d class mail  
without a complete ad-  
dress (unless you tell  
them your change of  
address is due to mili-  
tary orders.)

• Do that.

• And send us your  
new address.



# GIVE BOOKS ...


## THE LASTING CHRISTMAS GIFT




MM-37 ... AND A FEW MARINES  
—Short stories written with authority  
and feeling. \$5.95 (\$4.75)



CH-1 COMPACT HISTORY of the  
U.S. Marine Corps—The Corps' newest  
history. \$4.95 (\$4.21)




MM-10 THE MARINE CORPS WIFE—  
What she ought to know about the  
Corps. \$3.50 (\$2.98)




MM-35 THE MARINE OFFICER'S  
GUIDE—A basic handbook with a  
wealth of information. \$5.75 (\$4.89)



MM-38 SERVICE ETIQUETTE—Cor-  
rect social usage for all occasions.  
\$5.50 (\$4.67)



LG-1 GUIDEBOOK FOR MARINES—  
This is the new edition with all recent  
changes. \$1.50 (\$1.27)



K-1 KOGUN—The Japanese side of  
the Pacific War. An enemy tells of his  
mistakes. \$4.50 (\$3.00)



PH-1 THE UNITED STATES MARINES,  
a Pictorial History—Over 400 photos  
of the Corps. \$10.00 (\$8.50)



MM-36 INFANTRY ATTACKS—Rom-  
mel's great classic on small wars.  
(\$3.00)

To Order Use Postpaid Card in this Issue

THE GAZETTE BOOKSHOP BOX 1844 QUANTICO, VA.

(Member's Price  
shown in parens)

0130  
WD Oct  
2502  
2710  
2020  
WD Oct  
0130  
WD Oct  
3402  
WD Oct  
nd  
Y, MCB  
stMAW  
9901  
30Sep  
0130  
30Sep  
18Sep  
18Sep  
3402  
30Sep  
18Sep  
0302  
30Sep  
18Sep  
8 May  
20Aug  
16Aug  
ers  
n't  
ail  
d-  
ell  
of  
li-  
ur  
1960



MEMO TO JOHN:


Thank you for your letter in which you express your preference for Kaman helicopters. As you put it:

YOUR  
TRAFFIC IN HELICOPTERS. That  
is the truth. It sure is ~~that is~~ the truth.

Everyone here at Kaman Aircraft is proud of the helicopters and aircraft we build and supply to various branches of our Armed Forces. It makes us doubly proud when boys like you write and tell us what you think. We know that you realize that our whole National Defense program is one sure way of guaranteeing that you and your friends will get the chance to grow up and become terrific doctors or lawyers or scientists... maybe even terrific helicopter pilots.

Sincerely,

*Charles H. Kaman*



...in National Defense **KAMAN** is part of the plan